From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.5 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_MUTT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3ACF5C04EBA for ; Tue, 27 Nov 2018 16:41:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0D526208E4 for ; Tue, 27 Nov 2018 16:41:32 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 0D526208E4 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731205AbeK1Dj6 (ORCPT ); Tue, 27 Nov 2018 22:39:58 -0500 Received: from mga07.intel.com ([134.134.136.100]:39153 "EHLO mga07.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726409AbeK1Dj6 (ORCPT ); Tue, 27 Nov 2018 22:39:58 -0500 X-Amp-Result: UNSCANNABLE X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga002.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.26]) by orsmga105.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 27 Nov 2018 08:41:30 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.56,287,1539673200"; d="scan'208";a="112256592" Received: from jsakkine-mobl1.jf.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.24.8.96]) by fmsmga002.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 27 Nov 2018 08:41:29 -0800 Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2018 08:41:29 -0800 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: "Dr. Greg" Cc: Andy Lutomirski , Andy Lutomirski , X86 ML , Platform Driver , linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, Dave Hansen , "Christopherson, Sean J" , nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, "Ayoun, Serge" , shay.katz-zamir@intel.com, haitao.huang@linux.intel.com, Andy Shevchenko , Thomas Gleixner , "Svahn, Kai" , mark.shanahan@intel.com, Suresh Siddha , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , "H. Peter Anvin" , Darren Hart , Andy Shevchenko , LKML Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 18/23] platform/x86: Intel SGX driver Message-ID: <20181127164129.GB4170@linux.intel.com> References: <20181120120442.GA22172@linux.intel.com> <20181122111253.GA31150@wind.enjellic.com> <20181124172114.GB32210@linux.intel.com> <20181125145329.GA5777@linux.intel.com> <0669C300-02CB-4EA6-BF88-5C4B4DDAD4C7@amacapital.net> <20181126215145.GC868@linux.intel.com> <20181126230436.GA6737@linux.intel.com> <20181127085533.GA12247@wind.enjellic.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20181127085533.GA12247@wind.enjellic.com> Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Nov 27, 2018 at 02:55:33AM -0600, Dr. Greg wrote: > Since the thread has become a bit divergent I wanted to note that we > have offered a proposal for a general policy management framework > based on MRSIGNER values. This framework is consistent with the SGX > security model, ie. cryptographic rather then DAC based policy > controls. This framework also allows a much more flexible policy > implementation that doesn't result in combinatoric issues. > > Our framework also allows the preservation of the current ABI which > allows an EINITTOKEN to be passed in from userspace. The framework > also supports the ability to specify that only a kernel based launch > enclave (LE) should be available if the platform owner or distribution > should desire to implement such a model. > > The policy management framework is straight forward. Three linked > lists or their equivalent which are populated through /sysfs > pseudo-files or equivalent plumbing. Each list is populated with > MRSIGNER values for signing keys that are allowed to initialize > enclaves under three separate conditions. > > 1.) General enclaves without special attribute bits. > > 2.) Enclaves with the SGX_FLAGS_PROVISION_KEY attribute set. - i.e., > 'Provisioning Enclaves'. > > 3.) Enclaves with the SGX_FLAGS_LICENSE_KEY attribute set - i.e., 'Launch > Enclaves'. > > An all-null MRSIGNER value serves as a 'sealing' value that locks a > list from any further modifications. > > This architecture allows platform policies to be specified and then > sealed at early boot by the root user. At that point cryptographic > policy controls are in place rather then DAC based controls, the > latter of which have perpetual security liabilities in addition to the > useability constraints inherent in a DAC or device node model. > > We have developed an independent implementation of the PSW and > arguably have as much experience with issues surrounding how to > interact with the device driver as anyone. We have spent a lot of > time thinking about these issues and the above framework provides the > most flexible architecture available. Sounds like a lot bloat and policy added to the kernel whereas with Andy's proposal you can implement logic to a daemon and provide only mechanism to do it. /Jarkko