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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>,
	Martin Radev <martin.b.radev@gmail.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/5] x86/boot/compressed/64: Check SEV encryption in 64-bit boot-path
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2020 12:08:12 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201027110812.GC15580@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201021123938.3696-4-joro@8bytes.org>

On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 02:39:36PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S b/arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..5075458ecad0
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S

Why a separate file? You're using it just like verify_cpu.S and this is
kinda verifying CPU so you could simply add the functionality there...

> @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
> +/*
> + *	sev_verify_cbit.S - Code for verification of the C-bit position reported
> + *			    by the Hypervisor when running with SEV enabled.
> + *
> + *	Copyright (c) 2020  Joerg Roedel (jroedel@suse.de)
> + *
> + * Implements sev_verify_cbit() which is called before switching to a new
> + * long-mode page-table at boot.
> + *
> + * It verifies that the C-bit position is correct by writing a random value to
> + * an encrypted memory location while on the current page-table. Then it
> + * switches to the new page-table to verify the memory content is still the
> + * same. After that it switches back to the current page-table and when the
> + * check succeeded it returns. If the check failed the code invalidates the
> + * stack pointer and goes into a hlt loop. The stack-pointer is invalidated to
> + * make sure no interrupt or exception can get the CPU out of the hlt loop.
> + *
> + * New page-table pointer is expected in %rdi (first parameter)
> + *
> + */
> +SYM_FUNC_START(sev_verify_cbit)
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT

Yeah, can you please use the callee-clobbered registers in the order as
they're used by the ABI, see arch/x86/entry/calling.h.

Because I'm looking at this and wondering are rsi, rdx and rcx somehow
live here and you're avoiding them...

Otherwise nice commenting - I like when it is properly explained what
the asm does and what it expects as input, cool.

Thx.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

  reply	other threads:[~2020-10-27 11:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-10-21 12:39 [PATCH v3 0/5] x86/sev-es: Mitigate some HV attack vectors Joerg Roedel
2020-10-21 12:39 ` [PATCH v3 1/5] x86/boot/compressed/64: Introduce sev_status Joerg Roedel
2020-10-26 18:27   ` Borislav Petkov
2020-10-28  8:23     ` Joerg Roedel
2020-10-28 16:50       ` Arvind Sankar
2020-10-28 16:55         ` Joerg Roedel
2020-10-21 12:39 ` [PATCH v3 2/5] x86/boot/compressed/64: Add CPUID sanity check to early #VC handler Joerg Roedel
2020-10-27 10:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2020-10-28  8:31     ` Joerg Roedel
2020-10-21 12:39 ` [PATCH v3 3/5] x86/boot/compressed/64: Check SEV encryption in 64-bit boot-path Joerg Roedel
2020-10-27 11:08   ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2020-10-28  8:38     ` Joerg Roedel
2020-10-27 11:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2020-10-21 12:39 ` [PATCH v3 4/5] x86/head/64: Check SEV encryption before switching to kernel page-table Joerg Roedel
2020-10-27 11:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2020-10-21 12:39 ` [PATCH v3 5/5] x86/sev-es: Do not support MMIO to/from encrypted memory Joerg Roedel
2020-10-27 11:26   ` Borislav Petkov

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