Re: [PATCH bpf-next v5 4/7] bpf: lsm: Implement attach, detach and execution

KP Singh
2020-03-24T14:50:14Z

On 24-Mär 10:35, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 23, 2020 at 12:46 PM KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org> wrote:
> >
> > From: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
> >
> > JITed BPF programs are dynamically attached to the LSM hooks
> > using BPF trampolines. The trampoline prologue generates code to handle
> > conversion of the signature of the hook to the appropriate BPF context.
> >
> > The allocated trampoline programs are attached to the nop functions
> > initialized as LSM hooks.
> >
> > BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM programs must have a GPL compatible license and
> > and need CAP_SYS_ADMIN (required for loading eBPF programs).
> >
> > Upon attachment:
> >
> > * A BPF fexit trampoline is used for LSM hooks with a void return type.
> > * A BPF fmod_ret trampoline is used for LSM hooks which return an
> > int. The attached programs can override the return value of the
> > bpf LSM hook to indicate a MAC Policy decision.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com>
> > ---
>
> > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> > index 530d137f7a84..2a8131b640b8 100644
> > --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> > +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> > @@ -9,6 +9,9 @@
> > #include <linux/btf.h>
> > #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
> > #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h>
> > +#include <linux/jump_label.h>
> > +#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
> > +#include <linux/bpf_verifier.h>
> >
> > /* For every LSM hook that allows attachment of BPF programs, declare a NOP
> > * function where a BPF program can be attached as an fexit trampoline.
> > @@ -27,6 +30,32 @@ noinline __weak void bpf_lsm_##NAME(__VA_ARGS__) {}
> > #include <linux/lsm_hook_names.h>
> > #undef LSM_HOOK
> >
> > +#define BPF_LSM_SYM_PREFX "bpf_lsm_"
> > +
> > +int bpf_lsm_verify_prog(struct bpf_verifier_log *vlog,
> > + const struct bpf_prog *prog)
> > +{
> > + /* Only CAP_MAC_ADMIN users are allowed to make changes to LSM hooks
> > + */
> > + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
> > + return -EPERM;
>
> I had asked before, and will ask again: please provide an explicit LSM
> hook for mediating whether one can make changes to the LSM hooks.
> Neither CAP_MAC_ADMIN nor CAP_SYS_ADMIN suffices to check this for SELinux.

What do you think about:

int security_check_mutable_hooks(void)

Do you have any suggestions on the signature of this hook? Does this
hook need to be BPF specific?

- KP