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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.8 19/38] binder: Prevent context manager from incrementing ref 0
Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2020 17:19:09 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200810151804.840050319@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200810151803.920113428@linuxfoundation.org>

From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>

commit 4b836a1426cb0f1ef2a6e211d7e553221594f8fc upstream.

Binder is designed such that a binder_proc never has references to
itself. If this rule is violated, memory corruption can occur when a
process sends a transaction to itself; see e.g.
<https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=09e05aba06723a94d43d>.

There is a remaining edgecase through which such a transaction-to-self
can still occur from the context of a task with BINDER_SET_CONTEXT_MGR
access:

 - task A opens /dev/binder twice, creating binder_proc instances P1
   and P2
 - P1 becomes context manager
 - P2 calls ACQUIRE on the magic handle 0, allocating index 0 in its
   handle table
 - P1 dies (by closing the /dev/binder fd and waiting a bit)
 - P2 becomes context manager
 - P2 calls ACQUIRE on the magic handle 0, allocating index 1 in its
   handle table
   [this triggers a warning: "binder: 1974:1974 tried to acquire
   reference to desc 0, got 1 instead"]
 - task B opens /dev/binder once, creating binder_proc instance P3
 - P3 calls P2 (via magic handle 0) with (void*)1 as argument (two-way
   transaction)
 - P2 receives the handle and uses it to call P3 (two-way transaction)
 - P3 calls P2 (via magic handle 0) (two-way transaction)
 - P2 calls P2 (via handle 1) (two-way transaction)

And then, if P2 does *NOT* accept the incoming transaction work, but
instead closes the binder fd, we get a crash.

Solve it by preventing the context manager from using ACQUIRE on ref 0.
There shouldn't be any legitimate reason for the context manager to do
that.

Additionally, print a warning if someone manages to find another way to
trigger a transaction-to-self bug in the future.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 457b9a6f09f0 ("Staging: android: add binder driver")
Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200727120424.1627555-1-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/android/binder.c |   15 ++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2982,6 +2982,12 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct bi
 			goto err_dead_binder;
 		}
 		e->to_node = target_node->debug_id;
+		if (WARN_ON(proc == target_proc)) {
+			return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
+			return_error_param = -EINVAL;
+			return_error_line = __LINE__;
+			goto err_invalid_target_handle;
+		}
 		if (security_binder_transaction(proc->tsk,
 						target_proc->tsk) < 0) {
 			return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
@@ -3635,10 +3641,17 @@ static int binder_thread_write(struct bi
 				struct binder_node *ctx_mgr_node;
 				mutex_lock(&context->context_mgr_node_lock);
 				ctx_mgr_node = context->binder_context_mgr_node;
-				if (ctx_mgr_node)
+				if (ctx_mgr_node) {
+					if (ctx_mgr_node->proc == proc) {
+						binder_user_error("%d:%d context manager tried to acquire desc 0\n",
+								  proc->pid, thread->pid);
+						mutex_unlock(&context->context_mgr_node_lock);
+						return -EINVAL;
+					}
 					ret = binder_inc_ref_for_node(
 							proc, ctx_mgr_node,
 							strong, NULL, &rdata);
+				}
 				mutex_unlock(&context->context_mgr_node_lock);
 			}
 			if (ret)



  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-08-10 15:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-08-10 15:18 [PATCH 5.8 00/38] 5.8.1-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:18 ` [PATCH 5.8 01/38] scsi: ufs: Fix and simplify setup_xfer_req variant operation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:18 ` [PATCH 5.8 02/38] USB: serial: qcserial: add EM7305 QDL product ID Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:18 ` [PATCH 5.8 03/38] USB: iowarrior: fix up report size handling for some devices Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:18 ` [PATCH 5.8 04/38] usb: xhci: define IDs for various ASMedia host controllers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:18 ` [PATCH 5.8 05/38] usb: xhci: Fix ASMedia ASM1142 DMA addressing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:18 ` [PATCH 5.8 06/38] Revert "ALSA: hda: call runtime_allow() for all hda controllers" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:18 ` [PATCH 5.8 07/38] ALSA: hda/realtek: Add alc269/alc662 pin-tables for Loongson-3 laptops Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:18 ` [PATCH 5.8 08/38] ALSA: hda/ca0132 - Add new quirk ID for Recon3D Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:18 ` [PATCH 5.8 09/38] ALSA: hda/ca0132 - Fix ZxR Headphone gain control get value Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 10/38] ALSA: hda/ca0132 - Fix AE-5 microphone selection commands Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 11/38] ALSA: seq: oss: Serialize ioctls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 12/38] staging: android: ashmem: Fix lockdep warning for write operation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 13/38] staging: rtl8712: handle firmware load failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 14/38] Staging: rtl8188eu: rtw_mlme: Fix uninitialized variable authmode Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 15/38] Bluetooth: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in hci_extended_inquiry_result_evt() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 16/38] Bluetooth: Prevent out-of-bounds read in hci_inquiry_result_evt() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 17/38] Bluetooth: Prevent out-of-bounds read in hci_inquiry_result_with_rssi_evt() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 18/38] omapfb: dss: Fix max fclk divider for omap36xx Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 20/38] Smack: fix use-after-free in smk_write_relabel_self() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 21/38] scripts: add dummy report mode to add_namespace.cocci Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 22/38] lkdtm/heap: Avoid edge and middle of slabs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 23/38] vgacon: Fix for missing check in scrollback handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 24/38] mtd: properly check all write ioctls for permissions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 25/38] leds: wm831x-status: fix use-after-free on unbind Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 26/38] leds: lm36274: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 27/38] leds: da903x: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 28/38] leds: lm3533: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 29/38] leds: 88pm860x: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 30/38] gpio: max77620: Fix missing release of interrupt Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 31/38] xattr: break delegations in {set,remove}xattr Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 32/38] Revert "powerpc/kasan: Fix shadow pages allocation failure" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 33/38] powerpc/kasan: Fix shadow pages allocation failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 34/38] PCI: tegra: Revert tegra124 raw_violation_fixup Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 35/38] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 36/38] random32: move the pseudo-random 32-bit definitions to prandom.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 37/38] random: random.h should include archrandom.h, not the other way around Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 15:19 ` [PATCH 5.8 38/38] arm64: kaslr: Use standard early random function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-10 23:04 ` [PATCH 5.8 00/38] 5.8.1-rc1 review Shuah Khan
2020-08-11 16:19   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-11  6:29 ` Naresh Kamboju
2020-08-11 16:20   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-08-11 10:54 ` Puranjay Mohan
2020-08-11 14:24 ` Guenter Roeck
2020-08-11 16:20   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman

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