[PATCH 0/2] KVM: SVM: move the SEV command handling into a separate file

[PATCH 0/2] KVM: SVM: move the SEV command handling into a separate file

[Singh, Brijesh]

svm.c is pretty huge, before we add more SEV specific commands (e.g SEV-ES,
SEV-Migration etc) lets move the SEV command handling into a separate file.
There is no logical changes in this series.

The patch is based on motivation from this thread:
https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=153910240507399&w=2

Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>

Brijesh Singh (2):
  KVM: SVM: move common struct definitions to header file
  KVM: SVM: move the SEV specific function in a separate file

 arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h |  155 +++++
 arch/x86/kvm/Makefile      |    2 +
 arch/x86/kvm/sev.c         | 1076 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/sev.h         |   40 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c         | 1234 +-----------------------------------
 5 files changed, 1296 insertions(+), 1211 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/sev.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/sev.h

-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 1/2] KVM: SVM: move common struct definitions to header file

[Singh, Brijesh]

Some of the structure will be used by sev.c in next patch, lets
move the common structure definition in svm.h so that both the
sev.c and svm.c can use it.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 155 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c         | 155 -------------------------------------
 2 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 155 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index dec9c1e84c78..675623e1896c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #ifndef __SVM_H
 #define __SVM_H
 
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
 #include <uapi/asm/svm.h>
 
 
@@ -207,6 +208,160 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb {
 	struct vmcb_save_area save;
 };
 
+static const u32 host_save_user_msrs[] = {
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	MSR_STAR, MSR_LSTAR, MSR_CSTAR, MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE,
+	MSR_FS_BASE,
+#endif
+	MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP,
+	MSR_TSC_AUX,
+};
+
+#define NR_HOST_SAVE_USER_MSRS ARRAY_SIZE(host_save_user_msrs)
+
+struct kvm_sev_info {
+	bool active;		/* SEV enabled guest */
+	unsigned int asid;	/* ASID used for this guest */
+	unsigned int handle;	/* SEV firmware handle */
+	int fd;			/* SEV device fd */
+	unsigned long pages_locked; /* Number of pages locked */
+	struct list_head regions_list;  /* List of registered regions */
+};
+
+struct kvm_svm {
+	struct kvm kvm;
+
+	/* Struct members for AVIC */
+	u32 avic_vm_id;
+	u32 ldr_mode;
+	struct page *avic_logical_id_table_page;
+	struct page *avic_physical_id_table_page;
+	struct hlist_node hnode;
+
+	struct kvm_sev_info sev_info;
+};
+
+struct nested_state {
+	struct vmcb *hsave;
+	u64 hsave_msr;
+	u64 vm_cr_msr;
+	u64 vmcb;
+
+	/* These are the merged vectors */
+	u32 *msrpm;
+
+	/* gpa pointers to the real vectors */
+	u64 vmcb_msrpm;
+	u64 vmcb_iopm;
+
+	/* A VMEXIT is required but not yet emulated */
+	bool exit_required;
+
+	/* cache for intercepts of the guest */
+	u32 intercept_cr;
+	u32 intercept_dr;
+	u32 intercept_exceptions;
+	u64 intercept;
+
+	/* Nested Paging related state */
+	u64 nested_cr3;
+};
+
+struct vcpu_svm {
+	struct kvm_vcpu vcpu;
+	struct vmcb *vmcb;
+	unsigned long vmcb_pa;
+	struct svm_cpu_data *svm_data;
+	uint64_t asid_generation;
+	uint64_t sysenter_esp;
+	uint64_t sysenter_eip;
+	uint64_t tsc_aux;
+
+	u64 msr_decfg;
+
+	u64 next_rip;
+
+	u64 host_user_msrs[NR_HOST_SAVE_USER_MSRS];
+	struct {
+		u16 fs;
+		u16 gs;
+		u16 ldt;
+		u64 gs_base;
+	} host;
+
+	u64 spec_ctrl;
+	/*
+	 * Contains guest-controlled bits of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, which will be
+	 * translated into the appropriate L2_CFG bits on the host to
+	 * perform speculative control.
+	 */
+	u64 virt_spec_ctrl;
+
+	u32 *msrpm;
+
+	ulong nmi_iret_rip;
+
+	struct nested_state nested;
+
+	bool nmi_singlestep;
+	u64 nmi_singlestep_guest_rflags;
+
+	unsigned int3_injected;
+	unsigned long int3_rip;
+
+	/* cached guest cpuid flags for faster access */
+	bool nrips_enabled	: 1;
+
+	u32 ldr_reg;
+	struct page *avic_backing_page;
+	u64 *avic_physical_id_cache;
+	bool avic_is_running;
+
+	/*
+	 * Per-vcpu list of struct amd_svm_iommu_ir:
+	 * This is used mainly to store interrupt remapping information used
+	 * when update the vcpu affinity. This avoids the need to scan for
+	 * IRTE and try to match ga_tag in the IOMMU driver.
+	 */
+	struct list_head ir_list;
+	spinlock_t ir_list_lock;
+
+	/* which host CPU was used for running this vcpu */
+	unsigned int last_cpu;
+};
+
+#define __sme_page_pa(x) __sme_set(page_to_pfn(x) << PAGE_SHIFT)
+struct enc_region {
+	struct list_head list;
+	unsigned long npages;
+	struct page **pages;
+	unsigned long uaddr;
+	unsigned long size;
+};
+
+static inline struct kvm_svm *to_kvm_svm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return container_of(kvm, struct kvm_svm, kvm);
+}
+
+static inline bool sev_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+
+	return sev->active;
+#else
+	return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline int sev_get_asid(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+
+	return sev->asid;
+}
+
 #define SVM_CPUID_FUNC 0x8000000a
 
 #define SVM_VM_CR_SVM_DISABLE 4
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index a157ca5b6869..eb75077cb982 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -120,67 +120,8 @@ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, svm_cpu_id);
 
 static bool erratum_383_found __read_mostly;
 
-static const u32 host_save_user_msrs[] = {
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-	MSR_STAR, MSR_LSTAR, MSR_CSTAR, MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE,
-	MSR_FS_BASE,
-#endif
-	MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP,
-	MSR_TSC_AUX,
-};
-
-#define NR_HOST_SAVE_USER_MSRS ARRAY_SIZE(host_save_user_msrs)
-
-struct kvm_sev_info {
-	bool active;		/* SEV enabled guest */
-	unsigned int asid;	/* ASID used for this guest */
-	unsigned int handle;	/* SEV firmware handle */
-	int fd;			/* SEV device fd */
-	unsigned long pages_locked; /* Number of pages locked */
-	struct list_head regions_list;  /* List of registered regions */
-};
-
-struct kvm_svm {
-	struct kvm kvm;
-
-	/* Struct members for AVIC */
-	u32 avic_vm_id;
-	u32 ldr_mode;
-	struct page *avic_logical_id_table_page;
-	struct page *avic_physical_id_table_page;
-	struct hlist_node hnode;
-
-	struct kvm_sev_info sev_info;
-};
-
 struct kvm_vcpu;
 
-struct nested_state {
-	struct vmcb *hsave;
-	u64 hsave_msr;
-	u64 vm_cr_msr;
-	u64 vmcb;
-
-	/* These are the merged vectors */
-	u32 *msrpm;
-
-	/* gpa pointers to the real vectors */
-	u64 vmcb_msrpm;
-	u64 vmcb_iopm;
-
-	/* A VMEXIT is required but not yet emulated */
-	bool exit_required;
-
-	/* cache for intercepts of the guest */
-	u32 intercept_cr;
-	u32 intercept_dr;
-	u32 intercept_exceptions;
-	u64 intercept;
-
-	/* Nested Paging related state */
-	u64 nested_cr3;
-};
-
 #define MSRPM_OFFSETS	16
 static u32 msrpm_offsets[MSRPM_OFFSETS] __read_mostly;
 
