Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 25/35] iomap: sub-block dio needs to zeroout beyond EOF

Dave Chinner
2018-11-29T12:15:04Z

On Thu, Nov 29, 2018 at 01:00:59AM -0500, Sasha Levin wrote:
> From: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
>
> [ Upstream commit b450672fb66b4a991a5b55ee24209ac7ae7690ce ]
>
> If we are doing sub-block dio that extends EOF, we need to zero
> the unused tail of the block to initialise the data in it it. If we
> do not zero the tail of the block, then an immediate mmap read of
> the EOF block will expose stale data beyond EOF to userspace. Found
> with fsx running sub-block DIO sizes vs MAPREAD/MAPWRITE operations.
>
> Fix this by detecting if the end of the DIO write is beyond EOF
> and zeroing the tail if necessary.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
> ---
> fs/iomap.c | 9 ++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/iomap.c b/fs/iomap.c
> index 8f7673a69273..407efdae3978 100644
> --- a/fs/iomap.c
> +++ b/fs/iomap.c
> @@ -940,7 +940,14 @@ iomap_dio_actor(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, loff_t length,
> dio->submit.cookie = submit_bio(bio);
> } while (nr_pages);
>
> - if (need_zeroout) {
> + /*
> + * We need to zeroout the tail of a sub-block write if the extent type
> + * requires zeroing or the write extends beyond EOF. If we don't zero
> + * the block tail in the latter case, we can expose stale data via mmap
> + * reads of the EOF block.
> + */
> + if (need_zeroout ||
> + ((dio->flags & IOMAP_DIO_WRITE) && pos >= i_size_read(inode))) {
> /* zero out from the end of the write to the end of the block */
> pad = pos & (fs_block_size - 1);
> if (pad)

How do you propose to validate that this doesn't introduce new data
corruptions in isolation? I've spent the last 4 weeks of my life and
about 15 billion fsx ops chasing an validating the bug corruption
fixes we've pushed recently into the 4.19 and 4.20 codebase.

Cherry picking only one of the 50-odd patches we've committed into
late 4.19 and 4.20 kernels to fix the problems we've found really
seems like asking for trouble. If you're going to back port random
data corruption fixes, then you need to spend a *lot* of time
validating that it doesn't make things worse than they already
are...

Cheers,

Dave.
--
Dave Chinner
david@fromorbit.com