From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.2 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 94AFEC10F27 for ; Tue, 10 Mar 2020 10:25:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 64DD82467D for ; Tue, 10 Mar 2020 10:25:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726273AbgCJKZF (ORCPT ); Tue, 10 Mar 2020 06:25:05 -0400 Received: from mx2.suse.de ([195.135.220.15]:49108 "EHLO mx2.suse.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726202AbgCJKZF (ORCPT ); Tue, 10 Mar 2020 06:25:05 -0400 X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at test-mx.suse.de Received: from relay2.suse.de (unknown [195.135.220.254]) by mx2.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0D528B012; Tue, 10 Mar 2020 10:25:03 +0000 (UTC) Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2020 11:25:00 +0100 From: Joerg Roedel To: Tom Lendacky Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , "H. Peter Anvin" , Dave Hansen , Andy Lutomirski , Peter Zijlstra , Bruce Rogers Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/ioremap: Map EFI runtime services data as encrypted for SEV Message-ID: <20200310102500.GG7028@suse.de> References: <2d9e16eb5b53dc82665c95c6764b7407719df7a0.1582645327.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <2d9e16eb5b53dc82665c95c6764b7407719df7a0.1582645327.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hi Tom, On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 09:42:07AM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote: > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c > index 44e4beb4239f..382b6ca66820 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c > @@ -135,6 +135,13 @@ static void __ioremap_check_mem(resource_size_t addr, unsigned long size, > memset(desc, 0, sizeof(struct ioremap_desc)); > > walk_mem_res(start, end, desc, __ioremap_collect_map_flags); > + > + /* > + * The EFI runtime services data area is not covered by walk_mem_res(), > + * but must be mapped encrypted when SEV is active. > + */ > + if (sev_active() && efi_mem_type(addr) == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA) > + desc->flags |= IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED; > } I can confirm that this fixes dmi-decode on my SEV guest. While reviewing I looked into using walk_system_ram_range(), but since this is only for the EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA, it is not needed, so: Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel Tested-by: Joerg Roedel