From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-audit@redhat.com,
keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com,
penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com,
sds@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v32 06/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2022 15:53:01 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220202235323.23929-7-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220202235323.23929-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
lsmblob instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmblob_init()
fills the blob with the value of the old secid, ensuring that
it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of
the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(),
will be converted to use the blob structure later in the series.
At the point the use of lsmblob_init() is dropped.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
---
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
security/security.c | 5 +++--
4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 1edbb362ee72..3b734ebb7e29 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1946,7 +1946,7 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
@@ -1963,7 +1963,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob,
+ u32 field, u32 op,
struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index de75bd6ad866..15cd4fe35e9c 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1337,6 +1337,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
+ struct lsmblob blob;
pid_t pid;
u32 sid;
@@ -1369,8 +1370,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_str) {
security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
- f->type, f->op,
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(
+ &blob, f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index f1c26a322f9d..e5ca89160b5f 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -468,6 +468,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
unsigned int sessionid;
if (ctx && rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
@@ -678,8 +679,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
- f->op, &f->lsm_rules);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
+ f->type, f->op,
+ &f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
@@ -692,15 +695,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_str) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
- name->osid,
+ &blob,
f->type,
f->op,
&f->lsm_rules);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
if (security_audit_rule_match(
- n->osid, f->type, f->op,
+ &blob, f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules)) {
++result;
break;
@@ -710,7 +715,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Find ipc objects that match */
if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
break;
- if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules))
++result;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 29fc50322b1f..5b2dc867c57d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2683,7 +2683,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
}
}
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
@@ -2694,7 +2694,8 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
continue;
if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
continue;
- rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
+ rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ field, op,
&lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
if (rc)
return rc;
--
2.31.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-02-03 0:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20220202235323.23929-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2022-02-02 23:52 ` [PATCH v32 00/28] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:52 ` [PATCH v32 01/28] integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:52 ` [PATCH v32 02/28] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:52 ` [PATCH v32 03/28] LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2022-03-04 10:48 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-03-04 19:14 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:52 ` [PATCH v32 04/28] LSM: provide lsm name and id slot mappings Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:53 ` [PATCH v32 05/28] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2022-02-02 23:53 ` [PATCH v32 07/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:53 ` [PATCH v32 08/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:53 ` [PATCH v32 09/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:53 ` [PATCH v32 10/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:53 ` [PATCH v32 11/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_current_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:53 ` [PATCH v32 12/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:53 ` [PATCH v32 13/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:53 ` [PATCH v32 14/28] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:53 ` [PATCH v32 15/28] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:53 ` [PATCH v32 16/28] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:53 ` [PATCH v32 17/28] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:53 ` [PATCH v32 18/28] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:53 ` [PATCH v32 19/28] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:53 ` [PATCH v32 20/28] binder: Pass LSM identifier for confirmation Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:53 ` [PATCH v32 21/28] LSM: Extend security_secid_to_secctx to include module selection Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:53 ` [PATCH v32 22/28] Audit: Keep multiple LSM data in audit_names Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:53 ` [PATCH v32 23/28] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:53 ` [PATCH v32 24/28] Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records Casey Schaufler
2022-03-03 23:36 ` Paul Moore
2022-03-04 2:13 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-03-04 14:43 ` Paul Moore
2022-02-02 23:53 ` [PATCH v32 25/28] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:53 ` [PATCH v32 26/28] Audit: Add record for multiple object " Casey Schaufler
2022-03-03 23:36 ` Paul Moore
2022-03-04 1:26 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:53 ` [PATCH v32 27/28] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler
2022-02-02 23:53 ` [PATCH v32 28/28] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
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