From: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
To: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>,
Maxime Ripard <maxime.ripard@bootlin.com>,
Sean Paul <sean@poorly.run>, David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>,
Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>,
dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] drm/ioctl: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerabilities
Date: Thu, 20 Dec 2018 08:14:05 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181220071404.GD21184@phenom.ffwll.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181220000015.GA18973@embeddedor>
On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 06:00:15PM -0600, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> nr is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a
> potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
>
> drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:805 drm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev->driver->ioctls' [r]
> drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:810 drm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'drm_ioctls' [r] (local cap)
> drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:892 drm_ioctl_flags() warn: potential spectre issue 'drm_ioctls' [r] (local cap)
>
> Fix this by sanitizing nr before using it to index dev->driver->ioctls
> and drm_ioctls.
>
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
>
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
lgtm and I think there's no other obvious place where we need
array_index_nospec in drm core. Applied to drm-misc-fixes.
-Daniel
> ---
> drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c | 10 ++++++++--
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c
> index 94bd872d56c4..7e6746b2d704 100644
> --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c
> +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c
> @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
>
> #include <linux/pci.h>
> #include <linux/export.h>
> +#include <linux/nospec.h>
>
> /**
> * DOC: getunique and setversion story
> @@ -800,13 +801,17 @@ long drm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
>
> if (is_driver_ioctl) {
> /* driver ioctl */
> - if (nr - DRM_COMMAND_BASE >= dev->driver->num_ioctls)
> + unsigned int index = nr - DRM_COMMAND_BASE;
> +
> + if (index >= dev->driver->num_ioctls)
> goto err_i1;
> - ioctl = &dev->driver->ioctls[nr - DRM_COMMAND_BASE];
> + index = array_index_nospec(index, dev->driver->num_ioctls);
> + ioctl = &dev->driver->ioctls[index];
> } else {
> /* core ioctl */
> if (nr >= DRM_CORE_IOCTL_COUNT)
> goto err_i1;
> + nr = array_index_nospec(nr, DRM_CORE_IOCTL_COUNT);
> ioctl = &drm_ioctls[nr];
> }
>
> @@ -888,6 +893,7 @@ bool drm_ioctl_flags(unsigned int nr, unsigned int *flags)
>
> if (nr >= DRM_CORE_IOCTL_COUNT)
> return false;
> + nr = array_index_nospec(nr, DRM_CORE_IOCTL_COUNT);
>
> *flags = drm_ioctls[nr].flags;
> return true;
> --
> 2.20.1
>
--
Daniel Vetter
Software Engineer, Intel Corporation
http://blog.ffwll.ch
prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-12-20 7:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-12-20 0:00 [PATCH] drm/ioctl: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerabilities Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-12-20 7:14 ` Daniel Vetter [this message]
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