From: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>,
Martin Radev <martin.b.radev@gmail.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 5/5] x86/sev-es: Do not support MMIO to/from encrypted memory
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 17:46:59 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201028164659.27002-6-joro@8bytes.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201028164659.27002-1-joro@8bytes.org>
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
MMIO memory is usually not mapped encrypted, so there is no reason to
support emulated MMIO when it is mapped encrypted.
Prevent a possible hypervisor attack where a RAM page is mapped as
an MMIO page in the nested page-table, so that any guest access to it
will trigger a #VC exception and leak the data on that page to the
hypervisor via the GHCB (like with valid MMIO). On the read side this
attack would allow the HV to inject data into the guest.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 20 +++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index 4a96726fbaf8..0bd1a0fc587e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -374,8 +374,8 @@ static enum es_result vc_read_mem(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
return ES_EXCEPTION;
}
-static bool vc_slow_virt_to_phys(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
- unsigned long vaddr, phys_addr_t *paddr)
+static enum es_result vc_slow_virt_to_phys(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
+ unsigned long vaddr, phys_addr_t *paddr)
{
unsigned long va = (unsigned long)vaddr;
unsigned int level;
@@ -394,15 +394,19 @@ static bool vc_slow_virt_to_phys(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
if (user_mode(ctxt->regs))
ctxt->fi.error_code |= X86_PF_USER;
- return false;
+ return ES_EXCEPTION;
}
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(pte_val(*pte) & _PAGE_ENC))
+ /* Emulated MMIO to/from encrypted memory not supported */
+ return ES_UNSUPPORTED;
+
pa = (phys_addr_t)pte_pfn(*pte) << PAGE_SHIFT;
pa |= va & ~page_level_mask(level);
*paddr = pa;
- return true;
+ return ES_OK;
}
/* Include code shared with pre-decompression boot stage */
@@ -731,6 +735,7 @@ static enum es_result vc_do_mmio(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
{
u64 exit_code, exit_info_1, exit_info_2;
unsigned long ghcb_pa = __pa(ghcb);
+ enum es_result res;
phys_addr_t paddr;
void __user *ref;
@@ -740,11 +745,12 @@ static enum es_result vc_do_mmio(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
exit_code = read ? SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ : SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE;
- if (!vc_slow_virt_to_phys(ghcb, ctxt, (unsigned long)ref, &paddr)) {
- if (!read)
+ res = vc_slow_virt_to_phys(ghcb, ctxt, (unsigned long)ref, &paddr);
+ if (res != ES_OK) {
+ if (res == ES_EXCEPTION && !read)
ctxt->fi.error_code |= X86_PF_WRITE;
- return ES_EXCEPTION;
+ return res;
}
exit_info_1 = paddr;
--
2.28.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-10-29 2:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-10-28 16:46 [PATCH v4 0/5] x86/sev-es: Mitigate some HV attack vectors Joerg Roedel
2020-10-28 16:46 ` [PATCH v4 1/5] x86/boot/compressed/64: Introduce sev_status Joerg Roedel
2020-10-28 17:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-10-29 19:17 ` [tip: x86/seves] " tip-bot2 for Joerg Roedel
2020-10-28 16:46 ` [PATCH v4 2/5] x86/boot/compressed/64: Add CPUID sanity check to early #VC handler Joerg Roedel
2020-10-28 17:15 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-10-29 19:17 ` [tip: x86/seves] x86/boot/compressed/64: Sanity-check CPUID results in the " tip-bot2 for Joerg Roedel
2020-10-28 16:46 ` [PATCH v4 3/5] x86/boot/compressed/64: Check SEV encryption in 64-bit boot-path Joerg Roedel
2020-10-28 17:25 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-10-29 19:17 ` [tip: x86/seves] " tip-bot2 for Joerg Roedel
2020-10-28 16:46 ` [PATCH v4 4/5] x86/head/64: Check SEV encryption before switching to kernel page-table Joerg Roedel
2020-10-28 17:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-10-29 19:17 ` [tip: x86/seves] " tip-bot2 for Joerg Roedel
2020-10-28 16:46 ` Joerg Roedel [this message]
2020-10-28 17:31 ` [PATCH v4 5/5] x86/sev-es: Do not support MMIO to/from encrypted memory Tom Lendacky
2020-10-29 19:17 ` [tip: x86/seves] " tip-bot2 for Joerg Roedel
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