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From: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	rkrcmar@redhat.com,
	Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>,
	Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>,
	Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 01/13] KVM: x86: Protect x86_decode_insn from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2019 12:47:41 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191211204753.242298-2-pomonis@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191211204753.242298-1-pomonis@google.com>

This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in x86_decode_insn().
kvm_emulate_instruction() (an ancestor of x86_decode_insn()) is an exported
symbol, so KVM should treat it conservatively from a security perspective.

Fixes: commit 045a282ca415 ("KVM: emulator: implement fninit, fnstsw, fnstcw")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
---
 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
index 952d1a4f4d7e..fcf7cdb21d60 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -5303,10 +5303,15 @@ int x86_decode_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void *insn, int insn_len)
 			}
 			break;
 		case Escape:
-			if (ctxt->modrm > 0xbf)
-				opcode = opcode.u.esc->high[ctxt->modrm - 0xc0];
-			else
+			if (ctxt->modrm > 0xbf) {
+				size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(opcode.u.esc->high);
+				u32 index = array_index_nospec(
+					ctxt->modrm - 0xc0, size);
+
+				opcode = opcode.u.esc->high[index];
+			} else {
 				opcode = opcode.u.esc->op[(ctxt->modrm >> 3) & 7];
+			}
 			break;
 		case InstrDual:
 			if ((ctxt->modrm >> 6) == 3)
-- 
2.24.0.525.g8f36a354ae-goog


  reply	other threads:[~2019-12-11 20:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-12-11 20:47 [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: x86: Extend Spectre-v1 mitigation Marios Pomonis
2019-12-11 20:47 ` Marios Pomonis [this message]
2020-01-06 20:16   ` [PATCH v2 01/13] KVM: x86: Protect x86_decode_insn from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 02/13] KVM: x86: Protect kvm_hv_msr_[get|set]_crash_data() " Marios Pomonis
2019-12-12  9:43   ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2019-12-12 17:11     ` Marios Pomonis
2019-12-12 17:31   ` Christian Borntraeger
2019-12-12 17:44     ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-12 17:47       ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-01-06 20:16         ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 03/13] KVM: x86: Refactor picdev_write() to prevent " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:17   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 04/13] KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_read_indirect() from " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:17   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 05/13] KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_write_indirect() " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:17   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 06/13] KVM: x86: Protect kvm_lapic_reg_write() " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:17   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 07/13] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in fixed_msr_to_seg_unit() " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:18   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 08/13] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in pmu.h " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:18   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 09/13] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks in x86.c Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:18   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 10/13] KVM: x86: Protect memory accesses " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:19   ` Jim Mattson
2020-01-18 20:13   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 11/13] KVM: x86: Protect exit_reason from being used in Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks Marios Pomonis
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 12/13] KVM: x86: Protect DR-based index computations from " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:19   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 13/13] KVM: x86: Protect pmu_intel.c " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:19   ` Jim Mattson
2020-01-18 20:18 ` [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: x86: Extend Spectre-v1 mitigation Paolo Bonzini

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