@@ -190,69 +131,6 @@ static u32 msrpm_offsets[MSRPM_OFFSETS] __read_mostly;
  */
 static uint64_t osvw_len = 4, osvw_status;
 
-struct vcpu_svm {
-	struct kvm_vcpu vcpu;
-	struct vmcb *vmcb;
-	unsigned long vmcb_pa;
-	struct svm_cpu_data *svm_data;
-	uint64_t asid_generation;
-	uint64_t sysenter_esp;
-	uint64_t sysenter_eip;
-	uint64_t tsc_aux;
-
-	u64 msr_decfg;
-
-	u64 next_rip;
-
-	u64 host_user_msrs[NR_HOST_SAVE_USER_MSRS];
-	struct {
-		u16 fs;
-		u16 gs;
-		u16 ldt;
-		u64 gs_base;
-	} host;
-
-	u64 spec_ctrl;
-	/*
-	 * Contains guest-controlled bits of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, which will be
-	 * translated into the appropriate L2_CFG bits on the host to
-	 * perform speculative control.
-	 */
-	u64 virt_spec_ctrl;
-
-	u32 *msrpm;
-
-	ulong nmi_iret_rip;
-
-	struct nested_state nested;
-
-	bool nmi_singlestep;
-	u64 nmi_singlestep_guest_rflags;
-
-	unsigned int3_injected;
-	unsigned long int3_rip;
-
-	/* cached guest cpuid flags for faster access */
-	bool nrips_enabled	: 1;
-
-	u32 ldr_reg;
-	struct page *avic_backing_page;
-	u64 *avic_physical_id_cache;
-	bool avic_is_running;
-
-	/*
-	 * Per-vcpu list of struct amd_svm_iommu_ir:
-	 * This is used mainly to store interrupt remapping information used
-	 * when update the vcpu affinity. This avoids the need to scan for
-	 * IRTE and try to match ga_tag in the IOMMU driver.
-	 */
-	struct list_head ir_list;
-	spinlock_t ir_list_lock;
-
-	/* which host CPU was used for running this vcpu */
-	unsigned int last_cpu;
-};
-
 /*
  * This is a wrapper of struct amd_iommu_ir_data.
  */
@@ -418,45 +296,12 @@ enum {
 static unsigned int max_sev_asid;
 static unsigned int min_sev_asid;
 static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap;
-#define __sme_page_pa(x) __sme_set(page_to_pfn(x) << PAGE_SHIFT)
-
-struct enc_region {
-	struct list_head list;
-	unsigned long npages;
-	struct page **pages;
-	unsigned long uaddr;
-	unsigned long size;
-};
-
-
-static inline struct kvm_svm *to_kvm_svm(struct kvm *kvm)
-{
-	return container_of(kvm, struct kvm_svm, kvm);
-}
 
 static inline bool svm_sev_enabled(void)
 {
 	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) ? max_sev_asid : 0;
 }
 
-static inline bool sev_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
-	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
-
-	return sev->active;
-#else
-	return false;
-#endif
-}
-
-static inline int sev_get_asid(struct kvm *kvm)
-{
-	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
-
-	return sev->asid;
-}
-
 static inline void mark_all_dirty(struct vmcb *vmcb)
 {
 	vmcb->control.clean = 0;
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 2/2] KVM: SVM: move the SEV specific function in a separate file

[Singh, Brijesh]

svm.c was pretty huge, and the recent addition of SEV feature
grew it further. Before we add more SEV command handling lets split
the SEV bits into a separate file. The sev.c will be compiled only
when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV is selected.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/Makefile |    2 +
 arch/x86/kvm/sev.c    | 1076 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/sev.h    |   40 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c    | 1079 +----------------------------------------
 4 files changed, 1141 insertions(+), 1056 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/sev.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/sev.h

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
index 69b3a7c30013..4a434914d6a9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ kvm-y			+= x86.o mmu.o emulate.o i8259.o irq.o lapic.o \
 kvm-intel-y		+= vmx/vmx.o vmx/vmenter.o vmx/pmu_intel.o vmx/vmcs12.o vmx/evmcs.o vmx/nested.o
 kvm-amd-y		+= svm.o pmu_amd.o
 
