From: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
x86@kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH V2 0/7] x86/DB: protects more cpu entry data and
Date: Tue, 26 May 2020 01:42:14 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200526014221.2119-1-laijs@linux.alibaba.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200525152517.GY325280@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Hello
The patchset is based on (tag: entry-v9-the-rest, tglx-devel/x86/entry).
And it is complement of 3ea11ac991d
("x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on cpu_entry_area").
After reading the code, we can see that more data needs to be protected
against hw_breakpoint, otherwise it may cause
dangerous/recursive/unwanted #DB.
This patch also remove IST-shifting(patch 5-7). Because tglx work includes
debug_enter() which disables nested #DB.
Patch 5-7 depends tglx'w work only by now; they don't depends on Peter's
patchset[3], but this patch 6 should be discarded when they are mareged
with Peter's work.
Actually, I beg/hope Peter incorporate this V2 patchset into his patchset
which will be incorporated to tglx work. Because this V2 patchset
doesn't protect debug_idt_table and patch6 conflicts with Peter's
work.
Changed from V1
Protect the full cpu_tlbstate structure to be sure. Suggested
by Peter.
Drop the last patch of the V1 because debug_idt_table is removed
in Peter's patchset[3].
remove IST-shifting
Lai Jiangshan (7):
x86/hw_breakpoint: add within_area() to check data breakpoints
x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on direct GDT
x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on per_cpu cpu_tss_rw
x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on user_pcid_flush_mask
x86/entry: don't shift stack on #DB
x86/entry: is_debug_stack() don't check of DB1 stack
x86/entry: remove DB1 stack and DB2 hole from cpu entry area
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200505134058.272448010@linutronix.de
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200521200513.656533920@linutronix.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200522204738.645043059@infradead.org
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 17 --------
arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h | 12 ++---
arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_64.c | 5 ---
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c | 10 ++---
arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c | 7 +--
arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c | 4 +-
7 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
--
2.20.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-26 1:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-25 14:50 [RFC PATCH 0/5] x86/hw_breakpoint: protects more cpu entry data Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-25 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH 1/5] x86/hw_breakpoint: add within_area() to check data breakpoints Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-25 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH 2/5] x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on direct GDT Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-25 14:51 ` [RFC PATCH 3/5] x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on per_cpu cpu_tss_rw Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-25 14:51 ` [RFC PATCH 4/5] x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on user_pcid_flush_mask Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-25 14:51 ` [RFC PATCH 5/5] x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on debug_idt_table Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-25 15:25 ` [RFC PATCH 0/5] x86/hw_breakpoint: protects more cpu entry data Peter Zijlstra
2020-05-26 1:42 ` Lai Jiangshan [this message]
2020-05-26 1:42 ` [RFC PATCH V2 1/7] x86/hw_breakpoint: add within_area() to check data breakpoints Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-30 9:57 ` [tip: x86/entry] x86/hw_breakpoint: Add " tip-bot2 for Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-26 1:42 ` [RFC PATCH V2 2/7] x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on direct GDT Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-30 9:57 ` [tip: x86/entry] " tip-bot2 for Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-26 1:42 ` [RFC PATCH V2 3/7] x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on per_cpu cpu_tss_rw Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-30 9:57 ` [tip: x86/entry] " tip-bot2 for Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-26 1:42 ` [RFC PATCH V2 4/7] x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on user_pcid_flush_mask Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-26 4:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-26 4:31 ` Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-26 4:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-26 5:48 ` Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-30 9:57 ` [tip: x86/entry] " tip-bot2 for Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-26 1:42 ` [RFC PATCH V2 5/7] x86/entry: don't shift stack on #DB Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-26 9:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-05-26 1:42 ` [RFC PATCH V2 6/7] x86/entry: is_debug_stack() don't check of DB1 stack Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-26 1:42 ` [RFC PATCH V2 7/7] x86/entry: remove DB1 stack and DB2 hole from cpu entry area Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-26 1:48 ` [RFC PATCH 0/5] x86/hw_breakpoint: protects more cpu entry data Lai Jiangshan
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