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[173.164.112.133]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id d3sm26389989pfn.113.2019.04.24.13.34.09 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Wed, 24 Apr 2019 13:34:09 -0700 (PDT) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 13:34:08 -0700 From: Kees Cook To: Andrew Morton Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert , Marc Gonzalez , Jason Gunthorpe , Will Deacon , x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , Andy Lutomirski , Stephen Rothwell , Catalin Marinas , Mark Rutland , Arnd Bergmann , Linux ARM , Kernel Hardening , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v2] binfmt_elf: Update READ_IMPLIES_EXEC logic for modern CPUs Message-ID: <20190424203408.GA11386@beast> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org The READ_IMPLIES_EXEC work-around was designed for old CPUs lacking NX (to have the visible permission flags on memory regions reflect reality: they are all executable), and for old toolchains that lacked the ELF PT_GNU_STACK marking (under the assumption that toolchains that couldn't even specify memory protection flags may have it wrong for all memory regions). This logic is sensible, but was implemented in a way that equated having a PT_GNU_STACK marked executable as being as "broken" as lacking the PT_GNU_STACK marking entirely. This is not a reasonable assumption for CPUs that have had NX support from the start (or very close to the start). This confusion has led to situations where modern 64-bit programs with explicitly marked executable stack are forced into the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC state when no such thing is needed. (And leads to unexpected failures when mmap()ing regions of device driver memory that wish to disallow VM_EXEC[1].) To fix this, elf_read_implies_exec() is adjusted on arm64 (where NX has always existed and toolchains have implemented PT_GNU_STACK for a while), and x86 is adjusted to handle this combination of possible outcomes: CPU: | lacks NX | has NX, ia32 | has NX, x86_64 | ELF: | | | | ------------------------------|------------------|------------------| missing GNU_STACK | needs RIE | needs RIE | no RIE | GNU_STACK == RWX | needs RIE | no RIE: stack X | no RIE: stack X | GNU_STACK == RW | needs RIE | no RIE: stack NX | no RIE: stack NX | This has the effect of making binfmt_elf's EXSTACK_DEFAULT actually take on the correct architecture default of being non-executable on arm64 and x86_64, and being executable on ia32. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190418055759.GA3155@mellanox.com Suggested-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- v2: adjust arm64 to avoid is_compat_task() (marc.w.gonzalez) --- arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h | 8 +++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h index 6adc1a90e7e6..f1bb4b388b8f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h @@ -107,7 +107,13 @@ */ #define elf_check_arch(x) ((x)->e_machine == EM_AARCH64) -#define elf_read_implies_exec(ex,stk) (stk != EXSTACK_DISABLE_X) +/* + * 64-bit processes should not automatically gain READ_IMPLIES_EXEC. Only + * 32-bit processes without PT_GNU_STACK should trigger READ_IMPLIES_EXEC + * out of an abundance of caution against ancient toolchains not knowing + * how to mark memory protection flags correctly. + */ +#define compat_elf_read_implies_exec(ex, stk) (stk == EXSTACK_DEFAULT) #define CORE_DUMP_USE_REGSET #define ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE PAGE_SIZE diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h index 69c0f892e310..5e65f1dcefc9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h @@ -280,10 +280,28 @@ extern u32 elf_hwcap2; /* * An executable for which elf_read_implies_exec() returns TRUE will - * have the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag set automatically. + * have the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag set automatically. This + * is needed either to show the truth about a memory mapping (i.e. CPUs + * that lack NX have all memory implicitly executable, so this makes + * sure that the visible permissions reflect reality), or to deal with + * old toolchains on new CPUs. Old binaries entirely lacking a GNU_STACK + * indicate they were likely built with a toolchain that has no idea about + * memory permissions, and so we must default to the lowest reasonable + * common denominator for the architecture: on ia32 we assume all memory + * to be executable by default, and on x86_64 we assume all memory to be + * non-executable by default. + * + * CPU: | lacks NX | has NX, ia32 | has NX, x86_64 | + * ELF: | | | | + * ------------------------------|------------------|------------------| + * missing GNU_STACK | needs RIE | needs RIE | no RIE | + * GNU_STACK == RWX | needs RIE | no RIE: stack X | no RIE: stack X | + * GNU_STACK == RW | needs RIE | no RIE: stack NX | no RIE: stack NX | + * */ -#define elf_read_implies_exec(ex, executable_stack) \ - (executable_stack != EXSTACK_DISABLE_X) +#define elf_read_implies_exec(ex, stk) \ + (!(__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX) || \ + (mmap_is_ia32() && stk == EXSTACK_DEFAULT)) struct task_struct; -- 2.17.1 -- Kees Cook