+kvm-amd-$(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV)	+= sev.o
+
 obj-$(CONFIG_KVM)	+= kvm.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)	+= kvm-intel.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_AMD)	+= kvm-amd.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/sev.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..749f5d6db63b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/sev.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1076 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/swap.h>
+#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
+
+#include <asm/kvm_para.h>
+#include <asm/svm.h>
+
+#include "sev.h"
+
+static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap;
+static unsigned int max_sev_asid;
+static unsigned int min_sev_asid;
+
+static void __sev_asid_free(int asid);
+static void sev_unbind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle);
+static struct page **sev_pin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long uaddr,
+		unsigned long ulen, unsigned long *n, int write);
+static void sev_unpin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, struct page **pages,
+		unsigned long npages);
+static void sev_clflush_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned long npages);
+static void __unregister_enc_region_locked(struct kvm *kvm,
+		struct enc_region *region);
+
+bool svm_sev_enabled(void)
+{
+	return !!max_sev_asid;
+}
+
+unsigned int sev_get_max_asid(void)
+{
+	return max_sev_asid;
+}
+
+__init int sev_hardware_setup(void)
+{
+	struct sev_user_data_status *status;
+	int rc;
+
+	/* Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously */
+	max_sev_asid = cpuid_ecx(0x8000001F);
+
+	if (!max_sev_asid)
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest */
+	min_sev_asid = cpuid_edx(0x8000001F);
+
+	/* Initialize SEV ASID bitmap */
+	sev_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(max_sev_asid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sev_asid_bitmap)
+		return 1;
+
+	status = kmalloc(sizeof(*status), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!status)
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check SEV platform status.
+	 *
+	 * PLATFORM_STATUS can be called in any state, if we failed to query
+	 * the PLATFORM status then either PSP firmware does not support SEV
+	 * feature or SEV firmware is dead.
+	 */
+	rc = sev_platform_status(status, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
+
+	pr_info("SEV supported\n");
+
+err:
+	kfree(status);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+__exit void sev_hardware_unsetup(void)
+{
+	if (svm_sev_enabled())
+		bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
+}
+
+static int sev_asid_new(void)
+{
+	int pos;
+
+	/*
+	 * SEV-enabled guest must use asid from min_sev_asid to max_sev_asid.
+	 */
+	pos = find_next_zero_bit(sev_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_sev_asid - 1);
+	if (pos >= max_sev_asid)
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	set_bit(pos, sev_asid_bitmap);
+	return pos + 1;
+}
+
+static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	int asid, ret;
+
+
+	ret = -EBUSY;
+	if (unlikely(sev->active))
+		return ret;
+
+	asid = sev_asid_new();
+	if (asid < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_free;
+
+	sev->active = true;
+	sev->asid = asid;
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sev->regions_list);
+
+	return 0;
+
+e_free:
+	__sev_asid_free(asid);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle, int *error)
+{
+	struct sev_data_activate *data;
+	int asid = sev_get_asid(kvm);
+	int ret;
+
+	wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
+
+	ret = sev_guest_df_flush(error);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* activate ASID on the given handle */
+	data->handle = handle;
+	data->asid   = asid;
+	ret = sev_guest_activate(data, error);
+	kfree(data);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int __sev_issue_cmd(int fd, int id, void *data, int *error)
+{
+	struct fd f;
+	int ret;
+
+	f = fdget(fd);
+	if (!f.file)
+		return -EBADF;
+
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd_external_user(f.file, id, data, error);
+
+	fdput(f);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_issue_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, int id, void *data, int *error)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+
+	return __sev_issue_cmd(sev->fd, id, data, error);
+}
+
+static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_launch_start *start;
+	struct kvm_sev_launch_start params;
+	void *dh_blob, *session_blob;
+	int *error = &argp->error;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	start = kzalloc(sizeof(*start), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!start)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	dh_blob = NULL;
+	if (params.dh_uaddr) {
+		dh_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.dh_uaddr, params.dh_len);
+		if (IS_ERR(dh_blob)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(dh_blob);
+			goto e_free;
+		}
+
+		start->dh_cert_address = __sme_set(__pa(dh_blob));
+		start->dh_cert_len = params.dh_len;
+	}
+
+	session_blob = NULL;
+	if (params.session_uaddr) {
+		session_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr, params.session_len);
+		if (IS_ERR(session_blob)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(session_blob);
+			goto e_free_dh;
+		}
+
+		start->session_address = __sme_set(__pa(session_blob));
+		start->session_len = params.session_len;
+	}
+
+	start->handle = params.handle;
+	start->policy = params.policy;
+
+	/* create memory encryption context */
+	ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START, start, error);
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_free_session;
+
+	/* Bind ASID to this guest */
+	ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start->handle, error);
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_free_session;
+
+	/* return handle to userspace */
+	params.handle = start->handle;
+	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, &params, sizeof(params))) {
+		sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start->handle);
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto e_free_session;
+	}
+
+	sev->handle = start->handle;
+	sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
+
+e_free_session:
+	kfree(session_blob);
+e_free_dh:
+	kfree(dh_blob);
+e_free:
+	kfree(start);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int get_num_contig_pages(int idx, struct page **inpages,
+				unsigned long npages)
+{
+	unsigned long paddr, next_paddr;
+	int i = idx + 1, pages = 1;
+
+	/* find the number of contiguous pages starting from idx */
+	paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[idx]);
+	while (i < npages) {
+		next_paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i++]);
+		if ((paddr + PAGE_SIZE) == next_paddr) {
+			pages++;
+			paddr = next_paddr;
+			continue;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return pages;
+}
+
+static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr, npages, size;
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data params;
+	struct sev_data_launch_update_data *data;
+	struct page **inpages;
+	int i, ret, pages;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	vaddr = params.uaddr;
+	size = params.len;
+	vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
+
+	/* Lock the user memory. */
+	inpages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr, size, &npages, 1);
+	if (!inpages) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto e_free;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The LAUNCH_UPDATE command will perform in-place encryption of the
+	 * memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region with C=1).
+	 * It's possible that the cache may contain the data with C=0, i.e.,
+	 * unencrypted so invalidate it first.
+	 */
+	sev_clflush_pages(inpages, npages);
+
+	for (i = 0; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr, i += pages) {
+		int offset, len;
+
+		/*
+		 * If the user buffer is not page-aligned, calculate the offset
+		 * within the page.
+		 */
+		offset = vaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+
+		/* Calculate the number of pages that can be encrypted in one go. */
+		pages = get_num_contig_pages(i, inpages, npages);
+
+		len = min_t(size_t, ((pages * PAGE_SIZE) - offset), size);
+
+		data->handle = sev->handle;
+		data->len = len;
+		data->address = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i]) + offset;
+		ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, data, &argp->error);
+		if (ret)
+			goto e_unpin;
+
+		size -= len;
+		next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
+	}
+
+e_unpin:
+	/* content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */
+	for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
+		set_page_dirty_lock(inpages[i]);
+		mark_page_accessed(inpages[i]);
+	}
+	/* unlock the user pages */
+	sev_unpin_memory(kvm, inpages, npages);
+e_free:
+	kfree(data);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	void __user *measure = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data;
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_launch_measure *data;
+	struct kvm_sev_launch_measure params;
+	void __user *p = NULL;
+	void *blob = NULL;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, measure, sizeof(params)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* User wants to query the blob length */
+	if (!params.len)
+		goto cmd;
+
+	p = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr;
+	if (p) {
+		if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto e_free;
+		}
+
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		blob = kmalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!blob)
+			goto e_free;
+
+		data->address = __psp_pa(blob);
+		data->len = params.len;
+	}
+
+cmd:
+	data->handle = sev->handle;
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE, data, &argp->error);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we query the session length, FW responded with expected data.
+	 */
+	if (!params.len)
+		goto done;
+
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_free_blob;
+
+	if (blob) {
+		if (copy_to_user(p, blob, params.len))
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+done:
+	params.len = data->len;
+	if (copy_to_user(measure, &params, sizeof(params)))
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+e_free_blob:
+	kfree(blob);
+e_free:
+	kfree(data);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_launch_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_launch_finish *data;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	data->handle = sev->handle;
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_FINISH, data, &argp->error);
+
+	kfree(data);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_guest_status(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct kvm_sev_guest_status params;
+	struct sev_data_guest_status *data;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	data->handle = sev->handle;
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS, data, &argp->error);
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_free;
+
+	params.policy = data->policy;
+	params.state = data->state;
+	params.handle = data->handle;
+
+	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, &params, sizeof(params)))
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+e_free:
+	kfree(data);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src,
+			       unsigned long dst, int size,
+			       int *error, bool enc)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_dbg *data;
+	int ret;
+
+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	data->handle = sev->handle;
+	data->dst_addr = dst;
+	data->src_addr = src;
+	data->len = size;
+
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm,
+			    enc ? SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT : SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT,
+			    data, error);
+	kfree(data);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int __sev_dbg_decrypt(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src_paddr,
+			     unsigned long dst_paddr, int sz, int *err)
+{
+	int offset;
+
+	/*
+	 * Its safe to read more than we are asked, caller should ensure that
+	 * destination has enough space.
+	 */
+	src_paddr = round_down(src_paddr, 16);
+	offset = src_paddr & 15;
+	sz = round_up(sz + offset, 16);
+
+	return __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, src_paddr, dst_paddr, sz, err, false);
+}
+
+static int __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
+				  unsigned long __user dst_uaddr,
+				  unsigned long dst_paddr,
+				  int size, int *err)
+{
+	struct page *tpage = NULL;
+	int ret, offset;
+
+	/* if inputs are not 16-byte then use intermediate buffer */
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_paddr, 16) ||
+	    !IS_ALIGNED(paddr,     16) ||
+	    !IS_ALIGNED(size,      16)) {
+		tpage = (void *)alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!tpage)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		dst_paddr = __sme_page_pa(tpage);
+	}
+
+	ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, size, err);
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_free;
+
+	if (tpage) {
+		offset = paddr & 15;
+		if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)dst_uaddr,
+				 page_address(tpage) + offset, size))
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+e_free:
+	if (tpage)
+		__free_page(tpage);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
+				  unsigned long __user vaddr,
+				  unsigned long dst_paddr,
+				  unsigned long __user dst_vaddr,
+				  int size, int *error)
+{
+	struct page *src_tpage = NULL;
+	struct page *dst_tpage = NULL;
+	int ret, len = size;
+
+	/* If source buffer is not aligned then use an intermediate buffer */
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(vaddr, 16)) {
+		src_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!src_tpage)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		if (copy_from_user(page_address(src_tpage),
+				(void __user *)(uintptr_t)vaddr, size)) {
+			__free_page(src_tpage);
+			return -EFAULT;
+		}
+
+		paddr = __sme_page_pa(src_tpage);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *  If destination buffer or length is not aligned then do read-modify-write:
+	 *   - decrypt destination in an intermediate buffer
+	 *   - copy the source buffer in an intermediate buffer
+	 *   - use the intermediate buffer as source buffer
