Re: [PATCH v4 3/3] prctl: Allow ptrace capable processes to change /proc/self/exe

Paul Moore
2020-07-02T22:00:27Z

On Thu, Jul 2, 2020 at 5:16 PM Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 01, 2020 at 08:49:06AM +0200, Adrian Reber wrote:
> > From: Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@twosigma.com>
> >
> > Previously, the current process could only change the /proc/self/exe
> > link with local CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> > This commit relaxes this restriction by permitting such change with
> > CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, and the ability to use ptrace.
> >
> > With access to ptrace facilities, a process can do the following: fork a
> > child, execve() the target executable, and have the child use ptrace()
> > to replace the memory content of the current process. This technique
> > makes it possible to masquerade an arbitrary program as any executable,
> > even setuid ones.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@twosigma.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
>
> This is scary. But I believe it is safe.
>
> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
>
> I am a bit curious about the implications of the selinux patch.
> IIUC you are using the permission of the tracing process to
> execute the file without transition, so this is a way to work
> around the policy which might prevent the tracee from doing so.
> Given that SELinux wants to be MAC, I'm not *quite* sure that's
> considered kosher. You also are skipping the PROCESS__PTRACE
> to SECCLASS_PROCESS check which selinux_bprm_set_creds does later
> on. Again I'm just not quite sure what's considered normal there
> these days.
>
> Paul, do you have input there?

I agree, the SELinux hook looks wrong. Building on what Christian
said, this looks more like a ptrace operation than an exec operation.

--
paul moore