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* [RFC PATCH] ntp: Avoid undefined behaviour in second_overflow()
@ 2019-03-06  1:28 Xiongfeng Wang
  2019-03-06  1:42 ` John Stultz
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Xiongfeng Wang @ 2019-03-06  1:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: john.stultz, tglx, sboyd; +Cc: linux-kernel, wangxiongfeng2

When I ran Syzkaller testsuite, I got the following call trace.
================================================================================
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/time/ntp.c:457:16
signed integer overflow:
9223372036854775807 + 500 cannot be represented in type 'long int'
CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 4.19.25-dirty #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0xca/0x13e lib/dump_stack.c:113
 ubsan_epilogue+0xe/0x81 lib/ubsan.c:159
 handle_overflow+0x193/0x1e2 lib/ubsan.c:190
 second_overflow+0x403/0x540 kernel/time/ntp.c:457
 accumulate_nsecs_to_secs kernel/time/timekeeping.c:2002 [inline]
 logarithmic_accumulation kernel/time/timekeeping.c:2046 [inline]
 timekeeping_advance+0x2bb/0xec0 kernel/time/timekeeping.c:2114
 tick_do_update_jiffies64.part.2+0x1a0/0x350 kernel/time/tick-sched.c:97
 tick_do_update_jiffies64 kernel/time/tick-sched.c:1229 [inline]
 tick_nohz_update_jiffies kernel/time/tick-sched.c:499 [inline]
 tick_nohz_irq_enter kernel/time/tick-sched.c:1232 [inline]
 tick_irq_enter+0x1fd/0x240 kernel/time/tick-sched.c:1249
 irq_enter+0xc4/0x100 kernel/softirq.c:353
 entering_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:517 [inline]
 entering_ack_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:523 [inline]
 smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x20/0x480 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052
 apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:864
 </IRQ>
RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0x2/0x10 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:58
Code: 01 f0 0f 82 bc fd ff ff 48 c7 c7 c0 21 b1 83 e8 a1 0a 02 ff e9 ab fd ff ff 4c 89 e7 e8 77 b6 a5 fe e9 6a ff ff ff 90 90 fb f4 <c3> 0f 1f 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f4 c3 90 90 90 90 90 90
RSP: 0018:ffff888106307d20 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
RAX: 0000000000000007 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8881062e4f1c
RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: ffffed107c5dc77b R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff848c78a0
R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 1ffff11020c60fae R15: 0000000000000000
 arch_safe_halt arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:94 [inline]
 default_idle+0x24/0x2b0 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:561
 cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:153 [inline]
 do_idle+0x2ca/0x420 kernel/sched/idle.c:262
 cpu_startup_entry+0xcb/0xe0 kernel/sched/idle.c:368
 start_secondary+0x421/0x570 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:271
 secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:243
================================================================================

It is because time_maxerror is set as 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF by user. It
overflows when we add it with 'MAXFREQ / NSEC_PER_USEC' in
'second_overflow()'.

This patch add a limit check and saturate it when the user set
'time_maxerror'.

Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2@huawei.com>
---
 kernel/time/ntp.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/time/ntp.c b/kernel/time/ntp.c
index 36a2bef..38e1b65 100644
--- a/kernel/time/ntp.c
+++ b/kernel/time/ntp.c
@@ -677,6 +677,8 @@ static inline void process_adjtimex_modes(const struct timex *txc, s32 *time_tai
 
 	if (txc->modes & ADJ_MAXERROR)
 		time_maxerror = txc->maxerror;
+	if (time_maxerror > NTP_PHASE_LIMIT)
+		time_maxerror = NTP_PHASE_LIMIT;
 
 	if (txc->modes & ADJ_ESTERROR)
 		time_esterror = txc->esterror;
-- 
1.7.12.4


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [RFC PATCH] ntp: Avoid undefined behaviour in second_overflow()
  2019-03-06  1:28 [RFC PATCH] ntp: Avoid undefined behaviour in second_overflow() Xiongfeng Wang
@ 2019-03-06  1:42 ` John Stultz
  2019-03-06  9:54   ` Miroslav Lichvar
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: John Stultz @ 2019-03-06  1:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Xiongfeng Wang; +Cc: Thomas Gleixner, Stephen Boyd, lkml, Miroslav Lichvar