+	 */
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_vaddr, 16) || !IS_ALIGNED(size, 16)) {
+		int dst_offset;
+
+		dst_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!dst_tpage) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto e_free;
+		}
+
+		ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, dst_paddr,
+					__sme_page_pa(dst_tpage), size, error);
+		if (ret)
+			goto e_free;
+
+		/*
+		 *  If source is kernel buffer then use memcpy() otherwise
+		 *  copy_from_user().
+		 */
+		dst_offset = dst_paddr & 15;
+
+		if (src_tpage)
+			memcpy(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
+			       page_address(src_tpage), size);
+		else {
+			if (copy_from_user(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
+					   (void __user *)(uintptr_t)vaddr, size)) {
+				ret = -EFAULT;
+				goto e_free;
+			}
+		}
+
+		paddr = __sme_page_pa(dst_tpage);
+		dst_paddr = round_down(dst_paddr, 16);
+		len = round_up(size, 16);
+	}
+
+	ret = __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, len, error, true);
+
+e_free:
+	if (src_tpage)
+		__free_page(src_tpage);
+	if (dst_tpage)
+		__free_page(dst_tpage);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_dbg_crypt(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, bool dec)
+{
+	unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr;
+	unsigned long dst_vaddr;
+	struct page **src_p, **dst_p;
+	struct kvm_sev_dbg debug;
+	unsigned long n;
+	int ret, size;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&debug, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(debug)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	vaddr = debug.src_uaddr;
+	size = debug.len;
+	vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
+	dst_vaddr = debug.dst_uaddr;
+
+	for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr) {
+		int len, s_off, d_off;
+
+		/* lock userspace source and destination page */
+		src_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0);
+		if (!src_p)
+			return -EFAULT;
+
+		dst_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, dst_vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 1);
+		if (!dst_p) {
+			sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, n);
+			return -EFAULT;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * The DBG_{DE,EN}CRYPT commands will perform {dec,en}cryption of the
+		 * memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region with C=1).
+		 * It's possible that the cache may contain the data with C=0, i.e.,
+		 * unencrypted so invalidate it first.
+		 */
+		sev_clflush_pages(src_p, 1);
+		sev_clflush_pages(dst_p, 1);
+
+		/*
+		 * Since user buffer may not be page aligned, calculate the
+		 * offset within the page.
+		 */
+		s_off = vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
+		d_off = dst_vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
+		len = min_t(size_t, (PAGE_SIZE - s_off), size);
+
+		if (dec)
+			ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(kvm,
+						     __sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
+						     dst_vaddr,
+						     __sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
+						     len, &argp->error);
+		else
+			ret = __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(kvm,
+						     __sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
+						     vaddr,
+						     __sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
+						     dst_vaddr,
+						     len, &argp->error);
+
+		sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, 1);
+		sev_unpin_memory(kvm, dst_p, 1);
+
+		if (ret)
+			goto err;
+
+		next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
+		dst_vaddr = dst_vaddr + len;
+		size -= len;
+	}
+err:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_launch_secret *data;
+	struct kvm_sev_launch_secret params;
+	struct page **pages;
+	void *blob, *hdr;
+	unsigned long n;
+	int ret, offset;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr, params.guest_len, &n, 1);
+	if (!pages)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/*
+	 * The secret must be copied into contiguous memory region, lets verify
+	 * that userspace memory pages are contiguous before we issue command.
+	 */
+	if (get_num_contig_pages(0, pages, n) != n) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto e_unpin_memory;
+	}
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		goto e_unpin_memory;
+
+	offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+	data->guest_address = __sme_page_pa(pages[0]) + offset;
+	data->guest_len = params.guest_len;
+
+	blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(blob)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(blob);
+		goto e_free;
+	}
+
+	data->trans_address = __psp_pa(blob);
+	data->trans_len = params.trans_len;
+
+	hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(hdr)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(hdr);
+		goto e_free_blob;
+	}
+	data->hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
+	data->hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
+
+	data->handle = sev->handle;
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET, data, &argp->error);
+
+	kfree(hdr);
+
+e_free_blob:
+	kfree(blob);
+e_free:
+	kfree(data);
+e_unpin_memory:
+	sev_unpin_memory(kvm, pages, n);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!svm_sev_enabled())
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&sev_cmd, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+
+	switch (sev_cmd.id) {
+	case KVM_SEV_INIT:
+		r = sev_guest_init(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START:
+		r = sev_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA:
+		r = sev_launch_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE:
+		r = sev_launch_measure(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH:
+		r = sev_launch_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS:
+		r = sev_guest_status(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT:
+		r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, true);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT:
+		r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, false);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET:
+		r = sev_launch_secret(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	default:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (copy_to_user(argp, &sev_cmd, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
+		r = -EFAULT;
+
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct enc_region *region;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (range->addr > ULONG_MAX || range->size > ULONG_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	region = kzalloc(sizeof(*region), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!region)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	region->pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, range->addr, range->size, &region->npages, 1);
+	if (!region->pages) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto e_free;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The guest may change the memory encryption attribute from C=0 -> C=1
+	 * or vice versa for this memory range. Lets make sure caches are
+	 * flushed to ensure that guest data gets written into memory with
+	 * correct C-bit.
+	 */
+	sev_clflush_pages(region->pages, region->npages);
+
+	region->uaddr = range->addr;
+	region->size = range->size;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+	list_add_tail(&region->list, &sev->regions_list);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+
+	return ret;
+
+e_free:
+	kfree(region);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static struct enc_region *
+find_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
+	struct enc_region *i;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(i, head, list) {
+		if (i->uaddr == range->addr &&
+		    i->size == range->size)
+			return i;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range)
+{
+	struct enc_region *region;
+	int ret;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm)) {
+		ret = -ENOTTY;
+		goto failed;
+	}
+
+	region = find_enc_region(kvm, range);
+	if (!region) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto failed;
+	}
+
+	__unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm, region);
+
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+	return 0;
+
+failed:
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void __sev_asid_free(int asid)
+{
+	clear_bit(asid - 1, sev_asid_bitmap);
+}
+
+static void sev_asid_free(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+
+	__sev_asid_free(sev->asid);
+}
+
+static void sev_unbind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle)
+{
+	struct sev_data_decommission *decommission;
+	struct sev_data_deactivate *data;
+
+	if (!handle)
+		return;
+
+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return;
+
+	/* deactivate handle */
+	data->handle = handle;
+	sev_guest_deactivate(data, NULL);
+
+	wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
+	sev_guest_df_flush(NULL);
+	kfree(data);
+
+	decommission = kzalloc(sizeof(*decommission), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!decommission)
+		return;
+
+	/* decommission handle */
+	decommission->handle = handle;
+	sev_guest_decommission(decommission, NULL);
+
+	kfree(decommission);
+}
+
+static struct page **sev_pin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long uaddr,
+				    unsigned long ulen, unsigned long *n,
+				    int write)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	unsigned long npages, npinned, size;
+	unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
+	struct page **pages;
+	unsigned long first, last;
+
+	if (ulen == 0 || uaddr + ulen < uaddr)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* Calculate number of pages. */
+	first = (uaddr & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	last = ((uaddr + ulen - 1) & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	npages = (last - first + 1);
+
+	locked = sev->pages_locked + npages;
+	lock_limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
+		pr_err("SEV: %lu locked pages exceed the lock limit of %lu.\n", locked, lock_limit);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* Avoid using vmalloc for smaller buffers. */
+	size = npages * sizeof(struct page *);
+	if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
+		pages = vmalloc(size);
+	else
+		pages = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	if (!pages)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* Pin the user virtual address. */
+	npinned = get_user_pages_fast(uaddr, npages, write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0, pages);
+	if (npinned != npages) {
+		pr_err("SEV: Failure locking %lu pages.\n", npages);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	*n = npages;
+	sev->pages_locked = locked;
+
+	return pages;
+
+err:
+	if (npinned > 0)
+		release_pages(pages, npinned);
+
+	kvfree(pages);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static void sev_unpin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, struct page **pages,
+			     unsigned long npages)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+
+	release_pages(pages, npages);
+	kvfree(pages);
+	sev->pages_locked -= npages;
+}
+
+static void sev_clflush_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned long npages)
+{
+	uint8_t *page_virtual;
+	unsigned long i;
+
+	if (npages == 0 || pages == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
+		page_virtual = kmap_atomic(pages[i]);
+		clflush_cache_range(page_virtual, PAGE_SIZE);
+		kunmap_atomic(page_virtual);
+	}
+}
+
+static void __unregister_enc_region_locked(struct kvm *kvm,
+					   struct enc_region *region)
+{
+	/*
+	 * The guest may change the memory encryption attribute from C=0 -> C=1
+	 * or vice versa for this memory range. Lets make sure caches are
+	 * flushed to ensure that guest data gets written into memory with
+	 * correct C-bit.
+	 */
+	sev_clflush_pages(region->pages, region->npages);
+
+	sev_unpin_memory(kvm, region->pages, region->npages);
+	list_del(&region->list);
+	kfree(region);
+}
+
+void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
+	struct list_head *pos, *q;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * if userspace was terminated before unregistering the memory regions
+	 * then lets unpin all the registered memory.
+	 */
+	if (!list_empty(head)) {
+		list_for_each_safe(pos, q, head) {
+			__unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm,
+				list_entry(pos, struct enc_region, list));
+		}
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+
+	sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
+	sev_asid_free(kvm);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/sev.h b/arch/x86/kvm/sev.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..45a383443ffe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/sev.h
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef ARCH_X86_KVM_SEV_H
+#define ARCH_X86_KVM_SEV_H
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
+
+bool svm_sev_enabled(void);
+unsigned int sev_get_max_asid(void);
+__init int sev_hardware_setup(void);
+__exit void sev_hardware_unsetup(void);
+int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
+int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range);
+int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range);
+void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm);
+
+#else
+
+static inline unsigned int sev_get_max_asid(void) { return 0; }
+static inline bool svm_sev_enabled(void) { return false; }
+static inline __init int sev_hardware_setup(void) { return -ENOTTY; }
+static inline __exit void sev_hardware_unsetup(void) { }
+static inline void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) { }
+
+static inline int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
+{
+	return -ENOTTY;
+}
+static int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range)
+{
+	return -ENOTTY;
+}
+static inline int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
+					    struct kvm_enc_region *range)
+{
+	return -ENOTTY;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */
+#endif /* ARCH_X86_KVM_SEV_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index eb75077cb982..1d1228b7b57d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@
 #include <linux/amd-iommu.h>
 #include <linux/hashtable.h>
 #include <linux/frame.h>
-#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
 #include <linux/swap.h>
@@ -54,6 +53,8 @@
 #include <asm/virtext.h>
 #include "trace.h"
 
