Re: [PATCH bpf-next v5 4/7] bpf: lsm: Implement attach, detach and execution

Stephen Smalley
2020-03-24T14:57:06Z

On Tue, Mar 24, 2020 at 10:50 AM KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> On 24-Mär 10:35, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > On Mon, Mar 23, 2020 at 12:46 PM KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > From: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
> > > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> > > index 530d137f7a84..2a8131b640b8 100644
> > > --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> > > +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> > > @@ -9,6 +9,9 @@
> > > #include <linux/btf.h>
> > > #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
> > > #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h>
> > > +#include <linux/jump_label.h>
> > > +#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
> > > +#include <linux/bpf_verifier.h>
> > >
> > > /* For every LSM hook that allows attachment of BPF programs, declare a NOP
> > > * function where a BPF program can be attached as an fexit trampoline.
> > > @@ -27,6 +30,32 @@ noinline __weak void bpf_lsm_##NAME(__VA_ARGS__) {}
> > > #include <linux/lsm_hook_names.h>
> > > #undef LSM_HOOK
> > >
> > > +#define BPF_LSM_SYM_PREFX "bpf_lsm_"
> > > +
> > > +int bpf_lsm_verify_prog(struct bpf_verifier_log *vlog,
> > > + const struct bpf_prog *prog)
> > > +{
> > > + /* Only CAP_MAC_ADMIN users are allowed to make changes to LSM hooks
> > > + */
> > > + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
> > > + return -EPERM;
> >
> > I had asked before, and will ask again: please provide an explicit LSM
> > hook for mediating whether one can make changes to the LSM hooks.
> > Neither CAP_MAC_ADMIN nor CAP_SYS_ADMIN suffices to check this for SELinux.
>
> What do you think about:
>
> int security_check_mutable_hooks(void)
>
> Do you have any suggestions on the signature of this hook? Does this
> hook need to be BPF specific?

I'd do something like int security_bpf_prog_attach_security(const
struct bpf_prog *prog) or similar.
Then the security module can do a check based on the current task
and/or the prog. We already have some bpf-specific hooks.