public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
To: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: ashok.raj@intel.com, jacob.jun.pan@intel.com,
	kevin.tian@intel.com, yi.l.liu@intel.com,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
	Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>,
	Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] iommu/vt-d: Disable ATS support on untrusted devices
Date: Fri,  1 Mar 2019 11:23:10 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190301032313.9311-2-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190301032313.9311-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>

Commit fb58fdcd295b9 ("iommu/vt-d: Do not enable ATS for untrusted
devices") disables ATS support on the devices which have been marked
as untrusted. Unfortunately this is not enough to fix the DMA attack
vulnerabiltiies because IOMMU driver allows translated requests as
long as a device advertises the ATS capability. Hence a malicious
peripheral device could use this to bypass IOMMU.

This disables the ATS support on untrusted devices by clearing the
internal per-device ATS mark. As the result, IOMMU driver will block
any translated requests from any device marked as untrusted.

Cc: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Suggested-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Fixes: fb58fdcd295b9 ("iommu/vt-d: Do not enable ATS for untrusted devices")
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
---
 drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
index f8f6d46c60f4..abdd165a829c 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
@@ -2484,7 +2484,8 @@ static struct dmar_domain *dmar_insert_one_dev_info(struct intel_iommu *iommu,
 	if (dev && dev_is_pci(dev)) {
 		struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(info->dev);
 
-		if (!pci_ats_disabled() &&
+		if (!pdev->untrusted &&
+		    !pci_ats_disabled() &&
 		    ecap_dev_iotlb_support(iommu->ecap) &&
 		    pci_find_ext_capability(pdev, PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_ATS) &&
 		    dmar_find_matched_atsr_unit(pdev))
-- 
2.17.1


  reply	other threads:[~2019-03-01  3:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-03-01  3:23 [PATCH 0/4] iommu/vt-d: Several fixes for 5.1 Lu Baolu
2019-03-01  3:23 ` Lu Baolu [this message]
2019-03-02  8:29   ` [PATCH 1/4] iommu/vt-d: Disable ATS support on untrusted devices Mika Westerberg
2019-03-01  3:23 ` [PATCH 2/4] iommu/vt-d: Set context field after value initialized Lu Baolu
2019-03-01  3:23 ` [PATCH 3/4] iommu/vt-d: Fix NULL pointer reference in intel_svm_bind_mm() Lu Baolu
2019-03-01  3:23 ` [PATCH 4/4] iommu/vt-d: Get domain ID before clear pasid entry Lu Baolu
2019-03-01  9:24 ` [PATCH 0/4] iommu/vt-d: Several fixes for 5.1 Joerg Roedel

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20190301032313.9311-2-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com \
    --to=baolu.lu@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=ashok.raj@intel.com \
    --cc=dwmw2@infradead.org \
    --cc=iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=jacob.jun.pan@intel.com \
    --cc=jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=joro@8bytes.org \
    --cc=kevin.tian@intel.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=yi.l.liu@intel.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox