From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>,
Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>,
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 054/101] libceph: add authorizer challenge
Date: Thu, 6 Dec 2018 15:38:53 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181206143014.665403185@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181206143011.174892052@linuxfoundation.org>
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
commit 6daca13d2e72bedaaacfc08f873114c9307d5aea upstream.
When a client authenticates with a service, an authorizer is sent with
a nonce to the service (ceph_x_authorize_[ab]) and the service responds
with a mutation of that nonce (ceph_x_authorize_reply). This lets the
client verify the service is who it says it is but it doesn't protect
against a replay: someone can trivially capture the exchange and reuse
the same authorizer to authenticate themselves.
Allow the service to reject an initial authorizer with a random
challenge (ceph_x_authorize_challenge). The client then has to respond
with an updated authorizer proving they are able to decrypt the
service's challenge and that the new authorizer was produced for this
specific connection instance.
The accepting side requires this challenge and response unconditionally
if the client side advertises they have CEPHX_V2 feature bit.
This addresses CVE-2018-1128.
Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/24836
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 11 ++++++
include/linux/ceph/auth.h | 8 ++++
include/linux/ceph/messenger.h | 3 +
include/linux/ceph/msgr.h | 2 -
net/ceph/auth.c | 16 +++++++++
net/ceph/auth_x.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
net/ceph/auth_x_protocol.h | 7 +++
net/ceph/messenger.c | 17 +++++++++
net/ceph/osd_client.c | 11 ++++++
9 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
@@ -3983,6 +3983,16 @@ static struct ceph_auth_handshake *get_a
return auth;
}
+static int add_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_connection *con,
+ void *challenge_buf, int challenge_buf_len)
+{
+ struct ceph_mds_session *s = con->private;
+ struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = s->s_mdsc;
+ struct ceph_auth_client *ac = mdsc->fsc->client->monc.auth;
+
+ return ceph_auth_add_authorizer_challenge(ac, s->s_auth.authorizer,
+ challenge_buf, challenge_buf_len);
+}
static int verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_connection *con)
{
@@ -4046,6 +4056,7 @@ static const struct ceph_connection_oper
.put = con_put,
.dispatch = dispatch,
.get_authorizer = get_authorizer,
+ .add_authorizer_challenge = add_authorizer_challenge,
.verify_authorizer_reply = verify_authorizer_reply,
.invalidate_authorizer = invalidate_authorizer,
.peer_reset = peer_reset,
--- a/include/linux/ceph/auth.h
+++ b/include/linux/ceph/auth.h
@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ struct ceph_auth_client_ops {
/* ensure that an existing authorizer is up to date */
int (*update_authorizer)(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, int peer_type,
struct ceph_auth_handshake *auth);
+ int (*add_authorizer_challenge)(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+ struct ceph_authorizer *a,
+ void *challenge_buf,
+ int challenge_buf_len);
int (*verify_authorizer_reply)(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
struct ceph_authorizer *a);
void (*invalidate_authorizer)(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
@@ -117,6 +121,10 @@ void ceph_auth_destroy_authorizer(struct
extern int ceph_auth_update_authorizer(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
int peer_type,
struct ceph_auth_handshake *a);
+int ceph_auth_add_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+ struct ceph_authorizer *a,
+ void *challenge_buf,
+ int challenge_buf_len);
extern int ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
struct ceph_authorizer *a);
extern void ceph_auth_invalidate_authorizer(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
--- a/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h
+++ b/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ struct ceph_connection_operations {
struct ceph_auth_handshake *(*get_authorizer) (
struct ceph_connection *con,
int *proto, int force_new);
+ int (*add_authorizer_challenge)(struct ceph_connection *con,
+ void *challenge_buf,
+ int challenge_buf_len);
int (*verify_authorizer_reply) (struct ceph_connection *con);
int (*invalidate_authorizer)(struct ceph_connection *con);
--- a/include/linux/ceph/msgr.h
+++ b/include/linux/ceph/msgr.h
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ struct ceph_entity_inst {
#define CEPH_MSGR_TAG_SEQ 13 /* 64-bit int follows with seen seq number */
#define CEPH_MSGR_TAG_KEEPALIVE2 14 /* keepalive2 byte + ceph_timespec */
#define CEPH_MSGR_TAG_KEEPALIVE2_ACK 15 /* keepalive2 reply */
-
+#define CEPH_MSGR_TAG_CHALLENGE_AUTHORIZER 16 /* cephx v2 doing server challenge */
/*
* connection negotiation
--- a/net/ceph/auth.c
+++ b/net/ceph/auth.c
@@ -314,6 +314,22 @@ int ceph_auth_update_authorizer(struct c
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_auth_update_authorizer);
+int ceph_auth_add_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+ struct ceph_authorizer *a,
+ void *challenge_buf,
+ int challenge_buf_len)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ mutex_lock(&ac->mutex);
+ if (ac->ops && ac->ops->add_authorizer_challenge)
+ ret = ac->ops->add_authorizer_challenge(ac, a, challenge_buf,
+ challenge_buf_len);
+ mutex_unlock(&ac->mutex);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_auth_add_authorizer_challenge);
+
int ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
struct ceph_authorizer *a)
{
--- a/net/ceph/auth_x.c
+++ b/net/ceph/auth_x.c
@@ -291,7 +291,8 @@ bad:
* authorizer. The first part (ceph_x_authorize_a) should already be
* encoded.
