[PATCH 5.15 173/207] x86/entry: Add a fence for kernel entry SWAPGS in paranoid_entry()

Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-12-06T15:53:56Z

From: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>

[ Upstream commit c07e45553da1808aa802e9f0ffa8108cfeaf7a17 ]

Commit

18ec54fdd6d18 ("x86/speculation: Prepare entry code for Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations")

added FENCE_SWAPGS_{KERNEL|USER}_ENTRY for conditional SWAPGS. In
paranoid_entry(), it uses only FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY for both
branches. This is because the fence is required for both cases since the
CR3 write is conditional even when PTI is enabled.

But

96b2371413e8f ("x86/entry/64: Switch CR3 before SWAPGS in paranoid entry")

changed the order of SWAPGS and the CR3 write. And it missed the needed
FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY for the user gsbase case.

Add it back by changing the branches so that FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
can cover both branches.

[ bp: Massage, fix typos, remove obsolete comment while at it. ]

Fixes: 96b2371413e8f ("x86/entry/64: Switch CR3 before SWAPGS in paranoid entry")
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211126101209.8613-2-jiangshanlai@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 16 +++++-----------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index e38a4cf795d96..f1a8b5b2af964 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -890,6 +890,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry)
.Lparanoid_entry_checkgs:
/* EBX = 1 -> kernel GSBASE active, no restore required */
movl $1, %ebx
+
/*
* The kernel-enforced convention is a negative GSBASE indicates
* a kernel value. No SWAPGS needed on entry and exit.
@@ -897,21 +898,14 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry)
movl $MSR_GS_BASE, %ecx
rdmsr
testl %edx, %edx
- jns .Lparanoid_entry_swapgs
- ret
+ js .Lparanoid_kernel_gsbase

-.Lparanoid_entry_swapgs:
+ /* EBX = 0 -> SWAPGS required on exit */
+ xorl %ebx, %ebx
swapgs
+.Lparanoid_kernel_gsbase:

- /*
- * The above SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 macro doesn't do an
- * unconditional CR3 write, even in the PTI case. So do an lfence
- * to prevent GS speculation, regardless of whether PTI is enabled.
- */
FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
-
- /* EBX = 0 -> SWAPGS required on exit */
- xorl %ebx, %ebx
ret
SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_entry)

--
2.33.0