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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v0 03/12] x86/mce: Use mce_rdmsrl() in severity checking code
Date: Thu,  4 Nov 2021 15:40:26 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211104144035.20107-4-bp@alien8.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211104144035.20107-1-bp@alien8.de>

From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

MCA has its own special MSR accessors. Use them.

No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c     | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h | 2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c | 8 +++-----
 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
index 0dcd7ac7444c..c660008ccd4a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ void ex_handler_msr_mce(struct pt_regs *regs, bool wrmsr)
 }
 
 /* MSR access wrappers used for error injection */
-static noinstr u64 mce_rdmsrl(u32 msr)
+noinstr u64 mce_rdmsrl(u32 msr)
 {
 	DECLARE_ARGS(val, low, high);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h
index acd61c41846c..52c633950b38 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h
@@ -207,4 +207,6 @@ static inline void pentium_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs) {}
 static inline void winchip_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs) {}
 #endif
 
+noinstr u64 mce_rdmsrl(u32 msr);
+
 #endif /* __X86_MCE_INTERNAL_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
index bb019a594a2c..00e97ebbd94a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
@@ -288,8 +288,7 @@ static int error_context(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs)
 
 static int mce_severity_amd_smca(struct mce *m, enum context err_ctx)
 {
-	u32 addr = MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_CONFIG(m->bank);
-	u32 low, high;
+	u64 mcx_cfg;
 
 	/*
 	 * We need to look at the following bits:
@@ -300,11 +299,10 @@ static int mce_severity_amd_smca(struct mce *m, enum context err_ctx)
 	if (!mce_flags.succor)
 		return MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
 
-	if (rdmsr_safe(addr, &low, &high))
-		return MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
+	mcx_cfg = mce_rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_CONFIG(m->bank));
 
 	/* TCC (Task context corrupt). If set and if IN_KERNEL, panic. */
-	if ((low & MCI_CONFIG_MCAX) &&
+	if ((mcx_cfg & MCI_CONFIG_MCAX) &&
 	    (m->status & MCI_STATUS_TCC) &&
 	    (err_ctx == IN_KERNEL))
 		return MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
-- 
2.29.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-11-04 14:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-11-04 14:40 [PATCH v0 00/12] x86/mce: Correct the noinstr annotation Borislav Petkov
2021-11-04 14:40 ` [PATCH v0 01/12] x86/mce: Do not use memset to clear the banks bitmaps Borislav Petkov
2021-11-04 14:40 ` [PATCH v0 02/12] x86/mce: Remove function-local cpus variables Borislav Petkov
2021-11-04 14:40 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2021-11-04 14:40 ` [PATCH v0 04/12] x86/mce: Remove noinstr annotation from mce_setup() Borislav Petkov
2021-11-04 14:40 ` [PATCH v0 05/12] x86/mce: Allow instrumentation during task work queueing Borislav Petkov
2021-11-09 22:05   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-11-04 14:40 ` [PATCH v0 06/12] x86/mce: Prevent severity computation from being instrumented Borislav Petkov
2021-11-04 14:40 ` [PATCH v0 07/12] x86/mce: Mark mce_panic() noinstr Borislav Petkov
2021-11-04 14:40 ` [PATCH v0 08/12] x86/mce: Mark mce_end() noinstr Borislav Petkov
2021-11-04 14:40 ` [PATCH v0 09/12] x86/mce: Mark mce_read_aux() noinstr Borislav Petkov
2021-11-04 14:40 ` [PATCH v0 10/12] x86/mce: Move the tainting outside of the noinstr region Borislav Petkov
2021-11-04 14:40 ` [PATCH v0 11/12] x86/mce: Mark mce_timed_out() noinstr Borislav Petkov
2021-11-04 14:40 ` [PATCH v0 12/12] x86/mce: Mark mce_start() noinstr Borislav Petkov
2021-11-09 22:08 ` [PATCH v0 00/12] x86/mce: Correct the noinstr annotation Peter Zijlstra

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