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[46.139.12.213]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id z9sm1528971wrs.63.2018.11.20.00.13.41 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Tue, 20 Nov 2018 00:13:42 -0800 (PST) Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 09:13:39 +0100 From: Ingo Molnar To: Andy Lutomirski Cc: x86@kernel.org, LKML , Yu-cheng Yu , Dave Hansen , Peter Zijlstra , Borislav Petkov Subject: Re: [PATCH 02/13] x86/fault: Check user_mode(regs) when validating a stack extension Message-ID: <20181120081339.GA35948@gmail.com> References: <20181120073925.GC79825@gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20181120073925.GC79825@gmail.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.9.4 (2018-02-28) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org * Ingo Molnar wrote: > > * Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > > The fault handling code tries to validate that a page fault from > > user mode that would extend the stack is within a certain range of > > the user SP. regs->sp is only equal to the user SP if > > user_mode(regs). In the extremely unlikely event that that > > sw_error_code had the USER bit set but the faulting instruction was > > in the kernel (i.e. the faulting instruction was WRUSS), then the > > *kernel* stack pointer would have been checked, which would be an > > info leak. > > > > Note to -stable maintainers: don't backport this unless you backport > > CET. The bug it fixes is unobservable in current kernels. > > > > Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski > > --- > > arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 2 +- > > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c > > index 91d4d2722f2e..eae7ee3ce89b 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c > > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c > > @@ -1377,7 +1377,7 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, > > bad_area(regs, sw_error_code, address); > > return; > > } > > - if (sw_error_code & X86_PF_USER) { > > + if (user_mode(regs)) { > > /* > > * Accessing the stack below %sp is always a bug. > > * The large cushion allows instructions like enter > > Note that this check is gone now due to: > > 1d8ca3be86eb: x86/mm/fault: Allow stack access below %rsp > > Thanks, Ok, I like your series - I have applied the first ~7 patches of it to tip:x86/mm, the rest is interacting with 1d8ca3be86eb - will apply the rest as well once you send a v2. Thanks, Ingo