From: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT
AND 64-BIT)),
x86@kernel.org (maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)),
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] KVM: VMX: create vmx_process_injected_event
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 2021 12:53:05 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210106105306.450602-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210106105306.450602-1-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Refactor the logic that is dealing with parsing of an injected event to a
separate function.
This will be used in the next patch to deal with the events that L1 wants to
inject to L2 in a way that survives migration.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 4 +++
2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 75c9c6a0a3a45..dec6bc94a56b4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -6442,29 +6442,16 @@ static void vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
vmx->loaded_vmcs->entry_time));
}
-static void __vmx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- u32 idt_vectoring_info,
- int instr_len_field,
- int error_code_field)
+void vmx_process_injected_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ u32 idt_vectoring_info,
+ u32 instr_len,
+ u32 error_code)
{
- u8 vector;
- int type;
- bool idtv_info_valid;
-
- idtv_info_valid = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK;
-
- vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
- kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
- kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
-
- if (!idtv_info_valid)
- return;
+ u8 vector = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
+ u32 type = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_TYPE_MASK;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
- vector = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
- type = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_TYPE_MASK;
-
switch (type) {
case INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR:
vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = true;
@@ -6476,17 +6463,16 @@ static void __vmx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
vmx_set_nmi_mask(vcpu, false);
break;
case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION:
- vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len = vmcs_read32(instr_len_field);
+ vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len = instr_len;
fallthrough;
case INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION:
if (idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK) {
- u32 err = vmcs_read32(error_code_field);
- kvm_requeue_exception_e(vcpu, vector, err);
+ kvm_requeue_exception_e(vcpu, vector, error_code);
} else
kvm_requeue_exception(vcpu, vector);
break;
case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR:
- vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len = vmcs_read32(instr_len_field);
+ vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len = instr_len;
fallthrough;
case INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR:
kvm_queue_interrupt(vcpu, vector, type == INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR);
@@ -6496,6 +6482,34 @@ static void __vmx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
}
}
+static void __vmx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ u32 idt_vectoring_info,
+ int instr_len_field,
+ int error_code_field)
+{
+ u32 instr_len = 0, err_code = 0;
+ u32 type;
+
+ vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
+ kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
+ kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
+
+ if (!(idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK))
+ return;
+
+ type = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_TYPE_MASK;
+
+ if (idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK)
+ err_code = vmcs_read32(error_code_field);
+
+ if (type == INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION || type == INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR)
+ instr_len = vmcs_read32(instr_len_field);
+
+ vmx_process_injected_event(vcpu, idt_vectoring_info, instr_len,
+ err_code);
+}
+
+
static void vmx_complete_interrupts(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
__vmx_complete_interrupts(&vmx->vcpu, vmx->idt_vectoring_info,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
index 9d3a557949ac2..0c9ecada11025 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -336,6 +336,10 @@ bool vmx_interrupt_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
bool vmx_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked);
void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_process_injected_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ u32 idt_vectoring_info,
+ u32 instr_len,
+ u32 error_code);
struct vmx_uret_msr *vmx_find_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr);
void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp);
--
2.26.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-01-06 10:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-01-06 10:53 [PATCH 0/2] RFC: VMX: fix for disappearing L1->L2 event injection on L1 migration Maxim Levitsky
2021-01-06 10:53 ` Maxim Levitsky [this message]
2021-01-06 10:53 ` [PATCH 2/2] KVM: nVMX: " Maxim Levitsky
2021-01-06 18:17 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-07 2:38 ` Maxim Levitsky
2021-01-07 9:41 ` Maxim Levitsky
2021-01-06 18:07 ` [PATCH 0/2] RFC: VMX: " Sean Christopherson
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