public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	x86@kernel.org
Cc: kbuild-all@lists.01.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Chang Seok Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/entry/64: Disallow RDPID in paranoid entry if KVM is enabled
Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2020 18:28:24 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202008211856.KuZ6koru%lkp@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200821025050.32573-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 4318 bytes --]

Hi Sean,

I love your patch! Yet something to improve:

[auto build test ERROR on tip/auto-latest]
[also build test ERROR on v5.9-rc1 next-20200821]
[cannot apply to tip/x86/asm luto/next]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]

url:    https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Sean-Christopherson/x86-entry-64-Disallow-RDPID-in-paranoid-entry-if-KVM-is-enabled/20200821-105339
base:   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git a9bd3a91d6e49ebd2d7d8ace91d4cc339c382a31
config: x86_64-randconfig-s022-20200821 (attached as .config)
compiler: gcc-9 (Debian 9.3.0-15) 9.3.0
reproduce:
        # apt-get install sparse
        # sparse version: v0.6.2-191-g10164920-dirty
        # save the attached .config to linux build tree
        make W=1 C=1 CF='-fdiagnostic-prefix -D__CHECK_ENDIAN__' ARCH=x86_64 

If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>

All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):

   arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S: Assembler messages:
>> arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:851: Error: too many positional arguments

# https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/bebb51882f9c18938e44b6a7b66fdf0452eea142
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Sean-Christopherson/x86-entry-64-Disallow-RDPID-in-paranoid-entry-if-KVM-is-enabled/20200821-105339
git checkout bebb51882f9c18938e44b6a7b66fdf0452eea142
vim +851 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S

   794	
   795	/*
   796	 * Save all registers in pt_regs. Return GSBASE related information
   797	 * in EBX depending on the availability of the FSGSBASE instructions:
   798	 *
   799	 * FSGSBASE	R/EBX
   800	 *     N        0 -> SWAPGS on exit
   801	 *              1 -> no SWAPGS on exit
   802	 *
   803	 *     Y        GSBASE value at entry, must be restored in paranoid_exit
   804	 */
   805	SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry)
   806		UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
   807		cld
   808		PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS save_ret=1
   809		ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
   810	
   811		/*
   812		 * Always stash CR3 in %r14.  This value will be restored,
   813		 * verbatim, at exit.  Needed if paranoid_entry interrupted
   814		 * another entry that already switched to the user CR3 value
   815		 * but has not yet returned to userspace.
   816		 *
   817		 * This is also why CS (stashed in the "iret frame" by the
   818		 * hardware at entry) can not be used: this may be a return
   819		 * to kernel code, but with a user CR3 value.
   820		 *
   821		 * Switching CR3 does not depend on kernel GSBASE so it can
   822		 * be done before switching to the kernel GSBASE. This is
   823		 * required for FSGSBASE because the kernel GSBASE has to
   824		 * be retrieved from a kernel internal table.
   825		 */
   826		SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%r14
   827	
   828		/*
   829		 * Handling GSBASE depends on the availability of FSGSBASE.
   830		 *
   831		 * Without FSGSBASE the kernel enforces that negative GSBASE
   832		 * values indicate kernel GSBASE. With FSGSBASE no assumptions
   833		 * can be made about the GSBASE value when entering from user
   834		 * space.
   835		 */
   836		ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lparanoid_entry_checkgs", "", X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE
   837	
   838		/*
   839		 * Read the current GSBASE and store it in %rbx unconditionally,
   840		 * retrieve and set the current CPUs kernel GSBASE. The stored value
   841		 * has to be restored in paranoid_exit unconditionally.
   842		 *
   843		 * The MSR write ensures that no subsequent load is based on a
   844		 * mispredicted GSBASE. No extra FENCE required.
   845		 *
   846		 * Disallow RDPID if KVM is enabled as it may consume a guest's TSC_AUX
   847		 * if an NMI arrives in KVM's run loop.  KVM loads guest's TSC_AUX on
   848		 * VM-Enter and may not restore the host's value until the CPU returns
   849		 * to userspace, i.e. KVM depends on the kernel not using TSC_AUX.
   850		 */
 > 851		SAVE_AND_SET_GSBASE scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%rbx no_rdpid=IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM)
   852		ret
   853	

---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org

[-- Attachment #2: .config.gz --]
[-- Type: application/gzip, Size: 29093 bytes --]

      parent reply	other threads:[~2020-08-21 10:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-08-21  2:50 [PATCH] x86/entry/64: Disallow RDPID in paranoid entry if KVM is enabled Sean Christopherson
2020-08-21  7:24 ` peterz
2020-08-21  7:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2020-08-21  7:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-08-21  8:09   ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-08-21  8:16     ` Borislav Petkov
2020-08-21  9:05       ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-08-21  9:22         ` Borislav Petkov
2020-08-21  9:44           ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-08-21  9:48             ` Borislav Petkov
2020-08-21 10:07               ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-08-22 16:42                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-16 16:54                   ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-08-21  9:28     ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-08-21  9:37       ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-08-21 19:55       ` hpa
2020-08-21 20:02         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-08-21  8:56 ` kernel test robot
2020-08-21 10:28 ` kernel test robot [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=202008211856.KuZ6koru%lkp@intel.com \
    --to=lkp@intel.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=chang.seok.bae@intel.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=kbuild-all@lists.01.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=sean.j.christopherson@intel.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox