* [PATCH 1/2] Fix an OOB bug in parse_audio_mixer_unit
@ 2019-08-30 21:46 Hui Peng
2019-09-01 12:58 ` Salvatore Bonaccorso
[not found] ` <CAKpmkkVQ2fbL47JrbVMrfCenPShjjwfkS9MY0Ay5MpyFjftxpg@mail.gmail.com>
0 siblings, 2 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Hui Peng @ 2019-08-30 21:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Hui Peng, Mathias Payer, Jaroslav Kysela, Takashi Iwai,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, Wenwen Wang, alsa-devel, linux-kernel
The `uac_mixer_unit_descriptor` shown as below is read from the
device side. In `parse_audio_mixer_unit`, `baSourceID` field is
accessed from index 0 to `bNrInPins` - 1, the current implementation
assumes that descriptor is always valid (the length of descriptor
is no shorter than 5 + `bNrInPins`). If a descriptor read from
the device side is invalid, it may trigger out-of-bound memory
access.
```
struct uac_mixer_unit_descriptor {
__u8 bLength;
__u8 bDescriptorType;
__u8 bDescriptorSubtype;
__u8 bUnitID;
__u8 bNrInPins;
__u8 baSourceID[];
}
```
This patch fixes the bug by add a sanity check on the length of
the descriptor.
CVE: CVE-2018-15117
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
---
sound/usb/mixer.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/sound/usb/mixer.c b/sound/usb/mixer.c
index 1f7eb3816cd7..10ddec76f906 100644
--- a/sound/usb/mixer.c
+++ b/sound/usb/mixer.c
@@ -1628,6 +1628,7 @@ static int parse_audio_mixer_unit(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid,
int pin, ich, err;
if (desc->bLength < 11 || !(input_pins = desc->bNrInPins) ||
+ desc->bLength < sizeof(*desc) + desc->bNrInPins ||
!(num_outs = uac_mixer_unit_bNrChannels(desc))) {
usb_audio_err(state->chip,
"invalid MIXER UNIT descriptor %d\n",
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 1/2] Fix an OOB bug in parse_audio_mixer_unit 2019-08-30 21:46 [PATCH 1/2] Fix an OOB bug in parse_audio_mixer_unit Hui Peng @ 2019-09-01 12:58 ` Salvatore Bonaccorso 2019-09-01 19:43 ` Hui Peng [not found] ` <CAKpmkkVQ2fbL47JrbVMrfCenPShjjwfkS9MY0Ay5MpyFjftxpg@mail.gmail.com> 1 sibling, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread From: Salvatore Bonaccorso @ 2019-09-01 12:58 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Hui Peng Cc: stable, Mathias Payer, Jaroslav Kysela, Takashi Iwai, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Wenwen Wang, alsa-devel, linux-kernel On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 05:46:49PM -0400, Hui Peng wrote: > The `uac_mixer_unit_descriptor` shown as below is read from the > device side. In `parse_audio_mixer_unit`, `baSourceID` field is > accessed from index 0 to `bNrInPins` - 1, the current implementation > assumes that descriptor is always valid (the length of descriptor > is no shorter than 5 + `bNrInPins`). If a descriptor read from > the device side is invalid, it may trigger out-of-bound memory > access. > > ``` > struct uac_mixer_unit_descriptor { > __u8 bLength; > __u8 bDescriptorType; > __u8 bDescriptorSubtype; > __u8 bUnitID; > __u8 bNrInPins; > __u8 baSourceID[]; > } > ``` > > This patch fixes the bug by add a sanity check on the length of > the descriptor. > > CVE: CVE-2018-15117 FWIW, the correct CVE id should be probably CVE-2019-15117 here. But there was already a patch queued and released in 5.2.10 and 4.19.68 for this issue (as far I can see; is this correct?) Regards, Salvatore ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 1/2] Fix an OOB bug in parse_audio_mixer_unit 2019-09-01 12:58 ` Salvatore Bonaccorso @ 2019-09-01 19:43 ` Hui Peng 0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread From: Hui Peng @ 2019-09-01 19:43 UTC (permalink / raw) To: carnil Cc: stable, mathias.payer, perex, tiwai, gregkh, wang6495, alsa-devel, linux-kernel [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1425 bytes --] On 9/1/19 8:58 AM, Salvatore Bonaccorso wrote: > On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 05:46:49PM -0400, Hui Peng wrote: >> The `uac_mixer_unit_descriptor` shown as below is read from the >> device side. In `parse_audio_mixer_unit`, `baSourceID` field is >> accessed from index 0 to `bNrInPins` - 1, the current implementation >> assumes that descriptor is always valid (the length of descriptor >> is no shorter than 5 + `bNrInPins`). If a descriptor read from >> the device side is invalid, it may trigger out-of-bound memory >> access. >> >> ``` >> struct uac_mixer_unit_descriptor { >> __u8 bLength; >> __u8 bDescriptorType; >> __u8 bDescriptorSubtype; >> __u8 bUnitID; >> __u8 bNrInPins; >> __u8 baSourceID[]; >> } >> ``` >> >> This patch fixes the bug by add a sanity check on the length of >> the descriptor. >> >> CVE: CVE-2018-15117 > FWIW, the correct CVE id should be probably CVE-2019-15117 here. Yes, the CVE id was wrong. I have updated it in the attached patch. > But there was already a patch queued and released in 5.2.10 and > 4.19.68 for this issue (as far I can see; is this correct?) Yes, it should have been fixed in those branches. But google asked me to back port it to v4.4.190 and v4.14.141. I have mentioned it in one previous email, but it was blocked by vger because it was sent in html format. Can you apply it to these 2 versions? (it applies to both versions) Thanks. > Regards, > Salvatore [-- Attachment #2: 0001-Fix-an-OOB-bug-in-parse_audio_mixer_unit.patch --] [-- Type: text/x-patch, Size: 1601 bytes --] From 09942398a53bbe730264b782673890d4a54068d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com> Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2019 16:11:00 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix an OOB bug in parse_audio_mixer_unit The `uac_mixer_unit_descriptor` shown as below is read from the device side. In `parse_audio_mixer_unit`, `baSourceID` field is accessed from index 0 to `bNrInPins` - 1, the current implementation assumes that descriptor is always valid (the length of descriptor is no shorter than 5 + `bNrInPins`). If a descriptor read from the device side is invalid, it may trigger out-of-bound memory access. ``` struct uac_mixer_unit_descriptor { __u8 bLength; __u8 bDescriptorType; __u8 bDescriptorSubtype; __u8 bUnitID; __u8 bNrInPins; __u8 baSourceID[]; } ``` This patch fixes the bug by add a sanity check on the length of the descriptor. CVE: CVE-2019-15117 Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com> Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net> Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com> --- sound/usb/mixer.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/sound/usb/mixer.c b/sound/usb/mixer.c index 1f7eb3816cd7..10ddec76f906 100644 --- a/sound/usb/mixer.c +++ b/sound/usb/mixer.c @@ -1628,6 +1628,7 @@ static int parse_audio_mixer_unit(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid, int pin, ich, err; if (desc->bLength < 11 || !(input_pins = desc->bNrInPins) || + desc->bLength < sizeof(*desc) + desc->bNrInPins || !(num_outs = uac_mixer_unit_bNrChannels(desc))) { usb_audio_err(state->chip, "invalid MIXER UNIT descriptor %d\n", -- 2.17.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
[parent not found: <CAKpmkkVQ2fbL47JrbVMrfCenPShjjwfkS9MY0Ay5MpyFjftxpg@mail.gmail.com>]
* Re: [PATCH 1/2] Fix an OOB bug in parse_audio_mixer_unit [not found] ` <CAKpmkkVQ2fbL47JrbVMrfCenPShjjwfkS9MY0Ay5MpyFjftxpg@mail.gmail.com> @ 2019-09-02 16:00 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2019-09-02 16:00 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Hui Peng Cc: stable, Mathias Payer, Jaroslav Kysela, Takashi Iwai, Wenwen Wang, alsa-devel, linux-kernel On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 05:49:59PM -0400, Hui Peng wrote: > This is the backported patch of the following bug to v4.4.x and v4.14.x: > daac07156b33 ("ALSA: usb-audio: Fix an OOB bug in parse_audio_mixer_unit") Thanks, also now queued up to 4.9.y, you forgot that one :) greg k-h ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
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2019-08-30 21:46 [PATCH 1/2] Fix an OOB bug in parse_audio_mixer_unit Hui Peng
2019-09-01 12:58 ` Salvatore Bonaccorso
2019-09-01 19:43 ` Hui Peng
[not found] ` <CAKpmkkVQ2fbL47JrbVMrfCenPShjjwfkS9MY0Ay5MpyFjftxpg@mail.gmail.com>
2019-09-02 16:00 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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