From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.2 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E0946C47423 for ; Fri, 2 Oct 2020 12:39:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A4B8F20644 for ; Fri, 2 Oct 2020 12:39:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2387717AbgJBMjV (ORCPT ); Fri, 2 Oct 2020 08:39:21 -0400 Received: from verein.lst.de ([213.95.11.211]:52210 "EHLO verein.lst.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726017AbgJBMjV (ORCPT ); Fri, 2 Oct 2020 08:39:21 -0400 Received: by verein.lst.de (Postfix, from userid 107) id 258BB68C4E; Fri, 2 Oct 2020 14:39:19 +0200 (CEST) Received: from lst.de (p5b0d8779.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [91.13.135.121]) by verein.lst.de (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 90E8467354; Fri, 2 Oct 2020 14:38:40 +0200 (CEST) Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2020 14:38:36 +0200 From: Torsten Duwe To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Nicolai Stange , LKML , Arnd Bergmann , Greg Kroah-Hartman , "Eric W. Biederman" , "Alexander E. Patrakov" , "Ahmed S. Darwish" , Willy Tarreau , Matthew Garrett , Vito Caputo , Andreas Dilger , Jan Kara , Ray Strode , William Jon McCann , zhangjs , Andy Lutomirski , Florian Weimer , Lennart Poettering , Peter Matthias , Marcelo Henrique Cerri , Neil Horman , Randy Dunlap , Julia Lawall , Dan Carpenter , Andy Lavr , Eric Biggers , "Jason A. Donenfeld" , Stephan =?iso-8859-1?Q?M=FCller?= , Petr Tesarik Subject: Re: [DISCUSSION PATCH 00/41] random: possible ways towards NIST SP800-90B compliance Message-ID: <20201002123836.GA14807@lst.de> References: <20200921075857.4424-1-nstange@suse.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200921075857.4424-1-nstange@suse.de> User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Almost two weeks passed and these are the "relevant" replies: Jason personally does not like FIPS, and is afraid of "subpar crypto". Albeit this patch set strictly isn't about crypto at all; the crypto subsystem is in the unlucky position to just depend on a good entropy source. Greg claims that Linux (kernel) isn't about choice, which is clearly wrong. And this is all ??? There are options for stack protection. I can see bounds checking and other sanity checks all over the place. And doing a similar thing on entropy sources is a problem? Admittedly, if entropy sources fail, the kernel will happily remain running. No bad immediate effects in userland will arise. Only some cryptographic algorithms, otherwise very decent, will run on unneccessarily weak keys, probably causing some real-world problems. Does anybody care? The NIST and the BSI do, but that does not mean their solutions are automatically wrong or backdoored. There is now a well layed-out scheme to ensure quality randomness, and a lot of work here has been put into its implementation. Would some maintainer please comment on potential problems or shortcomings? Otherwise a "Thanks, applied" would be appropriate, IMO. Torsten