[PATCH 5.12 051/242] drm/amd/display: Avoid HDCP over-read and corruption

Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-07-15T19:08:06Z

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

[ Upstream commit 06888d571b513cbfc0b41949948def6cb81021b2 ]

Instead of reading the desired 5 bytes of the actual target field,
the code was reading 8. This could result in a corrupted value if the
trailing 3 bytes were non-zero, so instead use an appropriately sized
and zero-initialized bounce buffer, and read only 5 bytes before casting
to u64.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/hdcp/hdcp1_execution.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/hdcp/hdcp1_execution.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/hdcp/hdcp1_execution.c
index 73ca49f05bd3..eb56526ec32c 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/hdcp/hdcp1_execution.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/hdcp/hdcp1_execution.c
@@ -29,8 +29,10 @@ static inline enum mod_hdcp_status validate_bksv(struct mod_hdcp *hdcp)
{
uint64_t n = 0;
uint8_t count = 0;
+ u8 bksv[sizeof(n)] = { };

- memcpy(&n, hdcp->auth.msg.hdcp1.bksv, sizeof(uint64_t));
+ memcpy(bksv, hdcp->auth.msg.hdcp1.bksv, sizeof(hdcp->auth.msg.hdcp1.bksv));
+ n = *(uint64_t *)bksv;

while (n) {
count++;
--
2.30.2