From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
pbonzini@redhat.com, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
Cc: mst@redhat.com, rkrcmar@redhat.com, jmattson@google.com,
Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 3/7] KVM: VMX: Pass through CET related MSRs to Guest
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2019 10:19:23 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190927021927.23057-4-weijiang.yang@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190927021927.23057-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com>
CET MSRs pass through Guest directly to enhance performance.
CET runtime control settings are stored in MSR_IA32_{U,S}_CET,
Shadow Stack Pointer(SSP) are stored in MSR_IA32_PL{0,1,2,3}_SSP,
SSP table base address is stored in MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB,
these MSRs are defined in kernel and re-used here.
MSR_IA32_U_CET and MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP are used for user mode protection,
the contents could differ from process to process, therefore,
kernel needs to save/restore them during context switch, it makes
sense to pass through them so that the guest kernel can
use xsaves/xrstors to operate them efficiently. Other MSRs are used
for non-user mode protection. See CET spec for detailed info.
The difference between CET VMCS state fields and xsave components is that,
the former used for CET state storage during VMEnter/VMExit,
whereas the latter used for state retention between Guest task/process
switch.
Co-developed-by: Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 42 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 1aa86b87b6ab..0a47b9e565be 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ u64 kvm_supported_xss(void)
{
return KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS & kvm_x86_ops->supported_xss();
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_supported_xss);
#define F(x) bit(X86_FEATURE_##x)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
index d78a61408243..1d77b880084d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ bool kvm_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx,
int cpuid_query_maxphyaddr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+u64 kvm_supported_xss(void);
+
static inline int cpuid_maxphyaddr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return vcpu->arch.maxphyaddr;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index a84198cff397..f720baa7a9ba 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -7001,6 +7001,43 @@ static void update_intel_pt_cfg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(0xfULL << (32 + i * 4));
}
+static void vmx_intercept_cet_msrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+ unsigned long *msr_bitmap;
+ u64 kvm_xss;
+ bool cet_en;
+
+ msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
+ kvm_xss = kvm_supported_xss();
+ cet_en = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
+ guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT);
+
+ /*
+ * U_CET is a must for USER CET, per CET spec., U_CET and PL3_SPP are
+ * a bundle for USER CET xsaves.
+ */
+ if (cet_en && (kvm_xss & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER)) {
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_U_CET, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+ }
+ /*
+ * S_CET is a must for KERNEL CET, PL0_SSP ... PL2_SSP are a bundle
+ * for CET KERNEL xsaves.
+ */
+ if (cet_en && (kvm_xss & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)) {
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_S_CET, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+
+ /* SSP_TAB only available for KERNEL SHSTK.*/
+ if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB,
+ MSR_TYPE_RW);
+ }
+}
+
static void vmx_cpuid_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
@@ -7025,6 +7062,8 @@ static void vmx_cpuid_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT) &&
guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT))
update_intel_pt_cfg(vcpu);
+
+ vmx_intercept_cet_msrs(vcpu);
}
static void vmx_set_supported_cpuid(u32 func, struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry)
--
2.17.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-09-27 2:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-09-27 2:19 [PATCH v7 0/7] Introduce support for Guest CET feature Yang Weijiang
2019-09-27 2:19 ` [PATCH v7 1/7] KVM: CPUID: Fix IA32_XSS support in CPUID(0xd,i) enumeration Yang Weijiang
2019-10-02 17:26 ` Jim Mattson
2019-10-08 8:30 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-10-17 19:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-10-18 1:28 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-10-22 19:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-10-23 1:16 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-09-27 2:19 ` [PATCH v7 2/7] kvm: vmx: Define CET VMCS fields and CPUID flags Yang Weijiang
2019-10-02 18:04 ` Jim Mattson
2019-10-09 5:56 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-09-27 2:19 ` Yang Weijiang [this message]
2019-10-02 18:18 ` [PATCH v7 3/7] KVM: VMX: Pass through CET related MSRs to Guest Jim Mattson
2019-10-09 6:15 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-10-10 19:04 ` Jim Mattson
2019-10-11 1:51 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-10-17 20:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-10-18 1:31 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-09-27 2:19 ` [PATCH v7 4/7] KVM: VMX: Load Guest CET via VMCS when CET is enabled in Guest Yang Weijiang
2019-10-02 18:54 ` Jim Mattson
2019-10-09 6:43 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-10-09 23:08 ` Jim Mattson
2019-10-10 1:30 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-10-10 23:44 ` Jim Mattson
2019-10-11 1:43 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-09-27 2:19 ` [PATCH v7 5/7] kvm: x86: Add CET CR4 bit and XSS support Yang Weijiang
2019-10-02 19:05 ` Jim Mattson
2019-10-17 19:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-10-18 1:58 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-10-22 20:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-10-23 1:19 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-09-27 2:19 ` [PATCH v7 6/7] KVM: x86: Load Guest fpu state when accessing MSRs managed by XSAVES Yang Weijiang
2019-10-02 19:56 ` Jim Mattson
2019-10-09 6:46 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-09-27 2:19 ` [PATCH v7 7/7] KVM: x86: Add user-space access interface for CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2019-10-02 20:57 ` Jim Mattson
2019-10-09 6:56 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-10-17 19:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-10-18 1:32 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-10-02 22:40 ` [PATCH v7 0/7] Introduce support for Guest CET feature Jim Mattson
2019-10-03 13:01 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-10-03 16:33 ` Jim Mattson
2019-10-08 8:50 ` Yang Weijiang
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