*/
-static int encrypt_authorizer(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au)
+static int encrypt_authorizer(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au,
+ u64 *server_challenge)
{
struct ceph_x_authorize_a *msg_a;
struct ceph_x_authorize_b *msg_b;
@@ -304,16 +305,28 @@ static int encrypt_authorizer(struct cep
end = au->buf->vec.iov_base + au->buf->vec.iov_len;
msg_b = p + ceph_x_encrypt_offset();
- msg_b->struct_v = 1;
+ msg_b->struct_v = 2;
msg_b->nonce = cpu_to_le64(au->nonce);
+ if (server_challenge) {
+ msg_b->have_challenge = 1;
+ msg_b->server_challenge_plus_one =
+ cpu_to_le64(*server_challenge + 1);
+ } else {
+ msg_b->have_challenge = 0;
+ msg_b->server_challenge_plus_one = 0;
+ }
ret = ceph_x_encrypt(&au->session_key, p, end - p, sizeof(*msg_b));
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
p += ret;
- WARN_ON(p > end);
- au->buf->vec.iov_len = p - au->buf->vec.iov_base;
+ if (server_challenge) {
+ WARN_ON(p != end);
+ } else {
+ WARN_ON(p > end);
+ au->buf->vec.iov_len = p - au->buf->vec.iov_base;
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -378,7 +391,7 @@ static int ceph_x_build_authorizer(struc
le64_to_cpu(msg_a->ticket_blob.secret_id));
get_random_bytes(&au->nonce, sizeof(au->nonce));
- ret = encrypt_authorizer(au);
+ ret = encrypt_authorizer(au, NULL);
if (ret) {
pr_err("failed to encrypt authorizer: %d", ret);
goto out_au;
@@ -660,6 +673,54 @@ static int ceph_x_update_authorizer(
return 0;
}
+static int decrypt_authorize_challenge(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au,
+ void *challenge_buf,
+ int challenge_buf_len,
+ u64 *server_challenge)
+{
+ struct ceph_x_authorize_challenge *ch =
+ challenge_buf + sizeof(struct ceph_x_encrypt_header);
+ int ret;
+
+ /* no leading len */
+ ret = __ceph_x_decrypt(&au->session_key, challenge_buf,
+ challenge_buf_len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ if (ret < sizeof(*ch)) {
+ pr_err("bad size %d for ceph_x_authorize_challenge\n", ret);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ *server_challenge = le64_to_cpu(ch->server_challenge);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ceph_x_add_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+ struct ceph_authorizer *a,
+ void *challenge_buf,
+ int challenge_buf_len)
+{
+ struct ceph_x_authorizer *au = (void *)a;
+ u64 server_challenge;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = decrypt_authorize_challenge(au, challenge_buf, challenge_buf_len,
+ &server_challenge);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("failed to decrypt authorize challenge: %d", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = encrypt_authorizer(au, &server_challenge);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("failed to encrypt authorizer w/ challenge: %d", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
struct ceph_authorizer *a)
{
@@ -812,6 +873,7 @@ static const struct ceph_auth_client_ops
.handle_reply = ceph_x_handle_reply,
.create_authorizer = ceph_x_create_authorizer,
.update_authorizer = ceph_x_update_authorizer,
+ .add_authorizer_challenge = ceph_x_add_authorizer_challenge,
.verify_authorizer_reply = ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply,
.invalidate_authorizer = ceph_x_invalidate_authorizer,
.reset = ceph_x_reset,
--- a/net/ceph/auth_x_protocol.h
+++ b/net/ceph/auth_x_protocol.h
@@ -69,6 +69,13 @@ struct ceph_x_authorize_a {
struct ceph_x_authorize_b {
__u8 struct_v;
__le64 nonce;
+ __u8 have_challenge;
+ __le64 server_challenge_plus_one;
+} __attribute__ ((packed));
+
+struct ceph_x_authorize_challenge {
+ __u8 struct_v;
+ __le64 server_challenge;
} __attribute__ ((packed));
struct ceph_x_authorize_reply {
--- a/net/ceph/messenger.c
+++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c
@@ -2037,9 +2037,24 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_c
if (con->auth) {
/*
* Any connection that defines ->get_authorizer()
- * should also define ->verify_authorizer_reply().
