Re: [PATCH v2 01/12] fs-verity: add a documentation file

Eric Biggers
2018-12-14T04:48:07Z

Hi Christoph,

On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 12:22:49PM -0800, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 12:26:10PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > > As this apparently got merged despite no proper reviews from VFS
> > > level persons:
> >
> > fs-verity has been out for review since August, and Cc'ed to all relevant
> > mailing lists including linux-fsdevel, linux-ext4, linux-f2fs-devel,
> > linux-fscrypt, linux-integrity, and linux-kernel. There are tests,
> > documentation (since v2), and a userspace tool. It's also been presented at
> > multiple conferences, and has been covered by LWN multiple times. If more
> > people want to review it, then they should do so; there's nothing stopping them.
>
> But you did not got a review from someone like Al, Linus, Andrew or me,
> did you?

Sure, those specific people (modulo you just now) haven't responded to the
fs-verity patches yet. But again, the patches have been out for review for
months. Of course, we always prefer more reviews over fewer, and we strongly
encourage anyone interested to review fs-verity! (The Documentation/ file may
be a good place to start.) But ultimately we cannot force reviews, and as you
know kernel reviews can be very hard to come by. Yet, people still need
fs-verity anyway; it isn't just some toy. And we're committed to maintaining
it, similar to fscrypt. The ext4 and f2fs maintainers are also satisfied with
the current approach to storing the verity metadata past EOF; in fact it was
even originally Ted's idea, I think.

>
> > Can you elaborate on the actual problems you think the current solution has, and
> > exactly what solution you'd prefer instead? Keep in mind that (1) for large
> > files the Merkle tree can be gigabytes long, (2) Linux doesn't have an API for
> > file streams, and (3) when fs-verity is combined with fscrypt, it's important
> > that the hashes be encrypted, so as to not leak information about the plaintext.
>
> Given that you alread use an ioctl as the interface what is the problem
> of passing this data through the ioctl?

Do you mean pass the verity metadata in a buffer? That cannot work in general,
because it may be too large to fit into memory.

Or do you mean pass it via a second file descriptor? That could work, but it
doesn't seem better than the current approach. It would force every filesystem
to move the metadata around, whereas currently ext4 and f2fs can simply leave it
in place. If you meant this, are there advantages you have in mind that would
outweigh this?

We also considered generating the Merkle tree in the kernel, in which case
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY would just take a small structure similar to the current
fsverity_descriptor. But that would add extra complexity to the kernel, and
generating a Merkle tree over a large file is the type of parallelizable, CPU
intensive work that really should be done in userspace. Also, having userspace
provide the Merkle tree allows for it to be pre-generated and distributed with
the file, e.g. provided in a package to be installed on many systems.

But please do let us know if you have any better ideas.

Thanks!

- Eric