From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.14 04/15] fortify: Explicitly disable Clang support
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2021 18:38:37 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211119171443.866051513@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211119171443.724340448@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
commit a52f8a59aef46b59753e583bf4b28fccb069ce64 upstream.
Clang has never correctly compiled the FORTIFY_SOURCE defenses due to
a couple bugs:
Eliding inlines with matching __builtin_* names
https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=50322
Incorrect __builtin_constant_p() of some globals
https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=41459
In the process of making improvements to the FORTIFY_SOURCE defenses, the
first (silent) bug (coincidentally) becomes worked around, but exposes
the latter which breaks the build. As such, Clang must not be used with
CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE until at least latter bug is fixed (in Clang 13),
and the fortify routines have been rearranged.
Update the Kconfig to reflect the reality of the current situation.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAKwvOd=A+ueGV2ihdy5GtgR2fQbcXjjAtVxv3=cPjffpebZB7A@mail.gmail.com
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
security/Kconfig | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -191,6 +191,9 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
config FORTIFY_SOURCE
bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
+ # https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=50322
+ # https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=41459
+ depends on !CC_IS_CLANG
help
Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-11-19 17:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-11-19 17:38 [PATCH 5.14 00/15] 5.14.21-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-19 17:38 ` [PATCH 5.14 01/15] Revert "drm: fb_helper: improve CONFIG_FB dependency" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-19 17:38 ` [PATCH 5.14 02/15] Revert "drm: fb_helper: fix " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-19 17:38 ` [PATCH 5.14 03/15] KVM: Fix steal time asm constraints Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-19 17:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2021-11-19 17:38 ` [PATCH 5.14 05/15] block: Add a helper to validate the block size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-19 17:38 ` [PATCH 5.14 06/15] loop: Use blk_validate_block_size() to validate " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-19 17:38 ` [PATCH 5.14 07/15] bootconfig: init: Fix memblock leak in xbc_make_cmdline() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-19 17:38 ` [PATCH 5.14 08/15] Bluetooth: btusb: Add support for TP-Link UB500 Adapter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-19 17:38 ` [PATCH 5.14 09/15] parisc/entry: fix trace test in syscall exit path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-19 17:38 ` [PATCH 5.14 10/15] PCI/MSI: Destroy sysfs before freeing entries Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-19 17:38 ` [PATCH 5.14 11/15] PCI/MSI: Deal with devices lying about their MSI mask capability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-19 17:38 ` [PATCH 5.14 12/15] PCI: Add MSI masking quirk for Nvidia ION AHCI Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-19 17:38 ` [PATCH 5.14 13/15] perf/core: Avoid put_page() when GUP fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-19 17:38 ` [PATCH 5.14 14/15] thermal: Fix NULL pointer dereferences in of_thermal_ functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-19 17:38 ` [PATCH 5.14 15/15] Revert "ACPI: scan: Release PM resources blocked by unused objects" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-19 19:02 ` [PATCH 5.14 00/15] 5.14.21-rc1 review Florian Fainelli
2021-11-19 23:18 ` Shuah Khan
2021-11-19 23:57 ` Fox Chen
2021-11-20 4:40 ` Daniel Díaz
2021-11-20 16:52 ` Guenter Roeck
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