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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: torvalds@linux-foundation.org, tglx@linutronix.de, hpa@zytor.com,
	julien.thierry@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com, luto@amacapital.net,
	mingo@kernel.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com, james.morse@arm.com,
	valentin.schneider@arm.com, brgerst@gmail.com,
	jpoimboe@redhat.com, luto@kernel.org, bp@alien8.de,
	dvlasenk@redhat.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
	dvyukov@google.com, rostedt@goodmis.org
Subject: [PATCH 24/25] objtool: uaccess PUSHF/POPF support
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 16:39:04 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190318155142.119777676@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20190318153840.906404905@infradead.org

Add PUSHF / POPF state.uaccess restore logic. This makes
user_access_save() / user_access_restore() 'work' with objtool.

XXX: should be merged with the previous patch such that KASAN
doesn't explode in between. Split for review.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 tools/objtool/arch.h            |    2 ++
 tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c |    4 ++--
 tools/objtool/check.c           |   30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 tools/objtool/check.h           |    1 +
 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/tools/objtool/arch.h
+++ b/tools/objtool/arch.h
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ enum op_dest_type {
 	OP_DEST_REG_INDIRECT,
 	OP_DEST_MEM,
 	OP_DEST_PUSH,
+	OP_DEST_PUSHF,
 	OP_DEST_LEAVE,
 };
 
@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@ enum op_src_type {
 	OP_SRC_REG_INDIRECT,
 	OP_SRC_CONST,
 	OP_SRC_POP,
+	OP_SRC_POPF,
 	OP_SRC_ADD,
 	OP_SRC_AND,
 };
--- a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c
@@ -357,13 +357,13 @@ int arch_decode_instruction(struct elf *
 		/* pushf */
 		*type = INSN_STACK;
 		op->src.type = OP_SRC_CONST;
-		op->dest.type = OP_DEST_PUSH;
+		op->dest.type = OP_DEST_PUSHF;
 		break;
 
 	case 0x9d:
 		/* popf */
 		*type = INSN_STACK;
-		op->src.type = OP_SRC_POP;
+		op->src.type = OP_SRC_POPF;
 		op->dest.type = OP_DEST_MEM;
 		break;
 
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -1392,11 +1392,11 @@ static int update_insn_state_regs(struct
 		return 0;
 
 	/* push */
-	if (op->dest.type == OP_DEST_PUSH)
+	if (op->dest.type == OP_DEST_PUSH || op->dest.type == OP_DEST_PUSHF)
 		cfa->offset += 8;
 
 	/* pop */
-	if (op->src.type == OP_SRC_POP)
+	if (op->src.type == OP_SRC_POP || op->src.type == OP_SRC_POPF)
 		cfa->offset -= 8;
 
 	/* add immediate to sp */
@@ -1653,6 +1653,7 @@ static int update_insn_state(struct inst
 			break;
 
 		case OP_SRC_POP:
+		case OP_SRC_POPF:
 			if (!state->drap && op->dest.type == OP_DEST_REG &&
 			    op->dest.reg == cfa->base) {
 
@@ -1717,6 +1718,7 @@ static int update_insn_state(struct inst
 		break;
 
 	case OP_DEST_PUSH:
+	case OP_DEST_PUSHF:
 		state->stack_size += 8;
 		if (cfa->base == CFI_SP)
 			cfa->offset += 8;
@@ -1807,7 +1809,7 @@ static int update_insn_state(struct inst
 		break;
 
 	case OP_DEST_MEM:
-		if (op->src.type != OP_SRC_POP) {
+		if (op->src.type != OP_SRC_POP && op->src.type != OP_SRC_POPF) {
 			WARN_FUNC("unknown stack-related memory operation",
 				  insn->sec, insn->offset);
 			return -1;
@@ -2109,6 +2111,26 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtoo
 			if (update_insn_state(insn, &state))
 				return 1;
 
+			if (insn->stack_op.dest.type == OP_DEST_PUSHF) {
+				if (!state.uaccess_stack) {
+					state.uaccess_stack = 1;
+				} else if (state.uaccess_stack >> 31) {
+					WARN_FUNC("PUSHF stack exhausted", sec, insn->offset);
+					return 1;
+				}
+				state.uaccess_stack <<= 1;
+				state.uaccess_stack  |= state.uaccess;
+			}
+
+			if (insn->stack_op.src.type == OP_SRC_POPF) {
+				if (state.uaccess_stack) {
+					state.uaccess = state.uaccess_stack & 1;
+					state.uaccess_stack >>= 1;
+					if (state.uaccess_stack == 1)
+						state.uaccess_stack = 0;
+				}
+			}
+
 			break;
 
 		case INSN_STAC:
@@ -2126,7 +2148,7 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtoo
 				return 1;
 			}
 
