public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
	Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
	yhs@fb.com, lkp@01.org
Subject: Re: [uaccess] 780464aed0: WARNING:at_arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:#strnlen_user/0x
Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 18:06:10 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190304180610.2d4f6f08d9ad89d6abae3597@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=whYMvevgF4yh7uhQug=Wt1A1Eg7abyM=RCi=bQiqiMBvQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Sun, 3 Mar 2019 18:37:59 -0800
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:

> On Sun, Mar 3, 2019 at 5:14 PM Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > I think it comes from WARN_ON_ONCE(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS)) in
> > user_access_ok(). The call trace shows that strndup_user might be called
> > from kernel daemon context.
> 
> Ahh, yes.
> 
> We've had this before. We've gotten rid of the actual "use system
> calls", but we still have some of the init sequence in particular just
> calling the wrappers instead.

Are those safe if we are in init sequence?

> 
> And yes, ksys_mount() takes __user pointers.
> 
> It would be a lot better to use "do_mount()", which is the interface
> that takes actual "char *" pointers.

Unfortunately, it still takes a __user pointer.

long do_mount(const char *dev_name, const char __user *dir_name,
                const char *type_page, unsigned long flags, void *data_page)

So what we need is

long do_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *dir_path,
                const char *type_page, unsigned long flags, void *data_page)

or introduce kern_do_mount()?

Since devtmpfsd calls ksys_chdir() and ksys_chroot(), we need to replace
those too. Fortunately, it seems that the last part which we have to fix.

Thank you,

> 
>                     Linus


-- 
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>

  reply	other threads:[~2019-03-04  9:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-02-28 16:02 [PATCH v5 0/6] tracing/probes: uaccess: Add support user-space access Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-28 16:02 ` [PATCH v5 1/6] uaccess: Add user_access_ok() Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-28 16:03 ` [PATCH v5 2/6] uaccess: Use user_access_ok() in user_access_begin() Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-03 17:39   ` [uaccess] 780464aed0: WARNING:at_arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:#strnlen_user/0x kernel test robot
2019-03-03 19:53     ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-04  1:14       ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-04  2:37         ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-04  9:06           ` Masami Hiramatsu [this message]
2019-03-04 15:16             ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-04 15:58               ` Jann Horn
2019-03-04 18:59             ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-05  2:36               ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-05  8:22                 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-05  9:01                   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-05  9:07                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-05 13:58                   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-05 14:53                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-05 15:18                       ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-04  3:20       ` [LKP] " Rong Chen
2019-02-28 16:03 ` [PATCH v5 3/6] uaccess: Add non-pagefault user-space read functions Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-28 22:49   ` Yonghong Song
2019-03-01  2:29     ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-01  6:30       ` Yonghong Song
2019-02-28 16:04 ` [PATCH v5 4/6] tracing/probe: Add ustring type for user-space string Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-28 16:04 ` [PATCH v5 5/6] tracing/probe: Support user-space dereference Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-28 16:05 ` [PATCH v5 6/6] selftests/ftrace: Add user-memory access syntax testcase Masami Hiramatsu

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20190304180610.2d4f6f08d9ad89d6abae3597@kernel.org \
    --to=mhiramat@kernel.org \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com \
    --cc=changbin.du@gmail.com \
    --cc=jannh@google.com \
    --cc=joel@joelfernandes.org \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=lkp@01.org \
    --cc=lkp@intel.com \
    --cc=luto@amacapital.net \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@kernel.org \
    --cc=namit@vmware.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=rostedt@goodmis.org \
    --cc=shuah@kernel.org \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=yhs@fb.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox