public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
	Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] x86/traps: Print non-canonical address on #GP
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2019 10:20:43 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191114182043.GG24045@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrVmaN4BgvUdsuTJ8vdkaN1JrAfBzs+W7aS2cxxDYkqn_Q@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 10:00:35AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 9:46 AM Sean Christopherson
> <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> wrote:
> > > +     /*
> > > +      * For the user half, check against TASK_SIZE_MAX; this way, if the
> > > +      * access crosses the canonical address boundary, we don't miss it.
> > > +      */
> > > +     if (addr_ref <= TASK_SIZE_MAX)
> >
> > Any objection to open coding the upper bound instead of using
> > TASK_SIZE_MASK to make the threshold more obvious?
> >
> > > +             return;
> > > +
> > > +     pr_alert("dereferencing non-canonical address 0x%016lx\n", addr_ref);
> >
> > Printing the raw address will confuse users in the case where the access
> > straddles the lower canonical boundary.  Maybe combine this with open
> > coding the straddle case?  With a rough heuristic to hedge a bit for
> > instructions whose operand size isn't accurately reflected in opnd_bytes.
> >
> >         if (addr_ref > __VIRTUAL_MASK)
> >                 pr_alert("dereferencing non-canonical address 0x%016lx\n", addr_ref);
> >         else if ((addr_ref + insn->opnd_bytes - 1) > __VIRTUAL_MASK)
> >                 pr_alert("straddling non-canonical boundary 0x%016lx - 0x%016lx\n",
> >                          addr_ref, addr_ref + insn->opnd_bytes - 1);
> >         else if ((addr_ref + PAGE_SIZE - 1) > __VIRTUAL_MASK)
> >                 pr_alert("potentially straddling non-canonical boundary 0x%016lx - 0x%016lx\n",
> >                          addr_ref, addr_ref + PAGE_SIZE - 1);
> 
> This is unnecessarily complicated, and I suspect that Jann had the
> right idea but just didn't quite explain it enough.  The secret here
> is that TASK_SIZE_MAX is a full page below the canonical boundary
> (thanks, Intel, for screwing up SYSRET), so, if we get #GP for an
> address above TASK_SIZE_MAX,

Ya, I followed all that.  My point is that if "addr_ref + insn->opnd_bytes"
straddles the boundary then it's extremely likely the #GP is due to a
non-canonical access, i.e. the pr_alert() doesn't have to hedge (as much).

> then it's either a #GP for a different
> reason or it's a genuine non-canonical access.

Heh, "canonical || !canonical" would be the options :-D

> 
> So I think that just a comment about this would be enough.
> 
> *However*, the printout should at least hedge a bit and say something
> like "probably dereferencing non-canonical address", since there are
> plenty of ways to get #GP with an operand that is nominally
> non-canonical but where the actual cause of #GP is different.  And I
> think this code should be skipped entirely if error_code != 0.
> 
> --Andy

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-11-14 18:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-11-12 21:10 [PATCH 1/3] x86/insn-eval: Add support for 64-bit kernel mode Jann Horn
2019-11-12 21:10 ` [PATCH 2/3] x86/traps: Print non-canonical address on #GP Jann Horn
2019-11-14 17:46   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-11-14 18:00     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-11-14 18:08       ` Borislav Petkov
2019-11-14 18:20       ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2019-11-14 18:41         ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-11-14 18:54           ` Sean Christopherson
2019-11-14 20:03       ` Jann Horn
2019-11-12 21:10 ` [PATCH 3/3] x86/kasan: Print original " Jann Horn
2019-11-13 10:11   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-11-13 15:19     ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-11-13 15:43       ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-11-14 15:09     ` Jann Horn

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20191114182043.GG24045@linux.intel.com \
    --to=sean.j.christopherson@intel.com \
    --cc=aryabinin@virtuozzo.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dvyukov@google.com \
    --cc=glider@google.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=jannh@google.com \
    --cc=kasan-dev@googlegroups.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox