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From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Subject: [patch V2 03/16] x86/cr4: Sanitize CR4.PCE update
Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2020 11:20:30 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200421092559.049499158@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20200421092027.591582014@linutronix.de

load_mm_cr4_irqsoff() is really a strange name for a function which has
only one purpose: Update the CR4.PCE bit depending on the perf state.

Rename it to update_cr4_pce_mm(), move it into the tlb code and provide a
function which can be invoked by the perf smp function calls.

Another step to remove exposure of cpu_tlbstate.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 arch/x86/events/core.c             |   11 +++--------
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h |   14 +-------------
 arch/x86/mm/tlb.c                  |   22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/events/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/core.c
@@ -2162,11 +2162,6 @@ static int x86_pmu_event_init(struct per
 	return err;
 }
 
-static void refresh_pce(void *ignored)
-{
-	load_mm_cr4_irqsoff(this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm));
-}
-
 static void x86_pmu_event_mapped(struct perf_event *event, struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 	if (!(event->hw.flags & PERF_X86_EVENT_RDPMC_ALLOWED))
@@ -2185,7 +2180,7 @@ static void x86_pmu_event_mapped(struct
 	lockdep_assert_held_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
 
 	if (atomic_inc_return(&mm->context.perf_rdpmc_allowed) == 1)
-		on_each_cpu_mask(mm_cpumask(mm), refresh_pce, NULL, 1);
+		on_each_cpu_mask(mm_cpumask(mm), cr4_update_pce, NULL, 1);
 }
 
 static void x86_pmu_event_unmapped(struct perf_event *event, struct mm_struct *mm)
@@ -2195,7 +2190,7 @@ static void x86_pmu_event_unmapped(struc
 		return;
 
 	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&mm->context.perf_rdpmc_allowed))
-		on_each_cpu_mask(mm_cpumask(mm), refresh_pce, NULL, 1);
+		on_each_cpu_mask(mm_cpumask(mm), cr4_update_pce, NULL, 1);
 }
 
 static int x86_pmu_event_idx(struct perf_event *event)
@@ -2253,7 +2248,7 @@ static ssize_t set_attr_rdpmc(struct dev
 		else if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc == 2)
 			static_branch_dec(&rdpmc_always_available_key);
 
-		on_each_cpu(refresh_pce, NULL, 1);
+		on_each_cpu(cr4_update_pce, NULL, 1);
 		x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc = val;
 	}
 
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -24,21 +24,9 @@ static inline void paravirt_activate_mm(
 #endif	/* !CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
-
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(rdpmc_never_available_key);
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(rdpmc_always_available_key);
-
-static inline void load_mm_cr4_irqsoff(struct mm_struct *mm)
-{
-	if (static_branch_unlikely(&rdpmc_always_available_key) ||
-	    (!static_branch_unlikely(&rdpmc_never_available_key) &&
-	     atomic_read(&mm->context.perf_rdpmc_allowed)))
-		cr4_set_bits_irqsoff(X86_CR4_PCE);
-	else
-		cr4_clear_bits_irqsoff(X86_CR4_PCE);
-}
-#else
-static inline void load_mm_cr4_irqsoff(struct mm_struct *mm) {}
+void cr4_update_pce(void *ignored);
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -272,6 +272,26 @@ static void cond_ibpb(struct task_struct
 	}
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+static inline void cr4_update_pce_mm(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&rdpmc_always_available_key) ||
+	    (!static_branch_unlikely(&rdpmc_never_available_key) &&
+	     atomic_read(&mm->context.perf_rdpmc_allowed)))
+		cr4_set_bits_irqsoff(X86_CR4_PCE);
+	else
+		cr4_clear_bits_irqsoff(X86_CR4_PCE);
+}
+
+void cr4_update_pce(void *ignored)
+{
+	cr4_update_pce_mm(this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm));
+}
+
+#else
+static inline void cr4_update_pce_mm(struct mm_struct *mm) { }
+#endif
+
 void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
 			struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
@@ -440,7 +460,7 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct
 	this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid, new_asid);
 
 	if (next != real_prev) {
-		load_mm_cr4_irqsoff(next);
+		cr4_update_pce_mm(next);
 		switch_ldt(real_prev, next);
 	}
 }


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-04-21  9:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-21  9:20 [patch V2 00/16] x86/tlb: Unexport per-CPU tlbstate Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-21  9:20 ` [patch V2 01/16] x86/tlb: Uninline __get_current_cr3_fast() Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-21 17:04   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-04-26 18:42   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-21  9:20 ` [patch V2 02/16] x86/cpu: Uninline CR4 accessors Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-26 18:42   ` [tip: x86/mm] x86/cpu: Export native_write_cr4() only when CONFIG_LKTDM=m tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-26 18:42   ` [tip: x86/mm] x86/cpu: Uninline CR4 accessors tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-21  9:20 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2020-04-26 18:42   ` [tip: x86/mm] x86/cr4: Sanitize CR4.PCE update tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-21  9:20 ` [patch V2 04/16] x86/alternatives: Move temporary_mm helpers into C Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-26 18:42   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-21  9:20 ` [patch V2 05/16] x86/tlb: Move __flush_tlb() out of line Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-26 18:42   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-21  9:20 ` [patch V2 06/16] x86/tlb: Move __flush_tlb_global() " Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-26 18:42   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-21  9:20 ` [patch V2 07/16] x86/tlb: Move __flush_tlb_one_user() " Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-26 18:42   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-21  9:20 ` [patch V2 08/16] x86/tlb: Move __flush_tlb_one_kernel() " Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-26 18:42   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-21  9:20 ` [patch V2 09/16] x86/tlb: Move flush_tlb_others() " Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-26 18:42   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-21  9:20 ` [patch V2 10/16] x86/tlb: Move __flush_tlb_all() " Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-26 18:42   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-21  9:20 ` [patch V2 11/16] x86/tlb: Move paravirt_tlb_remove_table() to the usage site Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-26 18:42   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-21  9:20 ` [patch V2 12/16] x86/tlb: Move cr4_set_bits_and_update_boot() " Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-26 18:42   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-21  9:20 ` [patch V2 13/16] x86/tlb: Uninline nmi_uaccess_okay() Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-26 18:42   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-21  9:20 ` [patch V2 14/16] x86/tlb: Move PCID helpers where they are used Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-26 18:42   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-21  9:20 ` [patch V2 15/16] xen/privcmd: Remove unneeded asm/tlb.h include Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-26 18:42   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-21  9:20 ` [patch V2 16/16] x86/tlb: Restrict access to tlbstate Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-26 18:42   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner

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