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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.10 37/43] arm64: proton-pack: Report Spectre-BHB vulnerabilities as part of Spectre-v2
Date: Wed,  9 Mar 2022 17:00:10 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220309155900.313421352@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220309155859.239810747@linuxfoundation.org>

From: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>

commit dee435be76f4117410bbd90573a881fd33488f37 upstream.

Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can
make use of branch history to influence future speculation as part of
a spectre-v2 attack. This is not mitigated by CSV2, meaning CPUs that
previously reported 'Not affected' are now moderately mitigated by CSV2.

Update the value in /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
to also show the state of the BHB mitigation.

Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h |    2 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c  |   36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h
@@ -29,4 +29,6 @@ bool has_spectre_v4(const struct arm64_c
 void spectre_v4_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused);
 void spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation(struct task_struct *tsk);
 
+enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void);
+
 #endif	/* __ASM_SPECTRE_H */
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
@@ -94,14 +94,39 @@ static bool spectre_v2_mitigations_off(v
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static const char *get_bhb_affected_string(enum mitigation_state bhb_state)
+{
+	switch (bhb_state) {
+	case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
+		return "";
+	default:
+	case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
+		return ", but not BHB";
+	case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
+		return ", BHB";
+	}
+}
+
 ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 			    char *buf)
 {
+	enum mitigation_state bhb_state = arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state();
+	const char *bhb_str = get_bhb_affected_string(bhb_state);
+	const char *v2_str = "Branch predictor hardening";
+
 	switch (spectre_v2_state) {
 	case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
-		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+		if (bhb_state == SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED)
+			return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+
+		/*
+		 * Platforms affected by Spectre-BHB can't report
+		 * "Not affected" for Spectre-v2.
+		 */
+		v2_str = "CSV2";
+		fallthrough;
 	case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
-		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Branch predictor hardening\n");
+		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: %s%s\n", v2_str, bhb_str);
 	case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
 		fallthrough;
 	default:
@@ -787,3 +812,10 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task
 		return -ENODEV;
 	}
 }
+
+static enum mitigation_state spectre_bhb_state;
+
+enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void)
+{
+	return spectre_bhb_state;
+}



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-03-09 16:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-09 15:59 [PATCH 5.10 00/43] 5.10.105-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 01/43] x86,bugs: Unconditionally allow spectre_v2=retpoline,amd Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 02/43] x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 03/43] x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 04/43] Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 05/43] x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 06/43] x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 07/43] x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 08/43] x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 09/43] x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 10/43] ARM: report Spectre v2 status through sysfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 11/43] ARM: early traps initialisation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 12/43] ARM: use LOADADDR() to get load address of sections Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 13/43] ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 14/43] ARM: include unprivileged BPF status in Spectre V2 reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 15/43] arm64: cputype: Add CPU implementor & types for the Apple M1 cores Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 16/43] arm64: Add Neoverse-N2, Cortex-A710 CPU part definition Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 17/43] arm64: Add Cortex-X2 " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 18/43] arm64: Add Cortex-A510 " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 19/43] arm64: Add HWCAP for self-synchronising virtual counter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 20/43] arm64: add ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 sys register Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 21/43] arm64: cpufeature: add HWCAP for FEAT_AFP Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 22/43] arm64: cpufeature: add HWCAP for FEAT_RPRES Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 23/43] arm64: entry.S: Add ventry overflow sanity checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 24/43] arm64: spectre: Rename spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 25/43] arm64: entry: Make the trampoline cleanup optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.10 26/43] arm64: entry: Free up another register on kptis tramp_exit path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.10 27/43] arm64: entry: Move the trampoline data page before the text page Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.10 28/43] arm64: entry: Allow tramp_alias to access symbols after the 4K boundary Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.10 29/43] arm64: entry: Dont assume tramp_vectors is the start of the vectors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.10 30/43] arm64: entry: Move trampoline macros out of ifdefd section Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.10 31/43] arm64: entry: Make the kpti trampolines kpti sequence optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.10 32/43] arm64: entry: Allow the trampoline text to occupy multiple pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.10 33/43] arm64: entry: Add non-kpti __bp_harden_el1_vectors for mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.10 34/43] arm64: entry: Add vectors that have the bhb mitigation sequences Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.10 35/43] arm64: entry: Add macro for reading symbol addresses from the trampoline Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.10 36/43] arm64: Add percpu vectors for EL1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.10 38/43] KVM: arm64: Allow indirect vectors to be used without SPECTRE_V3A Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.10 39/43] arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.10 40/43] KVM: arm64: Allow SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 to be discovered and migrated Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.10 41/43] arm64: Use the clearbhb instruction in mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.10 42/43] arm64: proton-pack: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.10 43/43] ARM: fix build error when BPF_SYSCALL is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 21:10 ` [PATCH 5.10 00/43] 5.10.105-rc1 review Daniel Díaz
2022-03-09 23:56 ` Fox Chen
2022-03-10  3:56 ` Samuel Zou
2022-03-10  4:19 ` Florian Fainelli
2022-03-10  6:22 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-03-10 11:35 ` Pavel Machek

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