Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] arch/ima: extend secure boot check to include trusted boot

[Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>]

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On Fri, Jun 26, 2020 at 04:23:12PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Tue, 2020-06-23 at 17:26 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> <snip>
> 
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > index c1583d98c5e5..a760094e8f8d 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > @@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
> >  	switch (id) {
> >  	case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
> >  		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG)
> > -		    && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
> > +		    && arch_ima_secure_or_trusted_boot()) {
> >  			pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n");
> >  			return -EACCES;
> >  		}
> 
> Only IMA-appraisal enforces file integrity based on policy.
> 

Right, but I didn't get the relation to the code above: I basically
renamed the function: 

"arch_ima_get_secureboot" -> "arch_ima_secure_or_trusted_boot".  

Which doesn't change the ima_load_data logic.

-- 
bmeneg 
PGP Key: http://bmeneg.com/pubkey.txt

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