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Date:   Mon, 22 Apr 2019 08:01:19 -0700
From:   Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To:     "Dr. Greg" <greg@enjellic.com>
Cc:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
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        "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
Message-ID: <20190422150119.GA1236@linux.intel.com>
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On Sat, Apr 20, 2019 at 11:02:47AM -0500, Dr. Greg wrote:
> We understand and support the need for the LSM to trap these events,
> but what does LSM provenance mean if the platform is compromised?
> That is, technically, the target application for SGX technology.

No, it's not.  Protecting the kernel/platform from a malicious entity is
outside the scope of SGX.