From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.2 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E8A4BCA9EB5 for ; Mon, 4 Nov 2019 12:40:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C5D7421E6F for ; Mon, 4 Nov 2019 12:40:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729294AbfKDMkX (ORCPT ); Mon, 4 Nov 2019 07:40:23 -0500 Received: from foss.arm.com ([217.140.110.172]:41974 "EHLO foss.arm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728377AbfKDMkX (ORCPT ); Mon, 4 Nov 2019 07:40:23 -0500 Received: from usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (unknown [10.121.207.14]) by usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7EE251FB; Mon, 4 Nov 2019 04:40:22 -0800 (PST) Received: from lakrids.cambridge.arm.com (usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com [10.121.207.14]) by usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 433CB3F6C4; Mon, 4 Nov 2019 04:40:20 -0800 (PST) Date: Mon, 4 Nov 2019 12:40:18 +0000 From: Mark Rutland To: Sami Tolvanen Cc: Will Deacon , Catalin Marinas , Steven Rostedt , Masami Hiramatsu , Ard Biesheuvel , Dave Martin , Kees Cook , Laura Abbott , Marc Zyngier , Nick Desaulniers , Jann Horn , Miguel Ojeda , Masahiro Yamada , clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 07/17] scs: add support for stack usage debugging Message-ID: <20191104124017.GD45140@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com> References: <20191018161033.261971-1-samitolvanen@google.com> <20191101221150.116536-1-samitolvanen@google.com> <20191101221150.116536-8-samitolvanen@google.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20191101221150.116536-8-samitolvanen@google.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.11.1+11 (2f07cb52) (2018-12-01) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Nov 01, 2019 at 03:11:40PM -0700, Sami Tolvanen wrote: > Implements CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE for shadow stacks. When enabled, > also prints out the highest shadow stack usage per process. > > Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen > --- > kernel/scs.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/kernel/scs.c b/kernel/scs.c > index 7780fc4e29ac..67c43af627d1 100644 > --- a/kernel/scs.c > +++ b/kernel/scs.c > @@ -167,6 +167,44 @@ int scs_prepare(struct task_struct *tsk, int node) > return 0; > } > > +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE > +static inline unsigned long scs_used(struct task_struct *tsk) > +{ > + unsigned long *p = __scs_base(tsk); > + unsigned long *end = scs_magic(tsk); > + uintptr_t s = (uintptr_t)p; As previously, please use unsigned long for consistency. > + > + while (p < end && *p) > + p++; I think this is the only place where we legtimately access the shadow call stack directly. When using SCS and KASAN, are the compiler-generated accesses to the SCS instrumented? If not, it might make sense to make this: while (p < end && READ_ONCE_NOCKECK(*p)) ... and poison the allocation from KASAN's PoV, so that we can find unintentional accesses more easily. Mark. > + > + return (uintptr_t)p - s; > +} > + > +static void scs_check_usage(struct task_struct *tsk) > +{ > + static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock); > + static unsigned long highest; > + unsigned long used = scs_used(tsk); > + > + if (used <= highest) > + return; > + > + spin_lock(&lock); > + > + if (used > highest) { > + pr_info("%s: highest shadow stack usage %lu bytes\n", > + __func__, used); > + highest = used; > + } > + > + spin_unlock(&lock); > +} > +#else > +static inline void scs_check_usage(struct task_struct *tsk) > +{ > +} > +#endif > + > bool scs_corrupted(struct task_struct *tsk) > { > return *scs_magic(tsk) != SCS_END_MAGIC; > @@ -181,6 +219,7 @@ void scs_release(struct task_struct *tsk) > return; > > WARN_ON(scs_corrupted(tsk)); > + scs_check_usage(tsk); > > scs_account(tsk, -1); > task_set_scs(tsk, NULL); > -- > 2.24.0.rc1.363.gb1bccd3e3d-goog >