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From: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
To: Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	zohar@linux.ibm.com, erichte@linux.ibm.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime
Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2020 16:21:12 -0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200622192112.GB8956@glitch> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <043e52d4-6835-c2c4-bc9d-d36ddb3db0e9@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

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On Mon, Jun 22, 2020 at 03:01:27PM -0400, Nayna wrote:
> 
> On 6/22/20 1:27 PM, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> > IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM has been marked as dependent on !IMA_ARCH_POLICY in
> > compile time, enforcing the appraisal whenever the kernel had the arch
> > policy option enabled.
> > 
> > However it breaks systems where the option is actually set but the system
> > wasn't booted in a "secure boot" platform. In this scenario, anytime the
> > an appraisal policy (i.e. ima_policy=appraisal_tcb) is used it will be
> > forced, giving no chance to the user set the 'fix' state (ima_appraise=fix)
> > to actually measure system's files.
> > 
> > This patch remove this compile time dependency and move it to a runtime
> > decision, based on the arch policy loading failure/success.
> 
> Thanks for looking at this.
> 
> For arch specific policies, kernel signature verification is enabled based
> on the secure boot state of the system. Perhaps, enforce the appraisal as
> well based on if secure boot is enabled.
> 
> Thanks & Regards,

That's a good point.

I'm going to take another look and see where the check fits better and
come back with a new patch(set).

Thanks Nayna.

-- 
bmeneg 
PGP Key: http://bmeneg.com/pubkey.txt

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  reply	other threads:[~2020-06-22 19:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-06-22 17:27 [PATCH v2] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime Bruno Meneguele
2020-06-22 19:01 ` Nayna
2020-06-22 19:21   ` Bruno Meneguele [this message]
2020-06-22 19:28 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-06-22 20:16   ` Bruno Meneguele

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