From: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com,
casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com,
gmazyland@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com
Cc: tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, sashal@kernel.org,
jmorris@namei.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH v6 7/8] IMA: add a built-in policy rule for critical data measurement
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2020 15:26:10 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201119232611.30114-8-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201119232611.30114-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
The IMA hook to measure kernel critical data, namely
ima_measure_critical_data(), could be called before a custom IMA policy
is loaded. Define a new critical data builtin policy to allow measuring
early kernel integrity critical data before a custom IMA policy is
loaded.
Add critical data to built-in IMA rules if the kernel command line
contains "ima_policy=critical_data".
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index c9e52dab0638..119604a3efa0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -206,6 +206,10 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
};
+static struct ima_rule_entry critical_data_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
+ {.action = MEASURE, .func = CRITICAL_DATA, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
+};
+
/* An array of architecture specific rules */
static struct ima_rule_entry *arch_policy_entry __ro_after_init;
@@ -228,6 +232,7 @@ __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata;
+static bool ima_use_critical_data __ro_after_init;
static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init;
static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
{
@@ -242,6 +247,8 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
ima_use_appraise_tcb = true;
else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0)
ima_use_secure_boot = true;
+ else if (strcmp(p, "critical_data") == 0)
+ ima_use_critical_data = true;
else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0)
ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = true;
else
@@ -875,6 +882,11 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules),
IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
+ if (ima_use_critical_data)
+ add_rules(critical_data_rules,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(critical_data_rules),
+ IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
+
ima_update_policy_flag();
}
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-11-19 23:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-11-19 23:26 [PATCH v6 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 1/8] IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 2/8] IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 5/8] IMA: extend policy to add data sources as a critical data measurement constraint Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 6/8] IMA: add support to critical data hook to limit data sources for measurement Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-19 23:26 ` Tushar Sugandhi [this message]
2020-11-20 14:30 ` [PATCH v6 7/8] IMA: add a built-in policy rule for critical data measurement Mimi Zohar
2020-11-20 23:33 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 8/8] selinux: measure state and hash of the policy using IMA Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-20 15:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-11-20 23:40 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2020-11-21 2:05 ` James Morris
2020-11-23 19:37 ` Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-20 12:46 ` [PATCH v6 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data Pavel Machek
2020-11-22 20:53 ` Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-22 21:00 ` Pavel Machek
2020-11-23 13:41 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-11-23 17:18 ` Pavel Machek
2020-11-23 19:49 ` Mimi Zohar
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