Re: [PATCH] kbuild: Provide way to actually disable stack protector

Masahiro Yamada
2020-06-26T19:05:34Z

On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 2:37 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 11:33:53AM +0900, Masahiro Yamada wrote:
> > On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 4:02 AM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > Some builds of GCC enable stack protector by default. Simply removing
> > > the arguments is not sufficient to disable stack protector, as the stack
> > > protector for those GCC builds must be explicitly disabled. (Removing the
> > > arguments is left as-is just to be sure there are no ordering problems. If
> > > -fno-stack-protector ended up _before_ -fstack-protector, it would not
> > > disable it: GCC uses whichever -f... comes last on the command line.)
> > >
> > > Fixes: 20355e5f73a7 ("x86/entry: Exclude low level entry code from sanitizing")
> > > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> > > ---
> > > Makefile | 4 +++-
> > > arch/Kconfig | 3 ---
> > > arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile | 4 ++--
> > > arch/x86/entry/Makefile | 3 +++
> > > 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
> > > index ac2c61c37a73..b46e91bf0b0e 100644
> > > --- a/Makefile
> > > +++ b/Makefile
> > > @@ -762,7 +762,9 @@ ifneq ($(CONFIG_FRAME_WARN),0)
> > > KBUILD_CFLAGS += -Wframe-larger-than=$(CONFIG_FRAME_WARN)
> > > endif
> > >
> > > -stackp-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE) := -fno-stack-protector
> > > +DISABLE_STACKPROTECTOR := $(call cc-option,-fno-stack-protector)
> > > +export DISABLE_STACKPROTECTOR
> > > +stackp-flags-y := $(DISABLE_STACKPROTECTOR)
> > > stackp-flags-$(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR) := -fstack-protector
> > > stackp-flags-$(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG) := -fstack-protector-strong
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
> > > index 8cc35dc556c7..1ea61290900a 100644
> > > --- a/arch/Kconfig
> > > +++ b/arch/Kconfig
> > > @@ -478,9 +478,6 @@ config HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR
> > > An arch should select this symbol if:
> > > - it has implemented a stack canary (e.g. __stack_chk_guard)
> > >
> > > -config CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE
> > > - def_bool $(cc-option,-fno-stack-protector)
> > > -
> > > config STACKPROTECTOR
> > > bool "Stack Protector buffer overflow detection"
> > > depends on HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR
> > > diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile
> > > index 00602a6fba04..3693bac525d2 100644
> > > --- a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile
> > > +++ b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile
> > > @@ -84,9 +84,9 @@ endif
> > >
> > > # -fstack-protector-strong triggers protection checks in this code,
> > > # but it is being used too early to link to meaningful stack_chk logic.
> > > -nossp-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE) := -fno-stack-protector
> > > $(foreach o, $(libfdt_objs) atags_to_fdt.o, \
> > > - $(eval CFLAGS_$(o) := -I $(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt $(nossp-flags-y)))
> > > + $(eval CFLAGS_$(o) := -I $(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt \
> > > + $(DISABLE_STACKPROTECTOR)))
> > >
> > > # These were previously generated C files. When you are building the kernel
> > > # with O=, make sure to remove the stale files in the output tree. Otherwise,
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/Makefile
> > > index b7a5790d8d63..79902decc3d1 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/entry/Makefile
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/entry/Makefile
> > > @@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
> > > CFLAGS_REMOVE_common.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) -fstack-protector -fstack-protector-strong
> > > CFLAGS_REMOVE_syscall_32.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) -fstack-protector -fstack-protector-strong
> > > CFLAGS_REMOVE_syscall_64.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) -fstack-protector -fstack-protector-strong
> > > +CFLAGS_common.o += $(DISABLE_STACKPROTECTOR)
> > > +CFLAGS_syscall_32.o += $(DISABLE_STACKPROTECTOR)
> > > +CFLAGS_syscall_64.o += $(DISABLE_STACKPROTECTOR)
> >
> > There is one more c file in this directory.
> >
> > Is it OK to not patch syscall_x32.c ?
>
> Good question. Peter? (It seems all the syscall_*.c files are just a
> table, not code -- why do they need any instrumentation changes?)
>
> >
> >
> > >
> > > CFLAGS_syscall_64.o += $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,)
> > > CFLAGS_syscall_32.o += $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,)
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > This patch is ugly.
> >
> > I'd rather want to fix this by one-liner.
>
> Why not a global export to assist? This isn't the only place it's needed
> (see the arm64 chunk...)

Is it useful when we know
DISABLE_STACKPROTECTOR = -fno-stack-protector ?

I'd rather want to apply this patch
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11628493/
and hard-code -fno-stack-protector where necessary.

>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/Makefile
> > index b7a5790d8d63..0d41eb91aaea 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/entry/Makefile
> > +++ b/arch/x86/entry/Makefile
> > @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ CFLAGS_REMOVE_common.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
> > -fstack-protector -fstack-protector-
> > CFLAGS_REMOVE_syscall_32.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) -fstack-protector
> > -fstack-protector-strong
> > CFLAGS_REMOVE_syscall_64.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) -fstack-protector
> > -fstack-protector-strong
> >
> > +ccflags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE) += -fno-stack-protector
> > +
>
> Order matters here -- when is ccflags-y applied?

cc-flags-y comes after KBUILD_CFLAGS
so that -fno-stack-protector can negate -fstack-protector(-strong)

>
> > CFLAGS_syscall_64.o += $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,)
> > CFLAGS_syscall_32.o += $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,)
> > obj-y := entry_$(BITS).o thunk_$(BITS).o
> > syscall_$(BITS).o
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Best Regards
> > Masahiro Yamada
>
> --
> Kees Cook

--
Best Regards
Masahiro Yamada