From: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
To: "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>,
"ebiggers@google.com" <ebiggers@google.com>,
"herbert@gondor.apana.org.au" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"jpoimboe@redhat.com" <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
"jannh@google.com" <jannh@google.com>,
"Perla, Enrico" <enrico.perla@intel.com>,
"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon syscall
Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 09:33:47 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190528133347.GD19149@mit.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2236FBA76BA1254E88B949DDB74E612BA4CA8DBF@IRSMSX102.ger.corp.intel.com>
I confess I've kind of lost the plot on the performance requirements
at this point. Instead of measuring and evaluating potential
solutions, can we try to approach this from the opposite direction and
ask what the requirements are?
What's the maximum number of CPU cycles that we are allowed to burn
such that we can meet the 1-2% overhead?
And how many bits of uncertainty are we trying to present to the
attacker? What's the minimum beyond we shouldn't bother? (Perhaps
because rdtsc will give us that many bits?) And does that change if
we vary the reseed window in terms of the number of system calls
between reseeding?
And what are the ideal parameters after which point we're just gilding
the lily?
- Ted
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-05-28 13:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-15 6:09 [PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon syscall Elena Reshetova
2019-04-15 7:25 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-15 8:44 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-16 7:34 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-16 11:10 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-16 12:08 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-16 12:45 ` David Laight
2019-04-16 15:43 ` Theodore Ts'o
2019-04-16 16:07 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-16 16:47 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-17 9:28 ` David Laight
2019-04-17 15:15 ` Theodore Ts'o
2019-04-17 15:40 ` Kees Cook
2019-04-17 15:53 ` David Laight
2019-04-24 11:42 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-24 13:33 ` David Laight
2019-04-25 11:23 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-26 11:33 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-26 14:01 ` Theodore Ts'o
2019-04-26 17:44 ` Eric Biggers
2019-04-26 18:02 ` Theodore Ts'o
2019-04-27 13:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-29 8:04 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-26 18:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-29 7:46 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-29 16:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-30 17:51 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-30 18:01 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-01 8:23 ` David Laight
2019-05-02 8:07 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-05-01 8:41 ` David Laight
2019-05-01 23:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-02 8:15 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-05-02 9:23 ` David Laight
2019-05-02 14:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-02 15:08 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-05-02 16:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-02 16:43 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-05-03 16:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-02 16:34 ` David Laight
2019-05-02 16:45 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-05-03 16:17 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-05-03 16:40 ` David Laight
2019-05-03 19:10 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-06 6:47 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-05-06 7:01 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-05-08 11:18 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-05-08 11:32 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-05-08 13:22 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-05-09 5:59 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-05-09 7:01 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-05-09 8:43 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-05-11 22:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-12 0:12 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-12 8:02 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-05-12 14:33 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-28 12:28 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-05-28 13:33 ` Theodore Ts'o [this message]
2019-05-29 10:13 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-05-29 10:51 ` David Laight
2019-05-29 18:35 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-29 18:37 ` Kees Cook
2019-07-29 11:41 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-07-30 18:07 ` Kees Cook
2019-08-01 6:35 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-05-09 7:03 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-05-06 7:32 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-29 7:49 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-26 17:37 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2019-04-17 6:24 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-16 18:19 ` Reshetova, Elena
[not found] <20190408061358.21288-1-elena.reshetova@intel.com>
2019-04-08 12:49 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-08 13:30 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-08 16:21 ` Kees Cook
2019-04-10 8:26 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-10 9:00 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-10 10:17 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-10 10:24 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-10 14:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-12 5:36 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-12 21:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
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