+#include "sev.h"
+
 #define __ex(x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x)
 
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Qumranet");
@@ -294,13 +295,6 @@ enum {
 #define VMCB_AVIC_APIC_BAR_MASK		0xFFFFFFFFFF000ULL
 
 static unsigned int max_sev_asid;
-static unsigned int min_sev_asid;
-static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap;
-
-static inline bool svm_sev_enabled(void)
-{
-	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) ? max_sev_asid : 0;
-}
 
 static inline void mark_all_dirty(struct vmcb *vmcb)
 {
@@ -1057,47 +1051,6 @@ static int avic_ga_log_notifier(u32 ga_tag)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static __init int sev_hardware_setup(void)
-{
-	struct sev_user_data_status *status;
-	int rc;
-
-	/* Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously */
-	max_sev_asid = cpuid_ecx(0x8000001F);
-
-	if (!max_sev_asid)
-		return 1;
-
-	/* Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest */
-	min_sev_asid = cpuid_edx(0x8000001F);
-
-	/* Initialize SEV ASID bitmap */
-	sev_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(max_sev_asid, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!sev_asid_bitmap)
-		return 1;
-
-	status = kmalloc(sizeof(*status), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!status)
-		return 1;
-
-	/*
-	 * Check SEV platform status.
-	 *
-	 * PLATFORM_STATUS can be called in any state, if we failed to query
-	 * the PLATFORM status then either PSP firmware does not support SEV
-	 * feature or SEV firmware is dead.
-	 */
-	rc = sev_platform_status(status, NULL);
-	if (rc)
-		goto err;
-
-	pr_info("SEV supported\n");
-
-err:
-	kfree(status);
-	return rc;
-}
-
 static void grow_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
@@ -1183,6 +1136,8 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
 			r = sev_hardware_setup();
 			if (r)
 				sev = false;
+			else
+				max_sev_asid = sev_get_max_asid();
 		} else {
 			sev = false;
 		}
@@ -1249,8 +1204,7 @@ static __exit void svm_hardware_unsetup(void)
 {
 	int cpu;
 
-	if (svm_sev_enabled())
-		bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
+	sev_hardware_unsetup();
 
 	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
 		svm_cpu_uninit(cpu);
@@ -1560,154 +1514,6 @@ static int avic_init_backing_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void __sev_asid_free(int asid)
-{
-	struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
-	int cpu, pos;
-
-	pos = asid - 1;
-	clear_bit(pos, sev_asid_bitmap);
-
-	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
-		sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
-		sd->sev_vmcbs[pos] = NULL;
-	}
-}
-
-static void sev_asid_free(struct kvm *kvm)
-{
-	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
-
-	__sev_asid_free(sev->asid);
-}
-
-static void sev_unbind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle)
-{
-	struct sev_data_decommission *decommission;
-	struct sev_data_deactivate *data;
-
-	if (!handle)
-		return;
-
-	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!data)
-		return;
-
-	/* deactivate handle */
-	data->handle = handle;
-	sev_guest_deactivate(data, NULL);
-
-	wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
-	sev_guest_df_flush(NULL);
-	kfree(data);
-
-	decommission = kzalloc(sizeof(*decommission), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!decommission)
-		return;
-
-	/* decommission handle */
-	decommission->handle = handle;
-	sev_guest_decommission(decommission, NULL);
-
-	kfree(decommission);
-}
-
-static struct page **sev_pin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long uaddr,
-				    unsigned long ulen, unsigned long *n,
-				    int write)
-{
-	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
-	unsigned long npages, npinned, size;
-	unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
-	struct page **pages;
-	unsigned long first, last;
-
-	if (ulen == 0 || uaddr + ulen < uaddr)
-		return NULL;
-
-	/* Calculate number of pages. */
-	first = (uaddr & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
-	last = ((uaddr + ulen - 1) & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
-	npages = (last - first + 1);
-
-	locked = sev->pages_locked + npages;
-	lock_limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
-	if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
-		pr_err("SEV: %lu locked pages exceed the lock limit of %lu.\n", locked, lock_limit);
-		return NULL;
-	}
-
-	/* Avoid using vmalloc for smaller buffers. */
-	size = npages * sizeof(struct page *);
-	if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
-		pages = vmalloc(size);
-	else
-		pages = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
-
-	if (!pages)
-		return NULL;
-
-	/* Pin the user virtual address. */
-	npinned = get_user_pages_fast(uaddr, npages, write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0, pages);
-	if (npinned != npages) {
-		pr_err("SEV: Failure locking %lu pages.\n", npages);
-		goto err;
-	}
-
-	*n = npages;
-	sev->pages_locked = locked;
-
-	return pages;
-
-err:
-	if (npinned > 0)
-		release_pages(pages, npinned);
-
-	kvfree(pages);
-	return NULL;
-}
-
-static void sev_unpin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, struct page **pages,
-			     unsigned long npages)
-{
-	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
-
-	release_pages(pages, npages);
-	kvfree(pages);
-	sev->pages_locked -= npages;
-}
-
-static void sev_clflush_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned long npages)
-{
-	uint8_t *page_virtual;
-	unsigned long i;
-
-	if (npages == 0 || pages == NULL)
-		return;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
-		page_virtual = kmap_atomic(pages[i]);
-		clflush_cache_range(page_virtual, PAGE_SIZE);
-		kunmap_atomic(page_virtual);
-	}
-}
-
-static void __unregister_enc_region_locked(struct kvm *kvm,
-					   struct enc_region *region)
-{
-	/*
-	 * The guest may change the memory encryption attribute from C=0 -> C=1
-	 * or vice versa for this memory range. Lets make sure caches are
-	 * flushed to ensure that guest data gets written into memory with
-	 * correct C-bit.
-	 */
-	sev_clflush_pages(region->pages, region->npages);
-
-	sev_unpin_memory(kvm, region->pages, region->npages);
-	list_del(&region->list);
-	kfree(region);
-}
-
 static struct kvm *svm_vm_alloc(void)
 {
 	struct kvm_svm *kvm_svm = vzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_svm));
@@ -1719,34 +1525,6 @@ static void svm_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)
 	vfree(to_kvm_svm(kvm));
 }
 