+ * should also define ->add_authorizer_challenge() and
+ * ->verify_authorizer_reply().
+ *
* See get_connect_authorizer().
*/
+ if (con->in_reply.tag == CEPH_MSGR_TAG_CHALLENGE_AUTHORIZER) {
+ ret = con->ops->add_authorizer_challenge(
+ con, con->auth->authorizer_reply_buf,
+ le32_to_cpu(con->in_reply.authorizer_len));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ con_out_kvec_reset(con);
+ __prepare_write_connect(con);
+ prepare_read_connect(con);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
ret = con->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(con);
if (ret < 0) {
con->error_msg = "bad authorize reply";
--- a/net/ceph/osd_client.c
+++ b/net/ceph/osd_client.c
@@ -4478,6 +4478,16 @@ static struct ceph_auth_handshake *get_a
return auth;
}
+static int add_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_connection *con,
+ void *challenge_buf, int challenge_buf_len)
+{
+ struct ceph_osd *o = con->private;
+ struct ceph_osd_client *osdc = o->o_osdc;
+ struct ceph_auth_client *ac = osdc->client->monc.auth;
+
+ return ceph_auth_add_authorizer_challenge(ac, o->o_auth.authorizer,
+ challenge_buf, challenge_buf_len);
+}
static int verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_connection *con)
{
@@ -4519,6 +4529,7 @@ static const struct ceph_connection_oper
.put = put_osd_con,
.dispatch = dispatch,
.get_authorizer = get_authorizer,
+ .add_authorizer_challenge = add_authorizer_challenge,
.verify_authorizer_reply = verify_authorizer_reply,
.invalidate_authorizer = invalidate_authorizer,
.alloc_msg = alloc_msg,
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-12-06 14:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 115+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 001/101] Kbuild: suppress packed-not-aligned warning for default setting only Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 002/101] disable stringop truncation warnings for now Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 003/101] test_hexdump: use memcpy instead of strncpy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 004/101] kobject: Replace strncpy with memcpy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 005/101] unifdef: use memcpy instead of strncpy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 006/101] kernfs: Replace strncpy with memcpy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 007/101] ip_tunnel: Fix name string concatenate in __ip_tunnel_create() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 008/101] drm: gma500: fix logic error Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 009/101] scsi: bfa: convert to strlcpy/strlcat Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 010/101] staging: rts5208: fix gcc-8 logic error warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 011/101] kdb: use memmove instead of overlapping memcpy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 012/101] x86/power/64: Use char arrays for asm function names Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 013/101] iser: set sector for ambiguous mr status errors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 014/101] uprobes: Fix handle_swbp() vs. unregister() + register() race once more Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 015/101] MIPS: ralink: Fix mt7620 nd_sd pinmux Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 016/101] mips: fix mips_get_syscall_arg o32 check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 017/101] IB/mlx5: Avoid load failure due to unknown link width Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 018/101] drm/ast: Fix incorrect free on ioregs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 019/101] drm: set is_master to 0 upon drm_new_set_master() failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 020/101] scsi: scsi_devinfo: cleanly zero-pad devinfo strings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 021/101] ALSA: trident: Suppress gcc string warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 022/101] scsi: csiostor: Avoid content leaks and casts Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 023/101] kgdboc: Fix restrict error Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 024/101] kgdboc: Fix warning with module build Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 025/101] binder: fix proc->files use-after-free Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 026/101] svm: Add mutex_lock to protect apic_access_page_done on AMD systems Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 027/101] drm/mediatek: fix OF sibling-node lookup Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 028/101] Input: xpad - quirk all PDP Xbox One gamepads Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 029/101] Input: matrix_keypad - check for errors from of_get_named_gpio() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 030/101] Input: elan_i2c - add ELAN0620 to the ACPI table Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 031/101] Input: elan_i2c - add ACPI ID for Lenovo IdeaPad 330-15ARR Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 032/101] Input: elan_i2c - add support for ELAN0621 touchpad Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 033/101] btrfs: Always try all copies when reading extent buffers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 034/101] Btrfs: fix use-after-free when dumping free space Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 035/101] ARC: change defconfig defaults to ARCv2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 036/101] arc: [devboards] Add support of NFSv3 ACL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 037/101] udf: Allow mounting volumes with incorrect identification strings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 038/101] reset: make optional functions really optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 039/101] reset: core: fix reset_control_put Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 040/101] reset: fix optional reset_control_get stubs to return NULL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 041/101] reset: add exported __reset_control_get, return NULL if optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 042/101] reset: make device_reset_optional() really optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 043/101] reset: remove remaining WARN_ON() in <linux/reset.h> Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 044/101] mm: cleancache: fix corruption on missed inode invalidation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 045/101] usb: gadget: dummy: fix nonsensical comparisons Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 046/101] net: qed: use correct strncpy() size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 047/101] tipc: use destination length for copy string Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 