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From: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
To: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>,
	Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	sumit.garg@linaro.org, pmladek@suse.com,
	sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com, will@kernel.org,
	kgdb-bugreport@lists.sourceforge.net,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, patches@linaro.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH 1/4] kgdb: Honour the kprobe blacklist when setting breakpoints
Date: Fri,  5 Jun 2020 14:21:27 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200605132130.1411255-2-daniel.thompson@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200605132130.1411255-1-daniel.thompson@linaro.org>

Currently kgdb has absolutely no safety rails in place to discourage or
prevent a user from placing a breakpoint in dangerous places such as
the debugger's own trap entry/exit and other places where it is not safe
to take synchronous traps.

Modify the default implementation of kgdb_validate_break_address() so
that we honour the kprobe blacklist (if there is one). The resulting
blacklist will include code that kgdb could, in fact, debug but I think
we can assume that anyone with sufficient knowledge to meaningfully
debug that code would trivially be able to find and remove the safety
rail if they need to.

Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
---
 kernel/debug/debug_core.c | 11 +++++++++++
 kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_bp.c |  9 +++++++++
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/debug/debug_core.c b/kernel/debug/debug_core.c
index ef94e906f05a..81f56d616e04 100644
--- a/kernel/debug/debug_core.c
+++ b/kernel/debug/debug_core.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
 #include <linux/vmacache.h>
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/irq.h>
+#include <linux/kprobes.h>
 
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/byteorder.h>
@@ -188,6 +189,16 @@ int __weak kgdb_validate_break_address(unsigned long addr)
 {
 	struct kgdb_bkpt tmp;
 	int err;
+
+	/*
+	 * Disallow breakpoints that are marked as unsuitable for kprobing.
+	 * This check is a little over-zealous because it does include
+	 * code that kgdb is entirely capable of debugging but in exchange
+	 * we can avoid recursive trapping (and all the problems that brings).
+	 */
+	if (within_kprobe_blacklist(addr))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/* Validate setting the breakpoint and then removing it.  If the
 	 * remove fails, the kernel needs to emit a bad message because we
 	 * are deep trouble not being able to put things back the way we
diff --git a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_bp.c b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_bp.c
index d7ebb2c79cb8..ec4940146612 100644
--- a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_bp.c
+++ b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_bp.c
@@ -306,6 +306,15 @@ static int kdb_bp(int argc, const char **argv)
 	if (!template.bp_addr)
 		return KDB_BADINT;
 
+	/*
+	 * This check is redundant (since the breakpoint machinery should
+	 * be doing the same check during kdb_bp_install) but gives the
+	 * user immediate feedback.
+	 */
+	diag = kgdb_validate_break_address(template.bp_addr);
+	if (diag)
+		return diag;
+
 	/*
 	 * Find an empty bp structure to allocate
 	 */
-- 
2.25.4


  reply	other threads:[~2020-06-05 13:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-06-05 13:21 [RFC PATCH 0/4] kgdb: Honour the kprobe blacklist when setting breakpoints Daniel Thompson
2020-06-05 13:21 ` Daniel Thompson [this message]
2020-06-05 13:21 ` [RFC PATCH 2/4] kgdb: Use the kprobe blacklist to limit single stepping Daniel Thompson
2020-06-05 13:21 ` [RFC PATCH 3/4] kgdb: Add NOKPROBE labels on the trap handler functions Daniel Thompson
2020-06-11 12:43   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-06-05 13:21 ` [RFC PATCH 4/4] kprobes: Allow the kprobes blacklist to be compiled independently Daniel Thompson
2020-06-05 14:29 ` [RFC PATCH 0/4] kgdb: Honour the kprobe blacklist when setting breakpoints Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-05 14:44   ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-08 13:50     ` Daniel Thompson
2020-06-08 12:43   ` Daniel Thompson
2020-06-11 12:42   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-06-11 14:32     ` Daniel Thompson
2020-06-12 10:13       ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-06-12 11:04         ` Daniel Thompson

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