-static void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
-{
-	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
-	struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
-	struct list_head *pos, *q;
-
-	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
-		return;
-
-	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
-
-	/*
-	 * if userspace was terminated before unregistering the memory regions
-	 * then lets unpin all the registered memory.
-	 */
-	if (!list_empty(head)) {
-		list_for_each_safe(pos, q, head) {
-			__unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm,
-				list_entry(pos, struct enc_region, list));
-		}
-	}
-
-	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
-
-	sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
-	sev_asid_free(kvm);
-}
-
 static void avic_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
@@ -1765,9 +1543,27 @@ static void avic_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&svm_vm_data_hash_lock, flags);
 }
 
+static void sev_vmcb_clear(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
+	int cpu, pos;
+
+	pos = sev_get_asid(kvm) - 1;
+
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+		sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
+		sd->sev_vmcbs[pos] = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
 static void svm_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
 	avic_vm_destroy(kvm);
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return;
+
+	sev_vmcb_clear(kvm);
 	sev_vm_destroy(kvm);
 }
 
@@ -6102,835 +5898,6 @@ static int enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int sev_asid_new(void)
-{
-	int pos;
-
-	/*
-	 * SEV-enabled guest must use asid from min_sev_asid to max_sev_asid.
-	 */
-	pos = find_next_zero_bit(sev_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid, min_sev_asid - 1);
-	if (pos >= max_sev_asid)
-		return -EBUSY;
-
-	set_bit(pos, sev_asid_bitmap);
-	return pos + 1;
-}
-
-static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
-{
-	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
-	int asid, ret;
-
-	ret = -EBUSY;
-	if (unlikely(sev->active))
-		return ret;
-
-	asid = sev_asid_new();
-	if (asid < 0)
-		return ret;
-
-	ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
-	if (ret)
-		goto e_free;
-
-	sev->active = true;
-	sev->asid = asid;
-	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sev->regions_list);
-
-	return 0;
-
-e_free:
-	__sev_asid_free(asid);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int sev_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle, int *error)
-{
-	struct sev_data_activate *data;
-	int asid = sev_get_asid(kvm);
-	int ret;
-
-	wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
-
-	ret = sev_guest_df_flush(error);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
-	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!data)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	/* activate ASID on the given handle */
-	data->handle = handle;
-	data->asid   = asid;
-	ret = sev_guest_activate(data, error);
-	kfree(data);
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int __sev_issue_cmd(int fd, int id, void *data, int *error)
-{
-	struct fd f;
-	int ret;
-
-	f = fdget(fd);
-	if (!f.file)
-		return -EBADF;
-
-	ret = sev_issue_cmd_external_user(f.file, id, data, error);
-
-	fdput(f);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int sev_issue_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, int id, void *data, int *error)
-{
-	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
-
-	return __sev_issue_cmd(sev->fd, id, data, error);
-}
-
-static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
-{
-	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
-	struct sev_data_launch_start *start;
-	struct kvm_sev_launch_start params;
-	void *dh_blob, *session_blob;
-	int *error = &argp->error;
-	int ret;
-
-	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
-		return -ENOTTY;
-
-	if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
-		return -EFAULT;
-
-	start = kzalloc(sizeof(*start), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!start)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	dh_blob = NULL;
-	if (params.dh_uaddr) {
-		dh_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.dh_uaddr, params.dh_len);
-		if (IS_ERR(dh_blob)) {
-			ret = PTR_ERR(dh_blob);
-			goto e_free;
-		}
-
-		start->dh_cert_address = __sme_set(__pa(dh_blob));
-		start->dh_cert_len = params.dh_len;
-	}
-
-	session_blob = NULL;
-	if (params.session_uaddr) {
-		session_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr, params.session_len);
-		if (IS_ERR(session_blob)) {
-			ret = PTR_ERR(session_blob);
-			goto e_free_dh;
-		}
-
-		start->session_address = __sme_set(__pa(session_blob));
-		start->session_len = params.session_len;
-	}
-
-	start->handle = params.handle;
-	start->policy = params.policy;
-
-	/* create memory encryption context */
-	ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START, start, error);
-	if (ret)
-		goto e_free_session;
-
-	/* Bind ASID to this guest */
-	ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start->handle, error);
-	if (ret)
-		goto e_free_session;
-
-	/* return handle to userspace */
-	params.handle = start->handle;
-	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, &params, sizeof(params))) {
-		sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start->handle);
-		ret = -EFAULT;
-		goto e_free_session;
-	}
-
-	sev->handle = start->handle;
-	sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
-
-e_free_session:
-	kfree(session_blob);
-e_free_dh:
-	kfree(dh_blob);
-e_free:
-	kfree(start);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int get_num_contig_pages(int idx, struct page **inpages,
-				unsigned long npages)
-{
-	unsigned long paddr, next_paddr;
-	int i = idx + 1, pages = 1;
-
-	/* find the number of contiguous pages starting from idx */
-	paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[idx]);
-	while (i < npages) {
-		next_paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i++]);
-		if ((paddr + PAGE_SIZE) == next_paddr) {
-			pages++;
-			paddr = next_paddr;
-			continue;
-		}
-		break;
-	}
-
-	return pages;
-}
-
-static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
-{
-	unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr, npages, size;
-	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
-	struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data params;
-	struct sev_data_launch_update_data *data;
-	struct page **inpages;
-	int i, ret, pages;
-
-	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
-		return -ENOTTY;
-
-	if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
-		return -EFAULT;
-
-	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!data)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	vaddr = params.uaddr;
-	size = params.len;
-	vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
-
-	/* Lock the user memory. */
-	inpages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr, size, &npages, 1);
-	if (!inpages) {
-		ret = -ENOMEM;
-		goto e_free;
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * The LAUNCH_UPDATE command will perform in-place encryption of the
-	 * memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region with C=1).
-	 * It's possible that the cache may contain the data with C=0, i.e.,
-	 * unencrypted so invalidate it first.
-	 */
-	sev_clflush_pages(inpages, npages);
-
-	for (i = 0; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr, i += pages) {
-		int offset, len;
-
-		/*
-		 * If the user buffer is not page-aligned, calculate the offset
-		 * within the page.
-		 */
-		offset = vaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
-
-		/* Calculate the number of pages that can be encrypted in one go. */
-		pages = get_num_contig_pages(i, inpages, npages);
-
-		len = min_t(size_t, ((pages * PAGE_SIZE) - offset), size);
-
-		data->handle = sev->handle;
-		data->len = len;
-		data->address = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i]) + offset;
-		ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, data, &argp->error);
-		if (ret)
-			goto e_unpin;
-
-		size -= len;
-		next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
-	}
-
-e_unpin:
-	/* content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */
-	for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
-		set_page_dirty_lock(inpages[i]);
-		mark_page_accessed(inpages[i]);
-	}
-	/* unlock the user pages */
-	sev_unpin_memory(kvm, inpages, npages);
-e_free:
-	kfree(data);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
-{
-	void __user *measure = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data;
-	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
-	struct sev_data_launch_measure *data;
-	struct kvm_sev_launch_measure params;
-	void __user *p = NULL;
-	void *blob = NULL;
-	int ret;
-
-	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
-		return -ENOTTY;
-
-	if (copy_from_user(&params, measure, sizeof(params)))
-		return -EFAULT;
-
-	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!data)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	/* User wants to query the blob length */
-	if (!params.len)
-		goto cmd;
-
-	p = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr;
-	if (p) {
-		if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) {
-			ret = -EINVAL;
-			goto e_free;
-		}
-
-		ret = -ENOMEM;
-		blob = kmalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!blob)
-			goto e_free;
-
-		data->address = __psp_pa(blob);
-		data->len = params.len;
-	}
-
-cmd:
-	data->handle = sev->handle;
-	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE, data, &argp->error);
-
-	/*
-	 * If we query the session length, FW responded with expected data.
-	 */
-	if (!params.len)
-		goto done;
-
-	if (ret)
-		goto e_free_blob;
-
-	if (blob) {
-		if (copy_to_user(p, blob, params.len))
-			ret = -EFAULT;
-	}
-
-done:
-	params.len = data->len;
-	if (copy_to_user(measure, &params, sizeof(params)))
-		ret = -EFAULT;
-e_free_blob:
-	kfree(blob);
-e_free:
-	kfree(data);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int sev_launch_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
-{
-	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
-	struct sev_data_launch_finish *data;
-	int ret;
-
-	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
-		return -ENOTTY;
-
-	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!data)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	data->handle = sev->handle;
-	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_FINISH, data, &argp->error);
-
-	kfree(data);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int sev_guest_status(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
-{
-	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
-	struct kvm_sev_guest_status params;
-	struct sev_data_guest_status *data;
-	int ret;
-
-	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
-		return -ENOTTY;
-
-	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!data)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	data->handle = sev->handle;
-	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS, data, &argp->error);
-	if (ret)
-		goto e_free;
-
-	params.policy = data->policy;
-	params.state = data->state;
-	params.handle = data->handle;
-
-	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, &params, sizeof(params)))
-		ret = -EFAULT;
-e_free:
-	kfree(data);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src,
-			       unsigned long dst, int size,
-			       int *error, bool enc)
-{
-	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
-	struct sev_data_dbg *data;
-	int ret;
-
-	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!data)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	data->handle = sev->handle;
-	data->dst_addr = dst;
-	data->src_addr = src;
-	data->len = size;
-
-	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm,
-			    enc ? SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT : SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT,
-			    data, error);