On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at 5:29 PM Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2@huawei.com> wrote:
>
> When I ran Syzkaller testsuite, I got the following call trace.
> ================================================================================
> UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/time/ntp.c:457:16
> signed integer overflow:
> 9223372036854775807 + 500 cannot be represented in type 'long int'
> CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 4.19.25-dirty #2
> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
> Call Trace:
>  <IRQ>
>  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
>  dump_stack+0xca/0x13e lib/dump_stack.c:113
>  ubsan_epilogue+0xe/0x81 lib/ubsan.c:159
>  handle_overflow+0x193/0x1e2 lib/ubsan.c:190
>  second_overflow+0x403/0x540 kernel/time/ntp.c:457
>  accumulate_nsecs_to_secs kernel/time/timekeeping.c:2002 [inline]
>  logarithmic_accumulation kernel/time/timekeeping.c:2046 [inline]
>  timekeeping_advance+0x2bb/0xec0 kernel/time/timekeeping.c:2114
>  tick_do_update_jiffies64.part.2+0x1a0/0x350 kernel/time/tick-sched.c:97
>  tick_do_update_jiffies64 kernel/time/tick-sched.c:1229 [inline]
>  tick_nohz_update_jiffies kernel/time/tick-sched.c:499 [inline]
>  tick_nohz_irq_enter kernel/time/tick-sched.c:1232 [inline]
>  tick_irq_enter+0x1fd/0x240 kernel/time/tick-sched.c:1249
>  irq_enter+0xc4/0x100 kernel/softirq.c:353
>  entering_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:517 [inline]
>  entering_ack_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:523 [inline]
>  smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x20/0x480 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052
>  apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:864
>  </IRQ>
> RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0x2/0x10 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:58
> Code: 01 f0 0f 82 bc fd ff ff 48 c7 c7 c0 21 b1 83 e8 a1 0a 02 ff e9 ab fd ff ff 4c 89 e7 e8 77 b6 a5 fe e9 6a ff ff ff 90 90 fb f4 <c3> 0f 1f 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f4 c3 90 90 90 90 90 90
> RSP: 0018:ffff888106307d20 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
> RAX: 0000000000000007 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8881062e4f1c
> RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: ffffed107c5dc77b R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff848c78a0
> R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 1ffff11020c60fae R15: 0000000000000000
>  arch_safe_halt arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:94 [inline]
>  default_idle+0x24/0x2b0 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:561
>  cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:153 [inline]
>  do_idle+0x2ca/0x420 kernel/sched/idle.c:262
>  cpu_startup_entry+0xcb/0xe0 kernel/sched/idle.c:368
>  start_secondary+0x421/0x570 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:271
>  secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:243
> ================================================================================
>
> It is because time_maxerror is set as 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF by user. It
> overflows when we add it with 'MAXFREQ / NSEC_PER_USEC' in
> 'second_overflow()'.
>
> This patch add a limit check and saturate it when the user set
> 'time_maxerror'.
>
> Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2@huawei.com>
> ---
>  kernel/time/ntp.c | 2 ++
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/time/ntp.c b/kernel/time/ntp.c
> index 36a2bef..38e1b65 100644
> --- a/kernel/time/ntp.c
> +++ b/kernel/time/ntp.c
> @@ -677,6 +677,8 @@ static inline void process_adjtimex_modes(const struct timex *txc, s32 *time_tai
>
>         if (txc->modes & ADJ_MAXERROR)
>                 time_maxerror = txc->maxerror;
> +       if (time_maxerror > NTP_PHASE_LIMIT)
> +               time_maxerror = NTP_PHASE_LIMIT;

This looks sane to me.
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>

Though it makes me wonder a bit more about the sanity checking on the
other parameters passed via adjtimex(), tick_usec for instance looks
like it could be similarly problematic.

thanks
-john

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [RFC PATCH] ntp: Avoid undefined behaviour in second_overflow()
  2019-03-06  1:42 ` John Stultz
@ 2019-03-06  9:54   ` Miroslav Lichvar
  2019-03-06 12:29     ` Thomas Gleixner
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Miroslav Lichvar @ 2019-03-06  9:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: John Stultz; +Cc: Xiongfeng Wang, Thomas Gleixner, Stephen Boyd, lkml

On Tue, Mar 05, 2019 at 05:42:25PM -0800, John Stultz wrote:
> > --- a/kernel/time/ntp.c
> > +++ b/kernel/time/ntp.c
> > @@ -677,6 +677,8 @@ static inline void process_adjtimex_modes(const struct timex *txc, s32 *time_tai
> >
> >         if (txc->modes & ADJ_MAXERROR)
> >                 time_maxerror = txc->maxerror;
> > +       if (time_maxerror > NTP_PHASE_LIMIT)
> > +               time_maxerror = NTP_PHASE_LIMIT;
> 
> This looks sane to me.
> Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
> 
> Though it makes me wonder a bit more about the sanity checking on the
> other parameters passed via adjtimex(), tick_usec for instance looks
> like it could be similarly problematic.