-			if (func_uaccess_safe(func)) {
+			if (func_uaccess_safe(func) && !state.uaccess_stack) {
 				WARN_FUNC("UACCESS-safe disables UACCESS", sec, insn->offset);
 				return 1;
 			}
--- a/tools/objtool/check.h
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.h
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ struct insn_state {
 	unsigned char type;
 	bool bp_scratch;
 	bool drap, end, uaccess;
+	unsigned int uaccess_stack;
 	int drap_reg, drap_offset;
 	struct cfi_reg vals[CFI_NUM_REGS];
 };



  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-03-18 15:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-03-18 15:38 [PATCH 00/25] objtool: UACCESS validation v4 Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 15:38 ` [PATCH 01/25] x86: Make SMAP 64-bit only Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 16:58   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-18 17:36     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 17:51       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 18:10         ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-21 17:12           ` hpa
2019-03-21 17:25           ` Denys Vlasenko
2019-03-21 18:18             ` hpa
2019-03-21 21:03               ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-21 18:21             ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-19 11:16   ` [PATCH 01/25] sched/x86: Save [ER]FLAGS on context switch Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 15:38 ` [PATCH 02/25] tracing: Improve "if" macro code generation Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 17:41   ` Steven Rostedt
2019-03-18 23:37   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-19 10:11     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-20 11:18   ` David Laight
2019-03-20 17:26     ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-20 17:37       ` David Laight
2019-03-20 17:38         ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-20 18:18       ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-09 13:00       ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-09 16:51         ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-09 18:29           ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-09 18:45             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-05-09 18:47               ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-05-09 18:48                 ` Randy Dunlap
2019-05-09 18:57                   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-05-09 19:06               ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-09 19:28                 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-09 19:44                   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-18 15:38 ` [PATCH 03/25] x86/ia32: Fix ia32_restore_sigcontext AC leak Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 15:38 ` [PATCH 04/25] i915,uaccess: Fix redundant CLAC Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 15:38 ` [PATCH 05/25] x86/uaccess: Move copy_user_handle_tail into asm Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 15:38 ` [PATCH 06/25] x86/uaccess: Fix up the fixup Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 15:38 ` [PATCH 07/25] x86/nospec,objtool: Introduce ANNOTATE_IGNORE_ALTERNATIVE Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 15:38 ` [PATCH 08/25] x86/uaccess,xen: Suppress SMAP warnings Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 15:38 ` [PATCH 09/25] x86/uaccess: Always inline user_access_begin() Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 15:38 ` [PATCH 10/25] x86/uaccess,signal: Fix AC=1 bloat Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 15:38 ` [PATCH 11/25] x86/uaccess: Introduce user_access_{save,restore}() Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 15:38 ` [PATCH 12/25] x86/smap: Ditch __stringify() Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 15:38 ` [PATCH 13/25] x86/uaccess,kasan: Fix KASAN vs SMAP Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 15:38 ` [PATCH 14/25] x86/uaccess,ubsan: Fix UBSAN " Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 15:38 ` [PATCH 15/25] x86/uaccess,ftrace: Fix ftrace_likely_update() " Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 15:38 ` [PATCH 16/25] x86/uaccess,kcov: Disable stack protector Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 15:38 ` [PATCH 17/25] objtool: Set insn->func for alternatives Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 15:38 ` [PATCH 18/25] objtool: Handle function aliases Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 15:38 ` [PATCH 19/25] objtool: Rewrite add_ignores() Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 15:39 ` [PATCH 20/25] objtool: Add --backtrace support Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 15:39 ` [PATCH 21/25] objtool: Rewrite alt->skip_orig Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 15:39 ` [PATCH 22/25] objtool: Fix sibling call detection Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 15:39 ` [PATCH 23/25] objtool: Add UACCESS validation Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 23:51   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-05-07 11:52   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 15:39 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2019-03-18 15:39 ` [PATCH 25/25] objtool: Add Direction Flag validation Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-18 23:57 ` [PATCH 00/25] objtool: UACCESS validation v4 Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-19 11:20   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-19 11:17 ` [PATCH 26/25] sched/x86_64: Don't save flags on context switch Peter Zijlstra

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