-	kfree(data);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int __sev_dbg_decrypt(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src_paddr,
-			     unsigned long dst_paddr, int sz, int *err)
-{
-	int offset;
-
-	/*
-	 * Its safe to read more than we are asked, caller should ensure that
-	 * destination has enough space.
-	 */
-	src_paddr = round_down(src_paddr, 16);
-	offset = src_paddr & 15;
-	sz = round_up(sz + offset, 16);
-
-	return __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, src_paddr, dst_paddr, sz, err, false);
-}
-
-static int __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
-				  unsigned long __user dst_uaddr,
-				  unsigned long dst_paddr,
-				  int size, int *err)
-{
-	struct page *tpage = NULL;
-	int ret, offset;
-
-	/* if inputs are not 16-byte then use intermediate buffer */
-	if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_paddr, 16) ||
-	    !IS_ALIGNED(paddr,     16) ||
-	    !IS_ALIGNED(size,      16)) {
-		tpage = (void *)alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!tpage)
-			return -ENOMEM;
-
-		dst_paddr = __sme_page_pa(tpage);
-	}
-
-	ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, size, err);
-	if (ret)
-		goto e_free;
-
-	if (tpage) {
-		offset = paddr & 15;
-		if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)dst_uaddr,
-				 page_address(tpage) + offset, size))
-			ret = -EFAULT;
-	}
-
-e_free:
-	if (tpage)
-		__free_page(tpage);
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
-				  unsigned long __user vaddr,
-				  unsigned long dst_paddr,
-				  unsigned long __user dst_vaddr,
-				  int size, int *error)
-{
-	struct page *src_tpage = NULL;
-	struct page *dst_tpage = NULL;
-	int ret, len = size;
-
-	/* If source buffer is not aligned then use an intermediate buffer */
-	if (!IS_ALIGNED(vaddr, 16)) {
-		src_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!src_tpage)
-			return -ENOMEM;
-
-		if (copy_from_user(page_address(src_tpage),
-				(void __user *)(uintptr_t)vaddr, size)) {
-			__free_page(src_tpage);
-			return -EFAULT;
-		}
-
-		paddr = __sme_page_pa(src_tpage);
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 *  If destination buffer or length is not aligned then do read-modify-write:
-	 *   - decrypt destination in an intermediate buffer
-	 *   - copy the source buffer in an intermediate buffer
-	 *   - use the intermediate buffer as source buffer
-	 */
-	if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_vaddr, 16) || !IS_ALIGNED(size, 16)) {
-		int dst_offset;
-
-		dst_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!dst_tpage) {
-			ret = -ENOMEM;
-			goto e_free;
-		}
-
-		ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, dst_paddr,
-					__sme_page_pa(dst_tpage), size, error);
-		if (ret)
-			goto e_free;
-
-		/*
-		 *  If source is kernel buffer then use memcpy() otherwise
-		 *  copy_from_user().
-		 */
-		dst_offset = dst_paddr & 15;
-
-		if (src_tpage)
-			memcpy(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
-			       page_address(src_tpage), size);
-		else {
-			if (copy_from_user(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
-					   (void __user *)(uintptr_t)vaddr, size)) {
-				ret = -EFAULT;
-				goto e_free;
-			}
-		}
-
-		paddr = __sme_page_pa(dst_tpage);
-		dst_paddr = round_down(dst_paddr, 16);
-		len = round_up(size, 16);
-	}
-
-	ret = __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, len, error, true);
-
-e_free:
-	if (src_tpage)
-		__free_page(src_tpage);
-	if (dst_tpage)
-		__free_page(dst_tpage);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int sev_dbg_crypt(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, bool dec)
-{
-	unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr;
-	unsigned long dst_vaddr;
-	struct page **src_p, **dst_p;
-	struct kvm_sev_dbg debug;
-	unsigned long n;
-	int ret, size;
-
-	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
-		return -ENOTTY;
-
-	if (copy_from_user(&debug, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(debug)))
-		return -EFAULT;
-
-	vaddr = debug.src_uaddr;
-	size = debug.len;
-	vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
-	dst_vaddr = debug.dst_uaddr;
-
-	for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr) {
-		int len, s_off, d_off;
-
-		/* lock userspace source and destination page */
-		src_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0);
-		if (!src_p)
-			return -EFAULT;
-
-		dst_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, dst_vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 1);
-		if (!dst_p) {
-			sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, n);
-			return -EFAULT;
-		}
-
-		/*
-		 * The DBG_{DE,EN}CRYPT commands will perform {dec,en}cryption of the
-		 * memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region with C=1).
-		 * It's possible that the cache may contain the data with C=0, i.e.,
-		 * unencrypted so invalidate it first.
-		 */
-		sev_clflush_pages(src_p, 1);
-		sev_clflush_pages(dst_p, 1);
-
-		/*
-		 * Since user buffer may not be page aligned, calculate the
-		 * offset within the page.
-		 */
-		s_off = vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
-		d_off = dst_vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
-		len = min_t(size_t, (PAGE_SIZE - s_off), size);
-
-		if (dec)
-			ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(kvm,
-						     __sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
-						     dst_vaddr,
-						     __sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
-						     len, &argp->error);
-		else
-			ret = __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(kvm,
-						     __sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
-						     vaddr,
-						     __sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
-						     dst_vaddr,
-						     len, &argp->error);
-
-		sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, 1);
-		sev_unpin_memory(kvm, dst_p, 1);
-
-		if (ret)
-			goto err;
-
-		next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
-		dst_vaddr = dst_vaddr + len;
-		size -= len;
-	}
-err:
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
-{
-	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
-	struct sev_data_launch_secret *data;
-	struct kvm_sev_launch_secret params;
-	struct page **pages;
-	void *blob, *hdr;
-	unsigned long n;
-	int ret, offset;
-
-	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
-		return -ENOTTY;
-
-	if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
-		return -EFAULT;
-
-	pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr, params.guest_len, &n, 1);
-	if (!pages)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	/*
-	 * The secret must be copied into contiguous memory region, lets verify
-	 * that userspace memory pages are contiguous before we issue command.
-	 */
-	if (get_num_contig_pages(0, pages, n) != n) {
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-		goto e_unpin_memory;
-	}
-
-	ret = -ENOMEM;
-	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!data)
-		goto e_unpin_memory;
-
-	offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
-	data->guest_address = __sme_page_pa(pages[0]) + offset;
-	data->guest_len = params.guest_len;
-
-	blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
-	if (IS_ERR(blob)) {
-		ret = PTR_ERR(blob);
-		goto e_free;
-	}
-
-	data->trans_address = __psp_pa(blob);
-	data->trans_len = params.trans_len;
-
-	hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);
-	if (IS_ERR(hdr)) {
-		ret = PTR_ERR(hdr);
-		goto e_free_blob;
-	}
-	data->hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
-	data->hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
-
-	data->handle = sev->handle;
-	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET, data, &argp->error);
-
-	kfree(hdr);
-
-e_free_blob:
-	kfree(blob);
-e_free:
-	kfree(data);
-e_unpin_memory:
-	sev_unpin_memory(kvm, pages, n);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
-{
-	struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
-	int r;
-
-	if (!svm_sev_enabled())
-		return -ENOTTY;
-
-	if (copy_from_user(&sev_cmd, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
-		return -EFAULT;
-
-	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
-
-	switch (sev_cmd.id) {
-	case KVM_SEV_INIT:
-		r = sev_guest_init(kvm, &sev_cmd);
-		break;
-	case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START:
-		r = sev_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
-		break;
-	case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA:
-		r = sev_launch_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
-		break;
-	case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE:
-		r = sev_launch_measure(kvm, &sev_cmd);
-		break;
-	case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH:
-		r = sev_launch_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
-		break;
-	case KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS:
-		r = sev_guest_status(kvm, &sev_cmd);
-		break;
-	case KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT:
-		r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, true);
-		break;
-	case KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT:
-		r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, false);
-		break;
-	case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET:
-		r = sev_launch_secret(kvm, &sev_cmd);
-		break;
-	default:
-		r = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	if (copy_to_user(argp, &sev_cmd, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
-		r = -EFAULT;
-
-out:
-	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
-	return r;
-}
-
-static int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
-				   struct kvm_enc_region *range)
-{
-	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
-	struct enc_region *region;
-	int ret = 0;
-
-	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
-		return -ENOTTY;
-
-	if (range->addr > ULONG_MAX || range->size > ULONG_MAX)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	region = kzalloc(sizeof(*region), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!region)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	region->pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, range->addr, range->size, &region->npages, 1);
-	if (!region->pages) {
-		ret = -ENOMEM;
-		goto e_free;
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * The guest may change the memory encryption attribute from C=0 -> C=1
-	 * or vice versa for this memory range. Lets make sure caches are
-	 * flushed to ensure that guest data gets written into memory with
-	 * correct C-bit.
-	 */
-	sev_clflush_pages(region->pages, region->npages);
-
-	region->uaddr = range->addr;
-	region->size = range->size;
-
-	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
-	list_add_tail(&region->list, &sev->regions_list);
-	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
-
-	return ret;
-
-e_free:
-	kfree(region);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static struct enc_region *
-find_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range)
-{
-	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
-	struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
-	struct enc_region *i;
-
-	list_for_each_entry(i, head, list) {
-		if (i->uaddr == range->addr &&
-		    i->size == range->size)
-			return i;
-	}
-
-	return NULL;
-}
-
-
-static int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
-				     struct kvm_enc_region *range)
-{
-	struct enc_region *region;
-	int ret;
-
-	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
-
-	if (!sev_guest(kvm)) {
-		ret = -ENOTTY;
-		goto failed;
-	}
-
-	region = find_enc_region(kvm, range);
-	if (!region) {
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-		goto failed;
-	}
-
-	__unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm, region);
-
-	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
-	return 0;
-
-failed:
-	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
-	return ret;
-}
-
 static uint16_t nested_get_evmcs_version(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	/* Not supported */
-- 
2.17.1