The tick length is checked earlier in timekeeping_validate_timex(), so
that should be ok.

What I'd like to see clamped is the system time itself. ktime_t
overflows on Apr 11 2262. clock_settime() and adjtimex(ADJ_SETOFFSET)
can set the time close to the overflow and let everything break.

Boot a VM and try this:

# date -s 'Apr 11 23:47:15 UTC 2262'

There was a patch submitted couple years ago that prevented overflows
in 32-bit time_t and ktime_t.

http://lkml.iu.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1510.0/04719.html

-- 
Miroslav Lichvar

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [RFC PATCH] ntp: Avoid undefined behaviour in second_overflow()
  2019-03-06  9:54   ` Miroslav Lichvar
@ 2019-03-06 12:29     ` Thomas Gleixner
  2019-03-06 13:37       ` Arnd Bergmann
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-03-06 12:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Miroslav Lichvar
  Cc: John Stultz, Xiongfeng Wang, Stephen Boyd, lkml, Arnd Bergmann

On Wed, 6 Mar 2019, Miroslav Lichvar wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 05, 2019 at 05:42:25PM -0800, John Stultz wrote:
> > > --- a/kernel/time/ntp.c
> > > +++ b/kernel/time/ntp.c
> > > @@ -677,6 +677,8 @@ static inline void process_adjtimex_modes(const struct timex *txc, s32 *time_tai
> > >
> > >         if (txc->modes & ADJ_MAXERROR)
> > >                 time_maxerror = txc->maxerror;
> > > +       if (time_maxerror > NTP_PHASE_LIMIT)
> > > +               time_maxerror = NTP_PHASE_LIMIT;
> > 
> > This looks sane to me.
> > Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
> > 
> > Though it makes me wonder a bit more about the sanity checking on the
> > other parameters passed via adjtimex(), tick_usec for instance looks
> > like it could be similarly problematic.
> 
> The tick length is checked earlier in timekeeping_validate_timex(), so
> that should be ok.
> 
> What I'd like to see clamped is the system time itself. ktime_t
> overflows on Apr 11 2262. clock_settime() and adjtimex(ADJ_SETOFFSET)
> can set the time close to the overflow and let everything break.
> 
> Boot a VM and try this:
> 
> # date -s 'Apr 11 23:47:15 UTC 2262'

So once Arnd is done with y2038, we'll ask him to look into y2262 :)

Seriously, yes we should do clamping there.

Thanks,

	tglx

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [RFC PATCH] ntp: Avoid undefined behaviour in second_overflow()
  2019-03-06 12:29     ` Thomas Gleixner
@ 2019-03-06 13:37       ` Arnd Bergmann
  2019-03-07  5:10         ` Richard Cochran
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Arnd Bergmann @ 2019-03-06 13:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Thomas Gleixner
  Cc: Miroslav Lichvar, John Stultz, Xiongfeng Wang, Stephen Boyd, lkml

On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 1:29 PM Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> wrote:
> On Wed, 6 Mar 2019, Miroslav Lichvar wrote:
> > On Tue, Mar 05, 2019 at 05:42:25PM -0800, John Stultz wrote:

> So once Arnd is done with y2038, we'll ask him to look into y2262 :)

There is also y2070 (many RTCs), y2100 (some other RTCs, especially
those that assume it's a leap year), and y2106.

       Arnd

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [RFC PATCH] ntp: Avoid undefined behaviour in second_overflow()
  2019-03-06 13:37       ` Arnd Bergmann
@ 2019-03-07  5:10         ` Richard Cochran
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Richard Cochran @ 2019-03-07  5:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Arnd Bergmann
  Cc: Thomas Gleixner, Miroslav Lichvar, John Stultz, Xiongfeng Wang,
	Stephen Boyd, lkml

On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 02:37:21PM +0100, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> 
> There is also y2070 (many RTCs), y2100 (some other RTCs, especially
> those that assume it's a leap year), and y2106.

That's okay, Arnd.  When the time comes you can come out of retirement
and cash in, doing Y2.07, Y2.1, and Y2.106K consulting  ;^}

Cheers,
Richard


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2019-03-07  5:10 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2019-03-06  1:28 [RFC PATCH] ntp: Avoid undefined behaviour in second_overflow() Xiongfeng Wang
2019-03-06  1:42 ` John Stultz
2019-03-06  9:54   ` Miroslav Lichvar
2019-03-06 12:29     ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-06 13:37       ` Arnd Bergmann
2019-03-07  5:10         ` Richard Cochran

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