From: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
hpa@zytor.com, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 1/8] x86/split_lock: Rework the initialization flow of split lock detection
Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2020 23:18:52 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200324151859.31068-2-xiaoyao.li@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200324151859.31068-1-xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Current initialization flow of split lock detection has following
issues:
1. It assumes the initial value of MSR_TEST_CTRL.SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT to be
zero. However, it's possible that BIOS/firmware has set it.
2. X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT flag is unconditionally set even if
there is a virtualization flaw that FMS indicates the existence while
it's actually not supported.
3. Because of #2, for nest virt, L1 KVM cannot rely on flag
X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT to check the existence of feature.
Rework the initialization flow to solve above issues. In detail,
explicitly set and clear split_lock_detect bit to verify MSR_TEST_CTRL
can be accessed, and rdmsr after wrmsr to ensure bit is set
successfully.
X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT flag is set only when the feature does
exist and the feature is not disabled with kernel param
"split_lock_detect=off"
Originally-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
index db3e745e5d47..a0a7d0ec170a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ enum split_lock_detect_state {
* split_lock_setup() will switch this to sld_warn on systems that support
* split lock detect, unless there is a command line override.
*/
-static enum split_lock_detect_state sld_state = sld_off;
+static enum split_lock_detect_state sld_state __ro_after_init = sld_off;
/*
* Processors which have self-snooping capability can handle conflicting
@@ -984,78 +984,91 @@ static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len);
}
+static bool __init split_lock_verify_msr(bool on)
+{
+ u64 ctrl, tmp;
+
+ if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_TEST_CTRL, &ctrl))
+ return false;
+
+ if (on)
+ ctrl |= MSR_TEST_CTRL_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT;
+ else
+ ctrl &= ~MSR_TEST_CTRL_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT;
+
+ if (wrmsrl_safe(MSR_TEST_CTRL, ctrl))
+ return false;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_TEST_CTRL, tmp);
+ return ctrl == tmp;
+}
+
static void __init split_lock_setup(void)
{
+ enum split_lock_detect_state state = sld_warn;
char arg[20];
int i, ret;
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT);
- sld_state = sld_warn;
+ if (!split_lock_verify_msr(false)) {
+ pr_info("MSR access failed: Disabled\n");
+ return;
+ }
ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "split_lock_detect",
arg, sizeof(arg));
if (ret >= 0) {
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sld_options); i++) {
if (match_option(arg, ret, sld_options[i].option)) {
- sld_state = sld_options[i].state;
+ state = sld_options[i].state;
break;
}
}
}
- switch (sld_state) {
+ switch (state) {
case sld_off:
pr_info("disabled\n");
- break;
-
+ return;
case sld_warn:
pr_info("warning about user-space split_locks\n");
break;
-
case sld_fatal:
pr_info("sending SIGBUS on user-space split_locks\n");
break;
}
+
+ if (!split_lock_verify_msr(true)) {
+ pr_info("MSR access failed: Disabled\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ sld_state = state;
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT);
}
/*
- * Locking is not required at the moment because only bit 29 of this
- * MSR is implemented and locking would not prevent that the operation
- * of one thread is immediately undone by the sibling thread.
- * Use the "safe" versions of rdmsr/wrmsr here because although code
- * checks CPUID and MSR bits to make sure the TEST_CTRL MSR should
- * exist, there may be glitches in virtualization that leave a guest
- * with an incorrect view of real h/w capabilities.
+ * MSR_TEST_CTRL is per core, but we treat it like a per CPU MSR. Locking
+ * is not implemented as one thread could undo the setting of the other
+ * thread immediately after dropping the lock anyway.
*/
-static bool __sld_msr_set(bool on)
+static void sld_update_msr(bool on)
{
u64 test_ctrl_val;
- if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_TEST_CTRL, &test_ctrl_val))
- return false;
+ rdmsrl(MSR_TEST_CTRL, test_ctrl_val);
if (on)
test_ctrl_val |= MSR_TEST_CTRL_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT;
else
test_ctrl_val &= ~MSR_TEST_CTRL_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT;
- return !wrmsrl_safe(MSR_TEST_CTRL, test_ctrl_val);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_TEST_CTRL, test_ctrl_val);
}
static void split_lock_init(void)
{
- if (sld_state == sld_off)
- return;
-
- if (__sld_msr_set(true))
- return;
-
- /*
- * If this is anything other than the boot-cpu, you've done
- * funny things and you get to keep whatever pieces.
- */
- pr_warn("MSR fail -- disabled\n");
- sld_state = sld_off;
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT))
+ sld_update_msr(sld_state != sld_off);
}
bool handle_user_split_lock(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
@@ -1071,7 +1084,7 @@ bool handle_user_split_lock(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
* progress and set TIF_SLD so the detection is re-enabled via
* switch_to_sld() when the task is scheduled out.
*/
- __sld_msr_set(false);
+ sld_update_msr(false);
set_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_SLD);
return true;
}
@@ -1085,7 +1098,7 @@ bool handle_user_split_lock(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
*/
void switch_to_sld(unsigned long tifn)
{
- __sld_msr_set(!(tifn & _TIF_SLD));
+ sld_update_msr(!(tifn & _TIF_SLD));
}
#define SPLIT_LOCK_CPU(model) {X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, model, X86_FEATURE_ANY}
--
2.20.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-03-24 15:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-03-24 15:18 [PATCH v6 0/8] x86/split_lock: Fix and virtualization of split lock detection Xiaoyao Li
2020-03-24 15:18 ` Xiaoyao Li [this message]
2020-03-24 15:18 ` [PATCH v6 2/8] x86/split_lock: Avoid runtime reads of the TEST_CTRL MSR Xiaoyao Li
2020-03-24 15:18 ` [PATCH v6 3/8] x86/split_lock: Export handle_user_split_lock() Xiaoyao Li
2020-03-24 15:18 ` [PATCH v6 4/8] kvm: x86: Emulate split-lock access as a write in emulator Xiaoyao Li
2020-03-25 0:00 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-25 0:31 ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-03-24 15:18 ` [PATCH v6 5/8] kvm: vmx: Extend VMX's #AC interceptor to handle split lock #AC happens in guest Xiaoyao Li
2020-03-24 15:18 ` [PATCH v6 6/8] kvm: x86: Emulate MSR IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES Xiaoyao Li
2020-03-24 15:18 ` [PATCH v6 7/8] kvm: vmx: Enable MSR_TEST_CTRL for intel guest Xiaoyao Li
2020-03-25 0:07 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-24 15:18 ` [PATCH v6 8/8] kvm: vmx: virtualize split lock detection Xiaoyao Li
2020-03-25 0:40 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-25 1:11 ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-03-25 1:41 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-26 1:38 ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-03-26 11:08 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-26 12:31 ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-03-26 6:41 ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-03-26 11:10 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-26 12:43 ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-03-26 14:55 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-26 15:09 ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-03-26 18:51 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-24 17:47 ` [PATCH v6 0/8] x86/split_lock: Fix and virtualization of " Sean Christopherson
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