048/101] libceph: drop len argument of *verify_authorizer_reply() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 049/101] libceph: no need to drop con->mutex for ->get_authorizer() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 050/101] libceph: store ceph_auth_handshake pointer in ceph_connection Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 051/101] libceph: factor out __prepare_write_connect() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 052/101] libceph: factor out __ceph_x_decrypt() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 053/101] libceph: factor out encrypt_authorizer() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 055/101] libceph: implement CEPHX_V2 calculation mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 056/101] libceph: weaken sizeof check in ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 057/101] libceph: check authorizer reply/challenge length before reading Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 058/101] bpf/verifier: Add spi variable to check_stack_write() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 059/101] bpf/verifier: Pass instruction index to check_mem_access() and check_xadd() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 060/101] bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 061/101] wil6210: missing length check in wmi_set_ie Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 062/101] mm/hugetlb.c: dont call region_abort if region_chg fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 063/101] hugetlbfs: fix offset overflow in hugetlbfs mmap Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 064/101] hugetlbfs: check for pgoff value overflow Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 065/101] btrfs: validate type when reading a chunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 066/101] btrfs: Verify that every chunk has corresponding block group at mount time Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 067/101] btrfs: Refactor check_leaf function for later expansion Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 068/101] btrfs: Check if item pointer overlaps with the item itself Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 069/101] btrfs: Add sanity check for EXTENT_DATA when reading out leaf Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 070/101] btrfs: Add checker for EXTENT_CSUM Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 071/101] btrfs: Move leaf and node validation checker to tree-checker.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 072/101] btrfs: struct-funcs, constify readers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 073/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Enhance btrfs_check_node output Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 074/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Fix false panic for sanity test Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 075/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Add checker for dir item Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 076/101] btrfs: tree-checker: use %zu format string for size_t Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 077/101] btrfs: tree-check: reduce stack consumption in check_dir_item Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 078/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Verify block_group_item Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 079/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Detect invalid and empty essential trees Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 080/101] btrfs: Check that each block group has corresponding chunk at mount time Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 081/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Check level for leaves and nodes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 082/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Fix misleading group system information Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 083/101] f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 084/101] f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 085/101] f2fs: detect wrong layout Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 086/101] f2fs: return error during fill_super Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 087/101] f2fs: check blkaddr more accuratly before issue a bio Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 088/101] f2fs: sanity check on sit entry Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 089/101] f2fs: enhance sanity_check_raw_super() to avoid potential overflow Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 090/101] f2fs: clean up with is_valid_blkaddr() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 091/101] f2fs: introduce and spread verify_blkaddr Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 092/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with secs_per_zone Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 093/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with user_block_count Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 094/101] f2fs: Add sanity_check_inode() function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 095/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with node footer and iblocks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 096/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with block address in main area Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 097/101] f2fs: fix missing up_read Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 098/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with block address in main area v2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 099/101] f2fs: free meta pages if sanity check for ckpt is failed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 100/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with cp_pack_start_sum Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-07 18:12 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-12-08 9:01 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 101/101] xfs: dont fail when converting shortform attr to long form during ATTR_REPLACE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 20:12 ` [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review kernelci.org bot
2018-12-06 22:08 ` shuah
2018-12-07 9:03 ` Jon Hunter
2018-12-07 14:41 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-07 9:10 ` Naresh Kamboju
2018-12-07 14:41 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-07 15:34 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-12-07 15:51 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-07 17:53 ` Naresh Kamboju
2018-12-08 8:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-07 23:38 ` Guenter Roeck
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