Re: [PATCH 0/2] KVM: SVM: move the SEV command handling into a separate file

[Sean Christopherson]

On Fri, Feb 01, 2019 at 04:47:12PM +0000, Singh, Brijesh wrote:
> svm.c is pretty huge, before we add more SEV specific commands (e.g SEV-ES,
> SEV-Migration etc) lets move the SEV command handling into a separate file.
> There is no logical changes in this series.

Any reason not to create arch/x86/kvm/svm/ before introducing sev.c? 

> The patch is based on motivation from this thread:
> https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=153910240507399&w=2
> 
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
> 
> Brijesh Singh (2):
>   KVM: SVM: move common struct definitions to header file
>   KVM: SVM: move the SEV specific function in a separate file
> 
>  arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h |  155 +++++
>  arch/x86/kvm/Makefile      |    2 +
>  arch/x86/kvm/sev.c         | 1076 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kvm/sev.h         |   40 ++
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm.c         | 1234 +-----------------------------------
>  5 files changed, 1296 insertions(+), 1211 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/sev.c
>  create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/sev.h
> 
> -- 
> 2.17.1
> 

Re: [PATCH 0/2] KVM: SVM: move the SEV command handling into a separate file

[Singh, Brijesh]

On 2/1/19 12:20 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 01, 2019 at 04:47:12PM +0000, Singh, Brijesh wrote:
>> svm.c is pretty huge, before we add more SEV specific commands (e.g SEV-ES,
>> SEV-Migration etc) lets move the SEV command handling into a separate file.
>> There is no logical changes in this series.
> 
> Any reason not to create arch/x86/kvm/svm/ before introducing sev.c?
> 

There are several features in svm.c that can be moved to different
files, SEV bits are just the start. I was thinking that we create
svm directory after features are separated in different files rather
than creating the directory first. Having said so, I am not oppose
to creating directory first then moving the code in a separate file.

Paolo, Radim

thoughts ?

thanks

Re: [PATCH 0/2] KVM: SVM: move the SEV command handling into a separate file

[Singh, Brijesh]

Hi Paolo and Radim,


On 2/1/19 10:47 AM, Singh, Brijesh wrote:
> svm.c is pretty huge, before we add more SEV specific commands (e.g SEV-ES,
> SEV-Migration etc) lets move the SEV command handling into a separate file.
> There is no logical changes in this series.
> 

Any thoughts on this series ?


> The patch is based on motivation from this thread:
> https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=153910240507399&w=2
> 
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
> 
> Brijesh Singh (2):
>    KVM: SVM: move common struct definitions to header file
>    KVM: SVM: move the SEV specific function in a separate file
> 
>   arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h |  155 +++++
>   arch/x86/kvm/Makefile      |    2 +
>   arch/x86/kvm/sev.c         | 1076 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   arch/x86/kvm/sev.h         |   40 ++
>   arch/x86/kvm/svm.c         | 1234 +-----------------------------------
>   5 files changed, 1296 insertions(+), 1211 deletions(-)
>   create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/sev.c
>   create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/sev.h
> 


-Brijesh