From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
Mitsuo Hayasaka <mitsuo.hayasaka.hu@hitachi.com>
Subject: [patch V2 01/29] x86/irq/64: Limit IST stack overflow check to #DB stack
Date: Fri, 05 Apr 2019 17:06:59 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190405150928.506129462@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20190405150658.237064784@linutronix.de
commit 37fe6a42b343 ("x86: Check stack overflow in detail") added a broad
check for the full exception stack area, i.e. it considers the full
exception stack area as valid.
That's wrong in two aspects:
1) It does not check the individual areas one by one
2) #DF, NMI and #MCE are not enabling interrupts which means that a
regular device interrupt cannot happen in their context. In fact if a
device interrupt hits one of those IST stacks that's a bug because some
code path enabled interrupts while handling the exception.
Limit the check to the #DB stack and consider all other IST stacks as
'overflow' or invalid.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Mitsuo Hayasaka <mitsuo.hayasaka.hu@hitachi.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c
@@ -26,9 +26,18 @@ int sysctl_panic_on_stackoverflow;
/*
* Probabilistic stack overflow check:
*
- * Only check the stack in process context, because everything else
- * runs on the big interrupt stacks. Checking reliably is too expensive,
- * so we just check from interrupts.
+ * Regular device interrupts can enter on the following stacks:
+ *
+ * - User stack
+ *
+ * - Kernel task stack
+ *
+ * - Interrupt stack if a device driver reenables interrupts
+ * which should only happen in really old drivers.
+ *
+ * - Debug IST stack
+ *
+ * All other contexts are invalid.
*/
static inline void stack_overflow_check(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
@@ -53,8 +62,8 @@ static inline void stack_overflow_check(
return;
oist = this_cpu_ptr(&orig_ist);
- estack_top = (u64)oist->ist[0] - EXCEPTION_STKSZ + STACK_TOP_MARGIN;
- estack_bottom = (u64)oist->ist[N_EXCEPTION_STACKS - 1];
+ estack_bottom = (u64)oist->ist[DEBUG_STACK];
+ estack_top = estack_bottom - DEBUG_STKSZ + STACK_TOP_MARGIN;
if (regs->sp >= estack_top && regs->sp <= estack_bottom)
return;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-05 15:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-05 15:06 [patch V2 00/29] x86: Add guard pages to exception and interrupt stacks Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:06 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 02/29] x86/dumpstack: Fix off-by-one errors in stack identification Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:44 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 03/29] x86/irq/64: Remove a hardcoded irq_stack_union access Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 16:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-04-05 16:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-04-05 17:18 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 17:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 04/29] x86/irq/64: Sanitize the top/bottom confusion Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 16:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 05/29] x86/idt: Remove unused macro SISTG Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 06/29] x86/exceptions: Remove unused stack defines on 32bit Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 07/29] x86/exceptions: Make IST index zero based Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 18:59 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 08/29] x86/cpu_entry_area: Cleanup setup functions Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 19:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 09/29] x86/exceptions: Add structs for exception stacks Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 20:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-04-05 20:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-04-05 21:00 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 10/29] x86/cpu_entry_area: Prepare for IST guard pages Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 11/29] x86/cpu_entry_area: Provide exception stack accessor Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 12/29] x86/traps: Use cpu_entry_area instead of orig_ist Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 13/29] x86/irq/64: Use cpu entry area " Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 14/29] x86/dumpstack/64: Use cpu_entry_area " Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 15/29] x86/cpu: Prepare TSS.IST setup for guard pages Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 16/29] x86/cpu: Remove orig_ist array Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 17/29] x86/exceptions: Disconnect IST index and stack order Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 21:57 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 22:00 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 18/29] x86/exceptions: Enable IST guard pages Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 19/29] x86/exceptions: Split debug IST stack Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 20:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-04-05 21:01 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 20/29] x86/dumpstack/64: Speedup in_exception_stack() Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 21:55 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 21:56 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 21/29] x86/irq/32: Define IRQ_STACK_SIZE Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 22/29] x86/irq/32: Make irq stack a character array Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 23/29] x86/irq/32: Rename hard/softirq_stack to hard/softirq_stack_ptr Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 24/29] x86/irq/64: Rename irq_stack_ptr to hardirq_stack_ptr Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 25/29] x86/irq/32: Invoke irq_ctx_init() from init_IRQ() Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:27 ` Juergen Gross
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 26/29] x86/irq/32: Handle irq stack allocation failure proper Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 27/29] x86/irq/64: Split the IRQ stack into its own pages Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 28/29] x86/irq/64: Remap the IRQ stack with guard pages Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-07 4:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-07 6:08 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-07 9:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-07 9:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-07 14:03 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-07 22:44 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-08 2:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-08 6:46 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-08 16:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-08 16:36 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-08 16:44 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-08 18:19 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-05 15:07 ` [patch V2 29/29] x86/irq/64: Remove stack overflow debug code Thomas Gleixner
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