From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 34E06C33C9E for ; Tue, 14 Jan 2020 23:46:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 064402075B for ; Tue, 14 Jan 2020 23:46:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728880AbgANXqT (ORCPT ); Tue, 14 Jan 2020 18:46:19 -0500 Received: from zeniv.linux.org.uk ([195.92.253.2]:47370 "EHLO ZenIV.linux.org.uk" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728757AbgANXqT (ORCPT ); Tue, 14 Jan 2020 18:46:19 -0500 Received: from viro by ZenIV.linux.org.uk with local (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1irVsm-008O1i-77; Tue, 14 Jan 2020 23:46:00 +0000 Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2020 23:46:00 +0000 From: Al Viro To: Linus Torvalds Cc: Vineet Gupta , Arnd Bergmann , Khalid Aziz , Andrey Konovalov , Andrew Morton , Peter Zijlstra , Christian Brauner , Kees Cook , Ingo Molnar , Aleksa Sarai , linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org, Linux Kernel Mailing List , linux-arch Subject: Re: [RFC 2/4] lib/strncpy_from_user: Remove redundant user space pointer range check Message-ID: <20200114234600.GD8904@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> References: <20200114200846.29434-1-vgupta@synopsys.com> <20200114200846.29434-3-vgupta@synopsys.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Jan 14, 2020 at 01:22:07PM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote: > The fact is, copying a string from user space is *very* different from > copying a fixed number of bytes, and that whole dance with > > max_addr = user_addr_max(); > > is absolutely required and necessary. > > You completely broke string copying. BTW, a quick grep through the callers has found something odd - static ssize_t kmemleak_write(struct file *file, const char __user *user_buf, size_t size, loff_t *ppos) { char buf[64]; int buf_size; int ret; buf_size = min(size, (sizeof(buf) - 1)); if (strncpy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size) < 0) return -EFAULT; buf[buf_size] = 0; What the hell? If somebody is calling write(fd, buf, n) they'd better be ready to see any byte from buf[0] up to buf[n - 1] fetched, and if something is unmapped - deal with -EFAULT. Is something really doing that and if so, why does kmemleak try to accomodate that idiocy? The same goes for several more ->write() instances - mtrr_write(), armada_debugfs_crtc_reg_write() and cio_ignore_write(); IMO that's seriously misguided (and cio one ought use vmemdup_user() instead of what it's doing)...