From: "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: "kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>, "Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de>,
"Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 10/11] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 16:38:58 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190620163832.5451-11-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190620163832.5451-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Invoke a hypercall when a memory region is changed from encrypted ->
decrypted and vice versa. Hypervisor need to know the page encryption
status during the guest migration.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 3 ++
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c | 15 ++++++++++
3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 616f8e637bc3..3f43cfdd0209 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -97,4 +97,7 @@ extern char __start_bss_decrypted[], __end_bss_decrypted[], __start_bss_decrypte
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+extern void set_memory_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr,
+ unsigned long size, bool enc);
+
#endif /* __X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 51f50a7a07ef..55a4c806786d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/dma-direct.h>
#include <linux/swiotlb.h>
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/kvm_para.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/fixmap.h>
@@ -28,6 +29,7 @@
#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+#include <asm/kvm_para.h>
#include "mm_internal.h"
@@ -195,6 +197,45 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void)
swiotlb_force = SWIOTLB_FORCE;
}
+void set_memory_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long sz, bool enc)
+{
+ unsigned long vaddr_end, vaddr_next;
+
+ vaddr_end = vaddr + sz;
+
+ for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = vaddr_next) {
+ int psize, pmask, level;
+ unsigned long pfn;
+ pte_t *kpte;
+
+ kpte = lookup_address(vaddr, &level);
+ if (!kpte || pte_none(*kpte))
+ return;
+
+ switch (level) {
+ case PG_LEVEL_4K:
+ pfn = pte_pfn(*kpte);
+ break;
+ case PG_LEVEL_2M:
+ pfn = pmd_pfn(*(pmd_t *)kpte);
+ break;
+ case PG_LEVEL_1G:
+ pfn = pud_pfn(*(pud_t *)kpte);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return;
+ }
+
+ psize = page_level_size(level);
+ pmask = page_level_mask(level);
+
+ kvm_sev_hypercall3(KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS,
+ pfn << PAGE_SHIFT, psize >> PAGE_SHIFT, enc);
+
+ vaddr_next = (vaddr & pmask) + psize;
+ }
+}
+
static void __init __set_clr_pte_enc(pte_t *kpte, int level, bool enc)
{
pgprot_t old_prot, new_prot;
@@ -252,12 +293,13 @@ static void __init __set_clr_pte_enc(pte_t *kpte, int level, bool enc)
static int __init early_set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long vaddr,
unsigned long size, bool enc)
{
- unsigned long vaddr_end, vaddr_next;
+ unsigned long vaddr_end, vaddr_next, start;
unsigned long psize, pmask;
int split_page_size_mask;
int level, ret;
pte_t *kpte;
+ start = vaddr;
vaddr_next = vaddr;
vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
@@ -312,6 +354,7 @@ static int __init early_set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long vaddr,
ret = 0;
+ set_memory_enc_dec_hypercall(start, size, enc);
out:
__flush_tlb_all();
return ret;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
index 6a9a77a403c9..971f70f58f49 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <asm/proto.h>
#include <asm/pat.h>
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
+#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
#include "mm_internal.h"
@@ -2020,6 +2021,12 @@ int set_memory_global(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
__pgprot(_PAGE_GLOBAL), 0);
}
+void __attribute__((weak)) set_memory_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long addr,
+ unsigned long size,
+ bool enc)
+{
+}
+
static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
{
struct cpa_data cpa;
@@ -2060,6 +2067,14 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
*/
cpa_flush(&cpa, 0);
+ /*
+ * When SEV is active, notify hypervisor that a given memory range is mapped
+ * encrypted or decrypted. Hypervisor will use this information during
+ * the VM migration.
+ */
+ if (sev_active())
+ set_memory_enc_dec_hypercall(addr, numpages << PAGE_SHIFT, enc);
+
return ret;
}
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-20 16:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20190620163832.5451-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
2019-06-20 16:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/11] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 16:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/11] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 16:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/11] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 16:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/11] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 16:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/11] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 16:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/11] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 16:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/11] KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3 Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 16:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/11] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 16:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/11] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_PAGE_ENC_BITMAP ioctl Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 16:38 ` Singh, Brijesh [this message]
2019-06-20 16:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/11] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_SET_PAGE_ENC_BITMAP ioctl Singh, Brijesh
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