From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.0 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D357CC43387 for ; Fri, 18 Jan 2019 09:19:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A88AA2086D for ; Fri, 18 Jan 2019 09:19:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727177AbfARJTf (ORCPT ); Fri, 18 Jan 2019 04:19:35 -0500 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:39050 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725924AbfARJTe (ORCPT ); Fri, 18 Jan 2019 04:19:34 -0500 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx01.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.11]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2E9F87F6B2; Fri, 18 Jan 2019 09:19:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: from kasong-desktop-nay-redhat-com.nay.redhat.com (unknown [10.66.128.41]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 420DF600C0; Fri, 18 Jan 2019 09:19:16 +0000 (UTC) From: Kairui Song To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org, jwboyer@fedoraproject.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, bauerman@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, dyoung@redhat.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, Kairui Song Subject: [PATCH v4 2/2] kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2019 17:17:33 +0800 Message-Id: <20190118091733.29940-3-kasong@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20190118091733.29940-1-kasong@redhat.com> References: <20190118091733.29940-1-kasong@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.11 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.25]); Fri, 18 Jan 2019 09:19:34 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org This patch let kexec_file_load makes use of .platform keyring as fall back if it failed to verify a PE signed image against secondary or builtin keyring, make it possible to verify kernel image signed with preboot keys as well. This commit adds a VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING similar to previous VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING indicating that verify_pkcs7_signature should verify the signature using platform keyring. Also, decrease the error message log level when verification failed with -ENOKEY, so that if called tried multiple time with different keyring it won't generate extra noises. Signed-off-by: Kairui Song Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Tested-by: Mimi Zohar --- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 13 ++++++++++--- certs/system_keyring.c | 13 ++++++++++++- include/linux/verification.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c index 7d97e432cbbc..2c007abd3d40 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c @@ -534,9 +534,16 @@ static int bzImage64_cleanup(void *loader_data) #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG static int bzImage64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) { - return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, - VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, - VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE); + int ret; + ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, + VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, + VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE); + if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) { + ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, + VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING, + VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE); + } + return ret; } #endif diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c index 4690ef9cda8a..7085c286f4bd 100644 --- a/certs/system_keyring.c +++ b/certs/system_keyring.c @@ -240,11 +240,22 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len, #else trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys; #endif + } else if (trusted_keys == VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING) { +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING + trusted_keys = platform_trusted_keys; +#else + trusted_keys = NULL; +#endif + if (!trusted_keys) { + ret = -ENOKEY; + pr_devel("PKCS#7 platform keyring is not available\n"); + goto error; + } } ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keys); if (ret < 0) { if (ret == -ENOKEY) - pr_err("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n"); + pr_devel("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n"); goto error; } diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h index cfa4730d607a..018fb5f13d44 100644 --- a/include/linux/verification.h +++ b/include/linux/verification.h @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ * should be used. */ #define VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING ((struct key *)1UL) +#define VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING ((struct key *)2UL) /* * The use to which an asymmetric key is being put. -- 2.20.1