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[88.114.211.119]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id o15sm946696lfg.226.2020.10.08.09.54.23 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 08 Oct 2020 09:54:24 -0700 (PDT) From: Topi Miettinen To: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Topi Miettinen Subject: [PATCH RESEND v2] mm: Optional full ASLR for mmap() and mremap() Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2020 19:54:08 +0300 Message-Id: <20201008165408.38228-1-toiwoton@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Writing a new value of 3 to /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space enables full randomization of memory mappings created with mmap(NULL, ...). With 2, the base of the VMA used for such mappings is random, but the mappings are created in predictable places within the VMA and in sequential order. With 3, new VMAs are created to fully randomize the mappings. Also mremap(..., MREMAP_MAYMOVE) will move the mappings even if not necessary. On 32 bit systems this may cause problems due to increased VM fragmentation if the address space gets crowded. In this example, with value of 2, ld.so.cache, libc, an anonymous mmap and locale-archive are located close to each other: $ strace /bin/sync ... openat(AT_FDCWD, "/etc/ld.so.cache", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 3 fstat(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=189096, ...}) = 0 mmap(NULL, 189096, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0x7d9c1e7f2000 ... openat(AT_FDCWD, "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 3 read(3, "\177ELF\2\1\1\3\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0>\0\1\0\0\0\0n\2\0\0\0\0\0"..., 832) = 832 fstat(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=1839792, ...}) = 0 mmap(NULL, 8192, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0x7d9c1e7f0000 mmap(NULL, 1852680, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_DENYWRITE, 3, 0) = 0x7d9c1e62b000 ... openat(AT_FDCWD, "/usr/lib/locale/locale-archive", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 3 fstat(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=5642592, ...}) = 0 mmap(NULL, 5642592, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0x7d9c1e0c9000 With 3, they are located in unrelated addresses: $ echo 3 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space $ /bin/sync ... openat(AT_FDCWD, "/etc/ld.so.cache", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 3 fstat(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=189096, ...}) = 0 mmap(NULL, 189096, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0xeda4fbea000 ... openat(AT_FDCWD, "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 3 read(3, "\177ELF\2\1\1\3\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0>\0\1\0\0\0\0n\2\0\0\0\0\0"..., 832) = 832 fstat(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=1839792, ...}) = 0 mmap(NULL, 8192, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb8fb9c1d000 mmap(NULL, 1852680, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_DENYWRITE, 3, 0) = 0xaabd8598000 ... openat(AT_FDCWD, "/usr/lib/locale/locale-archive", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 3 fstat(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=5642592, ...}) = 0 mmap(NULL, 5642592, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0xbe351ab8000 Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen --- Resent also to hardening list (hopefully the right one) v2: also randomize mremap(..., MREMAP_MAYMOVE) --- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 6 +++--- Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 11 +++++++++++ init/Kconfig | 2 +- mm/mmap.c | 7 ++++++- mm/mremap.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst index e05e581af5cf..9ea250522077 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst @@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ Spectre variant 2 left by the previous process will also be cleared. User programs should use address space randomization to make attacks - more difficult (Set /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1 or 2). + more difficult (Set /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1, 2 or 3). 3. A virtualized guest attacking the host ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ @@ -499,8 +499,8 @@ Spectre variant 2 more overhead and run slower. User programs should use address space randomization - (/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1 or 2) to make attacks more - difficult. + (/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1, 2 or 3) to make attacks + more difficult. 3. VM mitigation ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst index d4b32cc32bb7..acd0612155d9 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst @@ -1060,6 +1060,17 @@ that support this feature. Systems with ancient and/or broken binaries should be configured with ``CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK`` enabled, which excludes the heap from process address space randomization. + +3 Additionally enable full randomization of memory mappings created + with mmap(NULL, ...). With 2, the base of the VMA used for such + mappings is random, but the mappings are created in predictable + places within the VMA and in sequential order. With 3, new VMAs + are created to fully randomize the mappings. Also mremap(..., + MREMAP_MAYMOVE) will move the mappings even if not necessary. + + On 32 bit systems this may cause problems due to increased VM + fragmentation if the address space gets crowded. + == =========================================================================== diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig index d6a0b31b13dc..c5ea2e694f6a 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig @@ -1859,7 +1859,7 @@ config COMPAT_BRK also breaks ancient binaries (including anything libc5 based). This option changes the bootup default to heap randomization disabled, and can be overridden at runtime by setting - /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space to 2. + /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space to 2 or 3. On non-ancient distros (post-2000 ones) N is usually a safe choice. diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index 40248d84ad5f..489368f43af1 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -206,7 +207,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(brk, unsigned long, brk) #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK /* * CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK can still be overridden by setting - * randomize_va_space to 2, which will still cause mm->start_brk + * randomize_va_space to >= 2, which will still cause mm->start_brk * to be arbitrarily shifted */ if (current->brk_randomized) @@ -1407,6 +1408,10 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, if (mm->map_count > sysctl_max_map_count) return -ENOMEM; + /* Pick a random address even outside current VMAs? */ + if (!addr && randomize_va_space >= 3) + addr = arch_mmap_rnd(); + /* Obtain the address to map to. we verify (or select) it and ensure * that it represents a valid section of the address space. */ diff --git a/mm/mremap.c b/mm/mremap.c index 138abbae4f75..c7fd1ab5fb5f 100644 --- a/mm/mremap.c +++ b/mm/mremap.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -720,6 +721,20 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mremap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, old_len, goto out; } + if ((flags & MREMAP_MAYMOVE) && randomize_va_space >= 3) { + /* + * Caller is happy with a different address, so let's + * move even if not necessary! + */ + new_addr = arch_mmap_rnd(); + + ret = mremap_to(addr, old_len, new_addr, new_len, + &locked, flags, &uf, &uf_unmap_early, + &uf_unmap); + goto out; + } + + /* * Always allow a shrinking remap: that just unmaps * the unnecessary pages.. -- 2.28.0