From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.5 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_MUTT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6E70AC04EB8 for ; Mon, 26 Nov 2018 19:39:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3B82520817 for ; Mon, 26 Nov 2018 19:39:08 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 3B82520817 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726705AbeK0GeP (ORCPT ); Tue, 27 Nov 2018 01:34:15 -0500 Received: from mga14.intel.com ([192.55.52.115]:21757 "EHLO mga14.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726253AbeK0GeP (ORCPT ); Tue, 27 Nov 2018 01:34:15 -0500 X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga002.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.26]) by fmsmga103.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 26 Nov 2018 11:39:06 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.56,283,1539673200"; d="scan'208";a="109013289" Received: from jsakkine-mobl1.jf.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.24.8.61]) by fmsmga002.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 26 Nov 2018 11:39:05 -0800 Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2018 11:39:06 -0800 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: "Dr. Greg" Cc: Andy Lutomirski , X86 ML , Platform Driver , linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, Dave Hansen , "Christopherson, Sean J" , nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, "Ayoun, Serge" , shay.katz-zamir@intel.com, haitao.huang@linux.intel.com, Andy Shevchenko , Thomas Gleixner , "Svahn, Kai" , mark.shanahan@intel.com, Suresh Siddha , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , "H. Peter Anvin" , Darren Hart , andy@infradead.org, LKML Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 18/23] platform/x86: Intel SGX driver Message-ID: <20181126193906.GA32327@linux.intel.com> References: <20181116010412.23967-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> <20181116010412.23967-19-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> <20181120111508.GA26127@wind.enjellic.com> <20181124161521.GB30310@linux.intel.com> <20181124192454.GA12149@wind.enjellic.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20181124192454.GA12149@wind.enjellic.com> Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Sat, Nov 24, 2018 at 01:24:54PM -0600, Dr. Greg wrote: > On Sat, Nov 24, 2018 at 08:15:21AM -0800, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 05:15:08AM -0600, Dr. Greg wrote: > > > Malware would not necessarily need the Intel attestation service. > > > Once access to the PROVISION bit is available, malware teams could > > > simply build their own attestation service. > > > AFAIK not possible as they wouldn't have access to the root > > provisioning key. Can be confirmed from the SDM's key derivation > > table (41-56). > > What provisioning and attestation is all about is establishing an > identity binding for a platform in question. The standard Intel > service binds the identity of a platform to an EPID private key. > > With access to the SGX_FLAGS_PROVISION_BIT an enclave can generate a > perpetual identity for a platform based on the identity modulus > signature (MRSIGNER) of the key that signs the signature structure of > the enclave. Without access to the root provisioning key a security > quorum or group has to be implemented via a subscription or enrollment > model but that is arguably not much of an obstacle. > > That is pretty much the way standard botware works now. > > Without provisions for cryptographically secure authorization and > policy enforcement in the driver, we will be creating infrastructure > for a new generation of botware/malware whose mothership will know > that a participating platform is running with full confidentiality and > integrity protections. OK, I think I got what you mean. With free access to the provision the bot net controller could be sure that a node is running inside an enclave. Is this what you are worried about? Please correct if not or even if there is a slight drift on what you are trying to state. /Jarkko