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From: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	clang-built-linux <clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com>,
	"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH -tip v3 1/2] kcov: Make runtime functions noinstr-compatible
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2020 16:53:36 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200615145336.GA220132@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200615142949.GT2531@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>

On Mon, 15 Jun 2020, Peter Zijlstra wrote:

> On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 09:53:06AM +0200, Marco Elver wrote:
> > 
> > Disabling KCOV for smp_processor_id now moves the crash elsewhere. In
> > the case of KASAN into its 'memcpy' wrapper, called after
> > __this_cpu_read in fixup_bad_iret. This is making me suspicious,
> > because it shouldn't be called from the noinstr functions.
> 
> With your .config, objtool complains about exactly that though:
> 
> vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: fixup_bad_iret()+0x8e: call to memcpy() leaves .noinstr.text section
> 
> The utterly gruesome thing below 'cures' that.

Is __memcpy() generally available? I think that bypasses KASAN and
whatever else.

> > For KCSAN the crash still happens in check_preemption_disabled, in the
> > inlined native_save_fl function (apparently on its 'pushf'). If I turn
> > fixup_bad_iret's __this_cpu_read into a raw_cpu_read (to bypass
> > check_preemption_disabled), no more crash with KCSAN.
> 
> vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: debug_smp_processor_id()+0x0: call to __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() leaves .noinstr.text section
> vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: check_preemption_disabled()+0x1f: call to __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() leaves .noinstr.text section
> vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: __this_cpu_preempt_check()+0x4: call to __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() leaves .noinstr.text section
> 
> That could be either of those I suppose, did you have the NOP patches
> on? Let me try... those seem to placate objtool at least.
> 
> I do see a fair amount of __kasan_check*() crud though:
> 
> vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: rcu_nmi_exit()+0x44: call to __kasan_check_read() leaves .noinstr.text section
> vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: rcu_dynticks_eqs_enter()+0x1c: call to __kasan_check_write() leaves .noinstr.text section
> vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: rcu_nmi_enter()+0x46: call to __kasan_check_read() leaves .noinstr.text section
> vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: rcu_dynticks_eqs_exit()+0x21: call to __kasan_check_write() leaves .noinstr.text section
> vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: __rcu_is_watching()+0x1c: call to __kasan_check_read() leaves .noinstr.text section
> vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: debug_locks_off()+0x1b: call to __kasan_check_write() leaves .noinstr.text section
> 
> That wasn't supported to happen with the __no_sanitize patches on (which
> I didn't forget). Aah, I think we've lost a bunch of patches.. /me goes
> rummage.
> 
> This:
> 
>   https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200603114051.896465666@infradead.org
> 
> that cures the rcu part of that.
> 
> Let me go look at your KCSAN thing now...

I tried to find the stack that is used by the crashing code -- which led
me to entry_stack? So I tried this:

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ struct x86_hw_tss {
 #define IO_BITMAP_OFFSET_INVALID	(__KERNEL_TSS_LIMIT + 1)
 
 struct entry_stack {
-	unsigned long		words[64];
+	unsigned long		words[128];
 };
 
 struct entry_stack_page {

No more crash. But that's probably not what we want. Just a datapoint.

> ---
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> index af75109485c26..031a21fb5a741 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> @@ -675,6 +675,14 @@ struct bad_iret_stack {
>  	struct pt_regs regs;
>  };
>  
> +void __always_inline __badcpy(void *dst, void *src, int nr)
> +{
> +	unsigned long *d = dst, *s = src;
> +	nr /= sizeof(unsigned long);
> +	while (nr--)
> +		*(d++) = *(s++);
> +}
> +

If we can use __memcpy() here, that would probably solve that.

Thanks,
-- Marco

  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-06-15 14:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-06-05  8:28 [PATCH -tip v3 1/2] kcov: Make runtime functions noinstr-compatible Marco Elver
2020-06-05  8:28 ` [PATCH -tip v3 2/2] kcov: Unconditionally add -fno-stack-protector to compiler options Marco Elver
2020-06-05 16:50   ` Nick Desaulniers
2020-06-05 10:57 ` [PATCH -tip v3 1/2] kcov: Make runtime functions noinstr-compatible Dmitry Vyukov
2020-06-05 12:03   ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-05 13:25     ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-06-07  9:37       ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-06-08  7:48         ` Marco Elver
2020-06-08  7:57           ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-06-08 11:01             ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-11 21:55               ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-11 21:58                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-12 11:34                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-12  4:04                 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-06-12 11:49                   ` Marco Elver
2020-06-13 17:24                     ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-06-15  7:53                       ` Marco Elver
2020-06-15 14:29                         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-15 14:35                           ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-15 14:53                           ` Marco Elver [this message]
2020-06-15 15:03                             ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-15 15:20                               ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-17 14:32                                 ` Marco Elver
2020-06-17 14:49                                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-17 15:19                                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-17 15:19                                     ` Marco Elver
2020-06-17 15:55                                       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-17 16:36                                         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-17 18:06                                           ` Marco Elver
2020-06-15 14:54                         ` Peter Zijlstra

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