[PATCH v7 2/7] kvm: vmx: Define CET VMCS fields and CPUID flags

Yang Weijiang
2019-09-27T02:17:15Z

CET(Control-flow Enforcement Technology) is an upcoming Intel(R)
processor feature that blocks Return/Jump-Oriented Programming(ROP)
attacks. It provides the following capabilities to defend
against ROP/JOP style control-flow subversion attacks:

Shadow Stack (SHSTK):
A second stack for program which is used exclusively for
control transfer operations.

Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT):
Code branching protection to defend against jump/call oriented
programming.

Several new CET MSRs are defined in kernel to support CET:
MSR_IA32_{U,S}_CET: Controls the CET settings for user
mode and suervisor mode respectively.

MSR_IA32_PL{0,1,2,3}_SSP: Stores shadow stack pointers for
CPL-0,1,2,3 level respectively.

MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB: Stores base address of shadow stack
pointer table.

Two XSAVES state bits are introduced for CET:
IA32_XSS:[bit 11]: For saving/restoring user mode CET states
IA32_XSS:[bit 12]: For saving/restoring supervisor mode CET states.

Six VMCS fields are introduced for CET:
{HOST,GUEST}_S_CET: Stores CET settings for supervisor mode.
{HOST,GUEST}_SSP: Stores shadow stack pointer for supervisor mode.
{HOST,GUEST}_INTR_SSP_TABLE: Stores base address of shadow stack pointer
table.

If VM_EXIT_LOAD_HOST_CET_STATE = 1, the host's CET MSRs are restored
from below VMCS fields at VM-Exit:
HOST_S_CET
HOST_SSP
HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE

If VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_CET_STATE = 1, the guest's CET MSRs are loaded
from below VMCS fields at VM-Entry:
GUEST_S_CET
GUEST_SSP
GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE

Co-developed-by: Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 8 ++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 3 ++-
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index a39136b0d509..68bca290a203 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@
#define VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS 0x00800000
#define VM_EXIT_PT_CONCEAL_PIP 0x01000000
#define VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL 0x02000000
+#define VM_EXIT_LOAD_HOST_CET_STATE 0x10000000

#define VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR 0x00036dff

@@ -103,6 +104,7 @@
#define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS 0x00010000
#define VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP 0x00020000
#define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL 0x00040000
+#define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_CET_STATE 0x00100000

#define VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR 0x000011ff

@@ -321,6 +323,9 @@ enum vmcs_field {
GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS = 0x00006822,
GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP = 0x00006824,
GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP = 0x00006826,
+ GUEST_S_CET = 0x00006828,
+ GUEST_SSP = 0x0000682a,
+ GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE = 0x0000682c,
HOST_CR0 = 0x00006c00,
HOST_CR3 = 0x00006c02,
HOST_CR4 = 0x00006c04,
@@ -333,6 +338,9 @@ enum vmcs_field {
HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP = 0x00006c12,
HOST_RSP = 0x00006c14,
HOST_RIP = 0x00006c16,
+ HOST_S_CET = 0x00006c18,
+ HOST_SSP = 0x00006c1a,
+ HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE = 0x00006c1c
};

/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 9d282fec0a62..1aa86b87b6ab 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -365,13 +365,13 @@ static inline void do_cpuid_7_mask(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, int index)
F(AVX512VBMI) | F(LA57) | F(PKU) | 0 /*OSPKE*/ |
F(AVX512_VPOPCNTDQ) | F(UMIP) | F(AVX512_VBMI2) | F(GFNI) |
F(VAES) | F(VPCLMULQDQ) | F(AVX512_VNNI) | F(AVX512_BITALG) |
- F(CLDEMOTE) | F(MOVDIRI) | F(MOVDIR64B);
+ F(CLDEMOTE) | F(MOVDIRI) | F(MOVDIR64B) | F(SHSTK);

/* cpuid 7.0.edx*/
const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features =
F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(SPEC_CTRL) |
F(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES) | F(INTEL_STIBP) |
- F(MD_CLEAR);
+ F(MD_CLEAR) | F(IBT);

/* cpuid 7.1.eax */
const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_1_eax_x86_features =
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index fbffabad0370..a85800b23e6e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -298,7 +298,8 @@ int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr2,
* Right now, no XSS states are used on x86 platform,
* expand the macro for new features.
*/
-#define KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS (0)
+#define KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS (XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER \
+ | XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)

extern u64 host_xcr0;

--
2.17.2